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Preface
Cet ouvrage conclut un chapitre important de ma vie qui aura débuté en fin de Rhéto il
y a douze ans, période de doute et d'incertitude partagée par beaucoup quant à la voie à
prendre. En définitive, j'aurai eu la chance de mener des études qui m'auront permis de
m'épanouir et de devenir un économiste.
En 2011, je démarrais une thèse sous la supervision de Romain Houssa. Je tiens à le
remercier tout particulièrement pour ses conseils avisés et son soutien tout au long de
ma thèse. Ses qualités de chercheur et de superviseur ont indubitablement contribué à la
bonne réalisation de cet ouvrage. Les différentes tâches dont il m'a chargé ont également
été extrêmement formatrices pour moi, tant sur le plan professionnel que personnel.
Je tiens à remercier mon second superviseur, Hans Dewachter. Je préfèrerai le terme
anglais advisor  plutôt que superviseur dans la mesure où la guidance dont j'ai bénéficié
de sa part a été particulièrement bénéfique. Je voudrais aussi souligner la patience dont il
a fait preuve avec moi, n'hésitant pas à libérer son emploi du temps chargé pour discuter
de mes projets.
Mes remerciements vont également aux membres du Jury, Jean-Marie Baland, Lasse
Bork, Stephan Fahr et Paul Reding qui ont su proposer, chacun selon leurs expertises
respectives, des suggestions importantes pour améliorer la qualité de mon travail. Je leur
dois beaucoup.
J'ai également eu la chance d'être assistant pour toute une série de cours qui m'ont
permis de transmettre l'économie et les méthodes quantitatives à plusieurs générations
d'étudiants. Cette expérience a été pour moi exceptionnellement enrichissante dans la
mesure où elle m'a permis d'assouvir ce besoin de transmettre le savoir. Je souhaiterais
ainsi remercier Alain de Crombrugghe, Vincenzo Verardi et Jean-Yves Gnabo. Les assister
a été un réel plaisir pour moi.
J'adresse également un clin d'÷il à Marcus Dejardin pour sa présence inconditionnelle
au sixième étage et sa bonne humeur, de jour comme de nuit, en semaine comme les
samedis. Rarement ai-je eu un voisinage si agréable.
La réalisation d'une thèse est loin d'être un travail individuel, et j'ai eu la chance
de pouvoir compter sur des collègues compétents, ouverts, et humains. Dans l'euphorie
comme dans le doute, ils ont incontestablement été là aux moments nécessaires. Nos
activités extra-curriculaires ensemble nous ont certainement permis de tisser des liens forts
et durables. Dès lors, chers collègues, chers amis, cher Jolan, je vous remercie du fond du
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c÷ur. Jolan mérite assurément une mention particulière car je dois en effet beaucoup à
mon compagnon d'échappée dont les connaissances n'ont d'égal que sa disponibilité et sa
volonté d'aider. Réduire à un seul mot mes collègues, ancien collègues et amis Nicolas,
Alexandre et Jérôme ne leur rendrait pas justice et je préfère leur adresser ma gratitude
dans un autre contexte que cette préface.
Je tiens à saluer également Pierrette pour avoir avoir été mon fil d'Ariane dans le
dédale des différentes versions du règlement doctoral.
Enfin, je ne peux conclure cette préface qu'en adressant mon entière gratitude à ma
famille : mes parents Dominique et Daniel, ma s÷ur Carole, son compagnon Denis et la
petite Johanne. Leur persévérance à essayer de comprendre ce que j'ai fait, durant sept
ans, là-haut dans le 622 de la Fac Eco, a été une bouffée d'oxygène pour moi. Je suis
aussi infiniment redevable envers Laura qui a eu la patience de supporter la distance, et
l'intelligence de comprendre à quels moments je voulais son avis, ou le mien dans une
autre voix que la mienne.
Heidelberg, le 14 Septembre 2018.
Introduction
In recent years, a lot of effort has been devoted to the understanding of the economic con-
tents of sovereign yields. In a market with free capital mobility, interest rates perfectly
represent agents expectations of the future state of the economy. Indeed, economic agents
want to smooth their consumption over time and this is only possible with an efficient
capital market where savers and borrowers can meet. The resulting interest rate therefore
represents the anticipated path of the economy for the years to come. The yield curve
 the function that links the interest rate to the time to maturity of a bond  summa-
rizes this information and is therefore a useful tool for policymakers and investors alike.
Understanding the drivers of the yield curve is thus particularly relevant as a forecasting
device. Additionally, it is possible to decompose the yield curve into several components.
Under the assumption that all arbitrage opportunities have been exhausted, long-term
interest rates are risk-adjusted expectations of the future short-term interest rate. There
is thus, for every long-term interest rate, a risk premium that rewards investors for holding
a riskier asset, the long-term bond, over a safe short-term bond.
The yield curve, and in particular the sovereign yield curve, also serves as a basis
for the construction of derivatives. In recent years, the size of the derivatives market has
exploded, from $80 trillion in 1999 to $544 trillion in 2016. Interest rates derivatives alone
represent around 75% of the total derivatives market. Moreover, government bonds of
short maturity are usually considered a safe asset such that investment strategies trading
risk for yield consider the yield on the short government bond as their benchmark.
The study of the yield curve is also particularly relevant when it comes to debt man-
agement policies. In effect, governments make an active decision regarding the maturity
of the debt they emit on the primary market. Changing the maturity composition of the
debt has an influence on the entirety of the yield curve. For instance, in times of distress,
governments have an incentive to emit more short-term debt than long-term debt so as
not to lock-in a high interest rate for a long period of time. The increased supply of
short-term debt therefore increases the short-end of the sovereign yield curve, provided
investors do not see long- and short-term debt as perfect substitutes. The substitution
between long and short rates may even cause the long-term yield to decrease. Monetary
authorities may also play a decisive role in the relative supply and demand of sovereign
bonds. For instance, central banks may buy government bonds of long maturities and sell
3
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short-term debt they currently hold as an attempt to bring down long-term yields.1
The three reasons presented above point to the marked time-varying properties of the
yield curve and its contents. Even more importantly, we have seen that the environment
in which market participants, governments, and central banks operate is changing over
time, sometimes drastically. It seems therefore incompatible to apply analysis tools that
do not take these structural changes into account. Consequently, the argument calls for
the development and the application of models that can accommodate changes in the
economic environment.
The literature has identified several fundamental drivers of the sovereign yield curve,
and I will focus on three key concepts: inflation, economic activity, and fiscal policy. First,
if inflation rises, a nominal bond that pays a constant coupon becomes less profitable
because the real return drops. As a consequence, the demand for such a bond decreases,
driving down its price. As the price drops, its yield mechanically goes up. The yield on the
bond has to rise in order to protect investors against the loss of purchasing power caused
by inflation. Second, as the economy slows down, individuals and firms are reluctant
to make risky consumption decisions or investments. Firms postpone investment and
hiring decisions, driving down their share prices because expected profits and dividends
are low. As households save more, they are inclined to buy government bonds that offer a
higher degree of certainty and security. This behavior pushes the demand for government
bonds upwards such that their price increases, driving down their yields. As the economy
recovers, inflationary pressures may rise, but at the same time, investment opportunities
broaden: with larger expected profits and dividends, investors will choose to invest in the
stock market rather than in government bonds. Hence, bond yields rise. Third, the degree
of indebtedness of the government may have an influence on the yields. In a market for
loanable funds framework, firms and the government compete for available funds from
savers. Increasing the sovereign debt level therefore puts pressure on the equilibrium
interest rate. At the same time, potential inflationary pressures may surface because the
government may temporarily support aggregate demand beyond the equilibrium. Fear
of default are also likely to play a role. If the government borrows too much, investors
may cast doubt on the capacity of the government to repay its debt burden in the future.
This element touches the notion of the sustainability of fiscal policy. If investors fear that
the government will have difficulty meeting its debt obligations, they will reduce their
demand for the government debt, driving up the interest rate on government debt.
The aim of this thesis is to identify the most relevant determinants of government bond
yields and to quantify their effect on the shape of the yield curve. Such an information is
relevant for investors and policymakers because it helps them forecast the most likely path
of economic indicators relevant for their decisions. The present essays address the general
theme of the determinants of sovereign interest rates along three dimensions disseminated
1The US Federal Reserve resorted to such a policy in 1961, dubbed Operation Twist, and between
2011 and 2012.
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in three self-contained chapters. As a consequence, the reader may encounter repetitions
of concepts. An introductory chapter details the economic mechanisms that are at play
in the first two chapters of this dissertation.
In the first chapter of this study, Romain Houssa and I revisit the question whether
larger deficits necessarily cause higher sovereign yields. Neither the theoretical nor the
empirical literature has reached a consensus in this respect and it seemed important to us
to contribute to the empirical debate by applying a dynamic model that accommodates
the time-varying properties of debt sustainability. We start by identifying periods in
the United States history when fiscal policy was deemed unsustainable. Such a policy is
unsustainable if it does not aim at the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio. We have
reasons to believe that investors will interpret this signal and revise their expectations
concerning inflation developments, prospects of economic growth and potentially default
risk. As a second step, we model the fiscal policy rule in conjunction with the monetary
policy rule that links the monetary policy rate to inflation and economic activity. Modeling
the two processes jointly is crucial because the literature has suggested that the two
authorities strategically interact (Leeper and Leith, 2016). The regimes identified lead to
different predictions concerning the likely path of the price level and sovereign interest
rates. We endeavor to test such predictions by introducing a fiscal policy shock into the
model. We also track this shock for 16 quarters to appraise the dynamic responses of
inflation, output growth and interest rates on government debt. The local projections
method developed by Jordà (2005) are particularly well suited for this purpose given its
flexibility and parsimony. We find that US sovereign yields do respond differently whether
fiscal policy is considered unsustainable or sustainable. Typically, sovereign yields rise by
about 70 basis points at a 6 quarters horizon in the sustainable regime while they decrease
by about 35 basis points in the sustainable regime. The sustainability premium therefore
amounts to one percentage point.
The second chapter of this manuscript, written with Hans Dewachter and Romain
Houssa, extends the first chapter along different dimensions. The first improvement is
certainly the structural approach to the question whether fiscal policy affects the shape
of the yield curve. As mentioned earlier, the yield curve contains information about the
expectations of economic agents. In particular, the slope of the yield curve  the differ-
ence between long-term rates and short-term rates  is closely linked to economic growth
prospects. Indeed, a positive slope is usually associated to a positive outlook while a neg-
ative slope often indicates an upcoming recession. The second major modification lies in
the way fiscal policy shocks are identified. In this chapter, we identify fiscal policy shocks
based on economic theory rather than with statistical tools. The fiscal policy shock, in
other words the public demand shock, is identified with sign restrictions together with
an aggregate supply and a private demand shock. We develop a regime-dependent term
structure model where yield curve factors are supplemented by macroeconomic factors.
The latter are unspanned by the yield curve: they do not explain the cross-section of
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yields but do affect their time series properties. The regimes are taken from the Sustain-
able/Unsustainable dichotomy developed in the first chapter. This model allows us to
appraise the responses of the elements that constitute the shape of the yield curve to a
fiscal policy shock depending on the timing of the shock, whether it takes place in the sus-
tainable or unsustainable regime. Results show that while the level of the yield curve rises
in both regimes, fiscal shocks in times of unsustainable fiscal policy significantly decrease
the slope of the yield curve. The term structure model also allows us to quantify the risk
premium embedded in the yield curve. Our specification shows that the risk premium in
the unsustainable regime is consistently larger than in the sustainable regime.
The third chapter is single-authored and focuses on the European bond markets. In
this chapter, I investigate whether the macroeconomic and financial situation of neighbor-
ing countries have a decisive influence on the domestic bond market. The European debt
crisis of 2011 revealed salient disparities in the resilience of core and periphery countries
to adverse shocks. Of the 76 credit ratings changes recorded by Standard and Poor's,
Moody's and Fitch Ratings between the first quarter of 1999 and the last quarter of 2013,
42 took place between the first quarter of 2011 and the last quarter of 2013. Periphery
countries were mostly affected, sometimes beyond what could be expected from the de-
terioration of their fundamentals. I was therefore interested to measure this contagion in
the context of a monetary union. To this aim, I devised a spatial Vector Autoregression
that is able to capture contemporaneous as well as delayed spatial transmission of shocks
from one country of the eurozone to the other members. The model encompasses both
macroeconomic and financial variables where the transmission mechanism relies on the
exposure of domestic banks to foreign sovereign debt. Banks adjust their loans to the
domestic private sector depending on the value of the assets they hold. If the value of
their sovereign debt holdings dramatically drop, the banks will reduce their lending to
the domestic private sector, thus slowing down the domestic economy. The model shows
that not all neighbors are created equal. Unexpected increases in the country's sovereign
spread that originate from core countries, whether big or small in terms of economic size,
do not propagate beyond their borders. On the contrary, shocks that originate from pe-
riphery countries do transmit to other periphery countries, but not to core countries. I
find that on average, 10 and 15% of domestic sovereign spreads can be explained by global
factors and neighboring countries, respectively. These shares are even larger in the case
of periphery countries, indicating that domestic policies in periphery countries can only
have a limited impact on their sovereign spreads.
Chapter 1
Methodological chapter
1.1 Introduction
The aim of this introductory chapter is to provide the reader with an analysis of hand-
picked influential pieces of research that shaped the way macroeconomics addresses the
role of debt for the determination of sovereign interest rates and other macroeconomic
aggregates, namely inflation and capital formation. This chapter will cover three topics.
The first topic will deal with the role of debt in a general equilibrium model. I will show in
that section how the early literature has accommodated debt issuance in their models and
I will emphasize the consequences, or absence thereof, of this choice. In the second section
I will explain how strategic interactions between the fiscal and monetary authorities can
deviate from the conclusions of Robert Barro regarding the neutrality of fiscal policy for
aggregate demand, interest rates, and capital formation. The emergence of the Fiscal
Theory of the Price Level provides interesting insights in this respect. The third section
discusses how the maturity structure can be used to smooth the effects of fiscal policy
over time. Finally, I address some limitations of the literature I have presented in Section
1.5.
1.2 The role of debt in a general equilibrium model
I set out first to describe in details the money growth model of Feldstein (1980) who
extends to three assets the model of Tobin (1965) where households could only choose
to invest in capital or money. In Feldstein's model, however, households face a broader
choice of assets: tangible capital, money and government bonds. This essentially turns
out to be a question of optimal allocation of assets based on their respective returns.
The paper investigates the consequences of an increased deficit on the inflation rate and
capital formation. How the deficit is financed, either by printing money or by borrowing,
is important. Feldstein then endeavors to analyze four possible predictions from his model
regarding the responses of capital formation, inflation and the interest rate to an increased
7
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deficit. He concludes that larger deficits cause higher inflation and/or lower capital in the
economy. At the same time, it is likely that interest rates increase as a result. At any
rate, the investment in tangible capital is lower than in an economy with only capital
because part of the households' savings is not invested in real assets but in money and
bonds.
I will now cover the main assumptions of the model before turning to its four predic-
tions. The model economy is growing at a constant rate n with a constant labor force
such that the economy is at full employment at every period. The economy faces a twice-
differentiable concave production function f where the only producing factor is capital
k.
There is no central bank in the model, and the government acts as the sole provider
of money m. The government thus has three sources of financing: taxes, seignoriage and
debt. The government can incur a deficit d, either by printing money and/or by issuing
bonds b.
Households can hold three types of assets: real capital, bonds and money, where the
sum of the last two corresponds to the total liabilities of the government. The respective
return on those assets is the net real return on capital, the real yield on government
bonds and zero. The net real return on capital is given by the gross marginal product
of capital minus taxes levied on it, taking into account the depreciation rule based on
nominal investment. The marginal tax rate is given by τ . The real yield on government
bond is the difference between the nominal interest rate on debt i and the inflation rate
pi.
At steady state, the real per capita growth rate of money is given by the sum of the
inflation rate and the growth rate of the population. A similar expression is given for
bonds. The real per capita deficit is given by the product of the nominal growth rate of
the economy, inflation and growth of population, and the real per capita liabilities of the
government, money and bonds.
The demand for bonds over capital depends negatively on the net real return on
capital, positively on the interest rate paid on debt and on inflation. Inflation increases
the demand for bonds because higher inflation reduces the net real return on capital. The
demand for money increases with output but decreases with the interest rate.
The saving rate is a constant share of the real per capita disposable income. As
mentioned earlier, government consumption is financed through taxes, money and bonds
creation. The share of government consumption over output γ is assumed to be constant
such that if expenditures devoted to interest payments increases, other types of expendi-
tures decrease. As such, this implies that the government does not use expenditures as
an instrument of fiscal policy. To close the model, all savings must be absorbed in either
real capital accumulation, additional real money or real bonds.
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Four equations summarize the model:

Deficit d = (pi + n) (m+ b)
Money Demand m = L (i) ∗ f (k)
BondDemand b = β
[
(1− τ) f ′ (k) + (1− τλ) pi − i] ∗ k
Savings allocation σ = n∗[k+m+b]
[(1−γ)∗f(k)+n∗m+n∗b]
(1.1)
The government therefore has four instruments at its disposal for the conduct of fiscal
policy: (i) the size of the deficits d, (ii) the share of government spending in national
income γ, (iii) the nominal interest rate on bonds i and (iv) the tax rates on capital
income τ and λ where λ is linked to the depreciation rules in the tax code. Values of n,
i, d, γ, τ and λ determine pi, k, m and b.
Five main results can be derived from the comparative statics of the model above.
First, the government could increase deficits without causing a change in inflation or
capital intensity if it can vary all of the remaining instruments. In other words, the
government can neutralize the adverse effects of deficits on inflation and capital intensity
if it reduces the share of government spending in national income.
However, the model assumes that γ, τ and λ are fixed. An increased deficit therefore
leads to higher inflation, reduced capital intensity, or both. I now turn to the comparative
statics.
The second result that emerges from the model is the following: an increase in the
deficit causes an increase in inflation and a decrease in capital intensity, provided that
the real interest rate is maintained or, in other words, if the nominal interest rate moves
in lockstep with inflation. To see this, we need to totally differentiate the system in (1.1)
subject to the restriction that di
dpi
= 0. Feldstein proceeds in two steps. He first shows
that higher inflation increases the demand for bonds but reduces the demand for money.
If the first effect dominates the second, larger deficits unambiguously reduce k. Since ∂K
∂d
and∂pi
∂d
are of opposite signs, the higher deficit also causes higher inflation.
The third result deals with the effect of larger deficits on the nominal interest rate.
Following an increase in the deficit, the nominal interest rate has to increase if we want
to keep inflation constant. The first equation in (1.1) states that a stable inflation rate
requires that m+b increases with the deficit. This larger m+b must be absorbed without
larger growth rates of m or b. Therefore, there needs to be a substitution of money for
bonds such that it leaves inflation constant. The way to achieve this is to increase the
nominal interest rate such that the increased demand for bonds matches the decreased
demand for money. In practice, an increase in the ratio b
m
means that liquidity in that
economy decreases and, therefore, the interest rate rises. Notice also that this higher
nominal rate induces a reduction in the capital intensity and a smaller real income.
Fourth, a larger deficit may not cause a lower capital intensity if both inflation and
the nominal interest rate rise. The absence of modification in the capital intensity in
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this economy is equivalent to saying that the variation of the sum of money and bonds
must be zero. If ∆(m + b) = 0, then larger deficits can only be financed through larger
inflation (first equation of (1.1)). Higher inflation decreases the demand for money and
raises the demand for bonds. However, with a constant value of k and i, higher inflation
would decrease the demand for bonds. The nominal interest rate must therefore increase
to support the demand for bonds.
Finally, it can be shown that a deficit financed through debt emission decreases k and
increases pi under the restriction that money demand is completely inelastic.
One important assumption that Feldstein makes, though in a footnote, is that gov-
ernment bonds are considered net wealth. That is, households do not consider the cor-
responding future taxes that they and the future generations will have to bear in order
to pay the principal and interests on these bonds. This directly refers to the article
of Robert Barro (1974) that addresses what was later called the Ricardian equivalence.
The Ricardian equivalence, as it was presented, states that the way larger government
spending is financed, either through debt or taxes, is irrelevant as optimizing households
will internalize that a larger debt today will eventually have to be repaid in the future.
Agents therefore increase their savings today in such a way that aggregate demand is
left unchanged and public consumption completely crowds out private consumption. As
aggregate demand does not change, neither do the interest rate and the capital intensity
in the economy. The Ricardian equivalence is, in a sense, the public finances equivalent
of the irrelevancy theorem of Modigliani-Miller (1958).
Let me now describe in more details the setup of Barro's article. An economy is
populated with n people at each generation. Each individual lives only through two
generations such that, at each moment in time, there are only two generations alive.
Individuals have the same preferences and productivity within each generation and across
generations. Future generations' utility matters for the current generation, however. The
young generation works and derives a wage w from it. There is no technological change
over time nor is there any change in the wage rate. Assets holdings take the form of
physical capital and government bonds. The return on both types of assets is given
by the real rate of return r such that both assets are perfect substitutes. Bonds in
particular can be bought while young. The interests are paid during the same period
while the principal is repaid next period. Production is given by a constant-returns-
to-scale production function with capital and labor as inputs. In equilibrium, marginal
products of capital and labor are equal to r and w, respectively.
Barro argues that as long as there exists an operative intergenerational transfer (posi-
tive bequests or gifts) across generations, there exists no wealth effect of government debt.
The line of argumentation of Barro is as follows. He starts by describing the mechanism
through which government debt can have wealth effects, provided households perceive
larger government debt as net wealth. If they do, consumption increases and savings
decrease. This increased consumption pushes Aggregate Demand upwards which leads to
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a higher interest rate on the market of loanable funds. Finally, this higher interest rate
reduces capital accumulation (Modigliani, 1961). Second, he recalls that taxes will have
to be levied in the future to finance the interest payments of the newly incurred debt such
that the direct positive wealth effect will be (partially) offset. Bailey (1962, pp. 75-77)
even suggests that these future taxes will completely offset the new deficit:
"It is possible that households regard deficit financing as equivalent to tax-
ation. The issue of a bond by the government to finance expenditures involves
a liability for future interest payments and possible ultimate repayment of
principal, and thus implies future taxes that would not be necessary if the
expenditures were finances by current taxation. [...] If future tax liabilities
implicit in deficit financing are accurately foreseen, the level at which total tax
receipts are set is immaterial; the behavior of the community will be exactly
the same as if the budget were continuously balanced."
There is, however, three possible reasons why the offset of future tax liabilities will only be
partial, which, essentially, leads to a positive net present value of debt. The first argument
suggests that the horizons for tax liabilities and interest payments do no coincide such
that the two streams of equal face value have different net present values. Typically,
with finite lives, the horizon for tax liabilities is shorter (Thompson: 1967, p. 1200).
The second argument considers that different discount rates should be applied to the two
streams of value that share the same horizon (Mundell, 1971). Lastly, as is clear from
the quote above, the decisions of households who are not able to perfectly forecast and
anticipate the extent of future tax liabilities, or those who may not have access to the
financial intermediation system may generate wealth effect of government debt.
The argument of Barro regarding the wealth-neutrality of government bonds hinges on
the existence of an interior solution regarding the consumption, savings and bequest quan-
tities. Positive values of debt b with a tax levied on future generations make the current
generation go insolvent by leaving a debt to its descendant. However, if a member of the
old generation had already chosen an optimal consumption, savings and bequests before
the new bond issue, it means that the new bond issue does not change the opportunity
set. As a consequence, adjusted positive bequests remain optimal. Indeed, the agent has
decided that leaving positive bequests was optimal. The corollary to the previous argu-
ment means that shifting resources from future generations to her own is sub-optimal.
In conclusion, the net present value of of current and future consumption and attained
utility will be unaffected, provided that shifts in the debt level will be fully compensated
by shifts in bequests. If, however, a member of the old generation is at a corner solution
such that bequests for the future generation is zero, then an increase in government debt
changes the opportunity set such that the agent will increase her consumption today while
potentially leaving zero bequest for the future generation. In that case, government bonds
generate wealth effects, similarly to the mechanism set out by Modigliani (1961).
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Barro does not therefore completely rule out the possibility of wealth effects of govern-
ment debt but rather shows that a small set of assumptions can prevent such a situation.
Namely, it only requires that current generations care about future generations and that
the possibility of bequests exist.
Several criticisms have been addressed to the Ricardian equivalence theorem. Barro
(1996) lists the principal: finiteness of life, imperfections of private credit markets, un-
certainty about the incidence of future taxes and other variables, and the distortionary
effects of taxes.1 The last point is of particular interest as it hints towards the fact that,
since taxes are distortionary, the timing of such taxes may be an additional instrument in
the fiscal authority toolkit. Governments, upon incurring new deficits, also have to decide
upon a tax schedule for the financing of the deficit. This tax schedule may be spread out
across different sources (labor income, consumption, etc) and across time. People want to
earn labor income when taxes on labor are low, and consume when taxes on consumption
are low. Barro therefore concludes that  variations in the anticipated timing of these
levies alters the intertemporal allocations of work effort and consumption. As a con-
sequence, adjustments to the timing of taxes and the source of tax receipts may be the
solution to an optimal-tax problem.
Absent from these models, however, is the conduct of monetary policy as a distinct
authority. The following section deals with this issue and models the determination of
the price level as a joint process between a monetary and a fiscal authority. The effect on
the interest rates, however, is not central to the analysis, although parts of it hint at this
issue.
1.3 Emergence of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
In 1991, Eric Leeper suggested an alternative view regarding the drivers of the price
level. His claim was that the monetary and fiscal authorities should not be treated as
acting separately but that they jointly determine the price level. Considering strategic
interactions between the two entities allows for a richer set of possible equilibria. In
particular, he surveys two cases that lead to different conclusions regarding equilibrium
prices and interest rates. In the first case, the monetary authority is active and the
fiscal authority is passive. That is to say, fiscal policy acts in such a way that future
taxes accommodate debt shocks such that fiscal disturbances do not influence inflation
nor the interest rate. These conclusions do not contradict the Ricardian equivalence
theorem. In this type of setup, the actions of the fiscal authority are subordinated to the
actions of the monetary authority. In the second case, however, the monetary authority
is passive and the fiscal authority is active. With an accommodative monetary authority,
incurred deficits generate inflation now or in the future. If the government wants the
households to hold the additional nominal debt, it needs to increase the nominal interest
1Barro covers most of the rebuttals of Ricardian equivalence in his 1989 paper.
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rate. Substitution of assets from money to bonds reduces the liquidity in the economy.
Such monetary contractions require higher money growth in the future (interest payments
and principal) such that inflation increases. Fiscal shocks can therefore have an impact
on inflation.
More recently, Leeper and Leith (2016), based on the works of early fiscal theorists
(Leeper (1991), Woodford (1996), Sims (1994) among others) provide an in-depth analysis
of the two cases highlighted above. In particular, they stress that the fiscal theory of the
price level (FTPL) should be not be seen as a substitute for conventional views on the
determinants of the price level, but rather as a complement (Leeper and Leith: 2016, p.
106):
Macroeconomists have an unfortunate history of arguing over whether mon-
etary or fiscal policy in the primary force behind inflation. [...] [T]he fiscal
theory and the quantity theory [...] are parts of a more general theory of
price-level determination in which monetary and fiscal policies always inter-
act with private-sector behavior to produce the equilibrium aggregate level of
prices. Within a certain parametric family of monetary and fiscal rules, the
two seemingly distinct perspectives arise from different regions of the policy
parameter space, but there is no sense in which one view is right and the
other is wrong. Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether we can dis-
cern whether and under what circumstances one view is the dominant factor
in inflation dynamics.
Leeper and Leith (2016) consider dynamically efficient models with monetary policy, taxes,
government expenditures, a budget identity and a maturity structure for nominal gov-
ernment debt in order to detect the differences that can arise between the Monetary and
Fiscal dominance regimes. They assert that there are four features that can emerge from
those small models in the Fiscal dominance regime. First, surprise changes in inflation
and bond prices serve as revaluation tools for the stabilization of nominal government
debt. The distinction between real and nominal debt is crucial for the FTPL. On the one
hand, real debt is a claim to real goods. If the government wishes to purchase those real
goods, it can only do so through taxation. The government therefore has to levy enough
taxes to finance its outstanding debt such that its budget constraint is satisfied. On the
other hand, nominal debt is a claim to future currency. The government can therefore
either levy taxes to acquire this currency, or print new currency if it is allowed to do so.
When all the debt of the government is nominal, the government does not face a budget
constraint as changes in the price level and bond prices will vary so as to stabilize the
real level of debt. Second, some combinations of parameters of the monetary and fiscal
policy rules permit nominal government debt expansions or increases in the monetary
policy interest rate instrument to generate an increase in nominal private wealth, nominal
Aggregate Demand and the price level. Third, expectations of both monetary and fiscal
policies matter to determine equilibrium prices and quantities. Fourth, debt management
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in the form of choosing optimally the maturity structure of nominal debt matters for
equilibrium dynamics. This last point amounts to say that the maturity structure could
be considered as an additional instrument for policymakers.
Most of the mechanisms at play can be found in a simple endowment economy where
households maximize their intertemporal consumption, have access to nominal assets
(bonds) and where they interact with the government in the form of lump-sum taxes and
transfers. There are two authorities in this economy: a central bank and a government.
The first authority sets its policy instrument, the nominal interest rate, as a proportion
of the deviation of inflation from its steady state value. The second authority sets its
policy instrument, in the form of budget surpluses, as a proportion of the deviation of
debt to its steady state value. In equilibrium, the net present value of outstanding debt
is given by the discounted future surpluses. The relevant discount factor is given by the
real interest rate. Importantly, the two authorities will interact because the government
issues nominal debt. As a consequence, the price level will matter for both authorities
when computing the equilibrium. As such, the central bank can either respond strongly
or weakly to inflation developments and the government can either respond strongly or
weakly to debt developments.
Leeper (1991) and Leeper and Leith (2016) show that only two combinations out of
the four possible yield a determinate equilibrium. For the rest of the explanation, I will
follow their terminology and call the combination of strong response to inflation and strong
response to debt Regime M while Regime F pertains to a weak response to inflation and
a weak response of surpluses to debt.2
1.3.1 Regime M
One may erroneously think that the conduct of monetary policy is not influenced by
fiscal behavior because fiscal aggregates do not enter the policy rule of the central bank.
However, fiscal aggregates may have a definitive influence on the price level. In the model
of Leeper (1991), the central bank reacts to inflation developments.
In this regime, the government reacts strongly to debt developments (in other words,
passive fiscal policy) in an environment where the central bank reacts strongly to inflation
(active monetary policy). Following an increase in the real debt, the price level will
increase. This increase will trigger a strong reaction of the central bank such that, by
increasing its nominal interest rate more than inflation, the net real interest rate will
increase. At the same time, future surpluses will increase sufficiently so as to cover the
increased debt service and part of the principal repayment. Real debt will therefore return
to its steady state value.
To see clearly the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies in this regime,
imagine that there is a surprise monetary expansion at time t such that it raises the
2Alternatively, regime M has been referred to as Monetary dominance and Regime F as Fiscal domi-
nance in the literature.
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price level Pt. The contemporaneous surplus is not affected but bond holders experience
a negative wealth effect. Indeed, in real terms, their holdings are now worth less. As a
consequence, the budget constraint of the government needs to be adapted because the
market value of its debt issued at time t has declined. If the fiscal authority reduces
surpluses by more than the increase in the real rate, the drop in future surpluses has
to match the drop in value of debt holdings. This thus eliminates the negative wealth
effect on households wealth to make monetary policy expansionary. In conclusion, fiscal
policy acts in such a way that it eliminates any monetary effects on households wealth.
The corollary to this proposition is the Ricardian equivalence. A decrease in surpluses of
one unit (an increase in the deficit) is financed by raising the nominal debt by Pt units.
Under the special case that the central bank pegs the interest rate, real debt increases by
Pt units. Future surpluses have to increase such that the net present value of those future
surpluses equals Pt units.
Notice also that if fiscal policy does not produce sufficient future fiscal adjustments,
households wealth would decline, and so would Aggregate Demand. This would therefore
counteract the inflationary pressure of monetary expansion. In conclusion, two active
authorities do not produce a stable equilibrium.
1.3.2 Regime F
Following an increased deficit financed by debt, nominal households wealth increases due
to future income derived from interest payments. Provided that there is not enough tax
increases to completely offset the rise in their wealth, households increase their demand
for goods, which raises the price level now and in the future. If surpluses do not ad-
just strongly to real debt, then the debt indefinitely grows, which is inconsistent with
equilibrium properties. Monetary policy therefore needs to ensure that real debt is stabi-
lized through non-explosive interest payments. Monetary policy needs to allow surprise
inflation to revalue government debt. To understand the mechanism, let me consider
the special case where the central bank pegs the nominal rate, that is, the central bank
does not respond at all to inflation. A one-time decrease in the time-t surplus financed
by new debt increases the price level at time t. Doing so, it keeps the real debt fixed,
but a higher price level depresses the value of outstanding debt such that it reduces real
interest payments. In conclusion, real debt remains at steady-state. If we assume that
the central bank responds weakly to inflation, real debt is still stabilized but inflation can
now persist. The persistence of the inflation response increases with the strength of the
monetary authority, provided it can still be categorized as passive.
1.3.3 Unstable combination of monetary and fiscal stances
When fiscal policy is active, monetary policy cannot be active at the same time. If this
were the case, then an increased deficit that increases the price level would have the effect
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that the nominal interest rate set by the central bank increases more than proportionally.
This would result in larger interest payments paid to the households that hold the nominal
debt. Their wealth would increase, acting positively on Aggregate Demand and inflation,
to which the central bank has to respond more than proportionally. This would lead to a
spiral effect inconsistent with equilibrium.
1.4 The role of the maturity structure
The case for the role of the maturity structure hinges on the type of regime one considers.
To see this, let us consider bonds with maturities ranging from one period to an infinity of
period. Without loss of generality, let us consider that the maturities decay at a constant
rate ρ. The parameter ρ therefore controls the average maturity of the debt. If ρ = 0,
then all the debt is a one-period debt. If ρ = 1, then the debt takes the form of perpetual
bonds. For the rest of this section, I will consider an intermediate case where 0 < ρ < 1.
The bonds are priced according to a no-arbitrage condition.
Regime M produces results similar to Barro's conclusion where the maturity of the
debt has no influence. In this regime, if the central bank engages in a contractionary
policy, the one-period nominal interest rate rises which, in turn, reduces the price of
time-t bonds because the net present value of the bond has decreased. Through the
no-arbitrage condition, prices of longer maturities bonds also decline. However, future
surpluses offset this decrease in bond prices because household will raise their demand
for the bonds in order to use the higher interest payments to finance the future surpluses.
The government can thus trade smaller surpluses for shorter maturities. In other words,
the government can achieve any path of the nominal term structure and, additionally
expected inflation, by adjusting the maturity structure (Leeper and Leith, 2016 ; p. 21).
In general, one may reformulate the argument of Thompson (1967) highlighted in
Section 1.2 in a different way so that maturity can still play a role in regime M: if the
stream of surpluses is fixed, shortening the maturity (reducing ρ) will increase the net
present value of nominal debt and increase the price level.
Regime F offers a new channel through which fiscal policy generates wealth effects:
bond prices that reflect expected inflation over the maturity of the bond. With one-period
bonds, the rise in the price level following a decrease in surpluses is direct and only lasts
one period. With m-periods bonds, the rise in inflation is spread out across all bonds
up to maturity m via a decrease in their prices. How this rise in inflation is distributed
across contemporaneous and future inflation depends on the maturity structure of the
debt and the parameters in the monetary policy rule. The maturity structure is a tool
to shift inflation intertemporally. The total inflationary effect of deficits is the same,
but the maturity structure can control which, from current or future inflation, will take
most of the change. In essence, the maturity parameter ρ acts as an additional discount
factor in the bond valuation equation. If the average maturity of the debt increases,
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Figure 1.1  Responses to an increase in transfers under various monetary
policy rules and maturity structures
Note: the figure reports the impulse responses from inflation, debt-to-GDP ratio and the nominal rate
from an endowment shock in the calibrated model of Leeper and Leith (2016). The values for the
calibrations are found under the third row of plots. The solid line corresponds to a one-period debt, the
long dashed line pertains to a debt maturity of 1-year and finally, the dashed and dotted line refers to a
5-years debt.
inflation can be smoothed out on longer horizons such that the contemporaneous rise in
inflation decreases at the expense of higher inflation in the future. As a consequence,
the price of the short-term bonds will decrease more the longer the debt maturity. As
the central bank increases its responsiveness to inflation (while still remaining passive),
inflation persistence increases and the drop in bond prices is more severe.
I reproduce in Figure 1.1 the responses of inflation, the debt-to-GDP and the nominal
interest rate following an increase in transfers in the endowment economy presented by
Leeper and Leith (2016) under their calibration.3
The graph should be read according to two dimensions: the responsiveness of the cen-
3In their calibration, they assume that the steady-state ratio of transfers-to-GDP is 18%, government
spending is 21% of GDP and taxes represent 41% of GDP such that the annualized steady-state ratio of
debt-to-GDP is 50%. Transfers follow an autoregressive process with persistence 0.9 and variance 0.005
of steady-state value.
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tral bank to inflation developments and the average maturity of the debt issued by the
government. In the first column, the central bank pegs the nominal rate such that there
is no difference across maturity structures. With this type of monetary policy reaction
function, the total adjustment occurs through surprise inflation in the first period. As
the central bank becomes less passive (columns 2 to 4), the persistence of the responses
of inflation and the nominal rate increases. With one-period debt, the initial inflation
response is the same than in the first column because it is the jump in inflation consistent
with the reduction in the net present value of real debt that follows a reduction in sur-
pluses. Inflation, however, remains higher for a prolonged period of time, although only
the initial jump in inflation is needed to reduce the value of debt. The rise in the nominal
rate is also persistent. A sustained increase in the nominal rate reduces bond prices such
that the bond valuation equation is satisfied at lower initial inflation rates. With longer
maturities, it is the inflation path over the life of the bond, rather than the initial drop,
that permits the reduction of the value of debt. As a consequence of sustained inflation,
bondholders obtain lower real returns.
In conclusion, the present value of a positive transfer shock must be financed with a
path of inflation that combines current and future inflation surprises where future inflation
surprises are embedded in bond prices to ensure solvency of the government.
1.5 Limitations of the literature presented
The literature presented above suffers from a few limitations that are worth mentioning.
The first is that most of the models presented explicitly or implicitly assume that the
economy is at full-employment or equilibrium. Out-of-equilibrium scenarios are not pre-
sented. The Keynesian view (Keynes, 1936), on the other hand, proposes that Aggregate
Demand support by means of larger deficits be expansionary without causing inflation, or
very little. This situation happens when the Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
schedules intersect in a portion of the AS curve that is (near-) flat.
The second limitation is probably the consideration that taxes are lump-sum. Dis-
tortionary taxes may provide richer conclusions. In particular, Traum and Yang (2011)
develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model whose parameter values can
either be compatible with regime M or regime F and present an unusual conclusion. In
regime M, the degree with with which the central bank reacts to output is crucial. If the
central bank responds strongly to inflation but relatively weakly to output, a reduction in
taxes will cause the interest to fall. The argument is as follows: a reduction in the income
tax rate increases labor and output because households want to supply more labor. As
labor income increases, so do savings, which leads to higher capital accumulation, raises
the marginal product of labor and the demand for labor. This in turn lowers the marginal
cost of intermediate products. With a constant markup, goods-producing firms can lower
their prices such that the general price level falls. Since, in their model, the monetary au-
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY ON SOVEREIGN YIELDS 19
thority responds more to falling prices than to the increased output, the nominal interest
rate falls.
Thirdly, early applications of the FTPL to open economies have not produced convinc-
ing results. Leeper and Leith (2016) present such limitations. In particular, the existence
of multiple monetary and fiscal authorities spread across as many countries may lead to
indeterminacy concerning the price level in the countries considered. Those early mod-
els also had the undesirable property that a single country, even small in comparison to
others, determines the price level for all.
Hubbard (2012) lists additional determinants of sovereign interest rates, although his
focus is rather on the crowding out of private investment. In a demand and supply of
loanable funds framework, he claims that private sector debt could also crowd out private
investment as they compete for loanable funds. Indeed, the choice between equity or debt
is intrinsically linked to the prevailing risk aversion such that variations in risk aversion
may cause interest rates to change. Hubbard (2012) also points to the role of open-market
operations by the central bank to determine sovereign interest rates. Typically, if bonds
of different maturities are not perfect substitutes, the central bank may alter the shape of
the yield curve by targeting specific maturities. A sustained demand for the bonds would
therefore increase their price and decrease their yield.
In an open-economy framework and using the national savings identity, Elmendorf and
Mankiw (1999) show that public dis-saving must be absorbed either by increased private
saving, a reduction in private investment or by a decrease in net foreign investments. If the
increase in private saving exactly matches the public dis-saving, we reach the Ricardian
conclusion. If, however, private saving does not rise enough to offset the increased deficit,
private investment and/or net foreign investments must come into play. If investment
decreases for a prolonged period of time, it lowers the capital stock. In turn, a lower
capital stock depresses output and income. At the same time, less capital available in the
economy raises the marginal product of capital such that the interest rate rises. With small
adjustments, one can approximate the current account by the net foreign investments such
that the drop in net foreign investments both reduces the capital income of residents, but
it also turns the current account in negative territory. With a subsequent trade deficit,
the currency appreciates, reducing the competitiveness of the domestic economy in the
global market.
1.6 Conclusion
An important consideration regarding the conclusions of the effects of fiscal policy on the
economy is probably the question of where in the business cycle such policies take place.
During periods of full- (or near full) employment, fiscal policy may generate inflation now
and/or in the future. In contrast, Keynesian economics tells us that if the Aggregate Sup-
ply schedule is flat or near flat at the intersection with the Aggregate Demand schedule,
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an increase in the deficit (either increased government spending or reduced taxes) boosts
Aggregate Demand such that output increases without causing too much inflation.
The Ricardian equivalence has been put to the test numerous times, both theoretically
and empirically under the criticism that crucial assumptions are not realistic. Empirically,
the evidence is mixed (see the reviews of Barth et al., 1991 and Gale and Orszag, 2003).
Very recently, for instance, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2017) empirically find that an
increase in the deficit when the state of the economy is low decreases the nominal interest
rate.
In this respect, the emergence of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level, although under
heavy criticisms as well, serves as a complement to the monetarist view of price level
determination.4 The fiscal theory also stresses that it is the interaction between the mon-
etary and fiscal policy that produce stable equilibria such that one cannot be considered
without the other.
Finally, the fiscal theory also addresses the role of the maturity structure to smooth
the effects of fiscal policy across time. Typically, a longer debt maturity generates more
persistent inflation and a larger drop in bond prices after an increased deficit.
4Leeper and Leith (2016, p. 4):
Accusations against the fiscal theory include: it confuses equilibrium conditions with
budget constraints; it violates Walras' law; it treats private agents and the government
differently; it is merely an equilibrium selection device; it is little more than a retread of
Sargent and Wallace's (1981) unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.
Chapter 2
Macroeconomic Policy Interactions and
the Effects of Fiscal Stimulus
2.1 Introduction
Following the 2007 financial and economic crisis, many governments from advanced coun-
tries have implemented large-scale fiscal stimulus packages. For instance, the size of the
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) totaled $803 billion in addition
to the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 which had a budget of $152 billion. Similarly, the
European Commission launched the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) in De-
cember 2008 for a budget of ¿200 billion. These programs were mainly financed through
increased government deficits and debt emissions, leading to a surge in the debt stock
of the countries involved. As such, renewed concerns about the sustainability of public
finances emerged. Indeed, too large a debt raises doubts about the capacity of the govern-
ment to repay it. As a consequence, investors require a premium for holding more risky
sovereign bonds (e.g., Arellano, 2018 ; Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981).1 Equally important,
theory predicts that larger deficits may generate larger inflation such that investors may
require a compensation against the loss of value of their investment across time.
Although the preceding mechanisms would suggest a positive impact of deficits on
bond yields, we need to isolate its impact from other drivers. Indeed, deficits are likely to
rise in recessions due to the effect of automatic stabilizers. At the same time, the central
bank often reduces its policy rate in recessions in order to reduce households savings and
increase firms production and investment. As a consequence, the overall behavior of yields
1Fiscal preferences influence interest rate dynamics through the present value of deficit channel. As
the present value of deficit increases, the present value of the consumption available to economic agents
rises if prices and interest rates do not increase. In turn, it creates a substantial wealth effect and
aggregate demand rises in consequence. To offset the discrepancy between the present value of current
government debt and expected government budget surpluses, prices and/or inflation have to adjust in
order to restore the equality between the present value of government liabilities and the present value of
expected surpluses. Unexpected inflation reduces the real value of debt issued in nominal terms. A drop
in the real interest rate paid on government liabilities could also allow the government to service its debt
with smaller primary surpluses (Woodford, 1996).
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in this scenario is ambiguous.
Additionally, the impact of deficit shocks on yields will depend on the intrinsic be-
havior of demand expressed by bond investors. For instance, if these investors have other
motives to hold US bonds (e.g. accumulation of reserves by foreign officials to stabilize
their exchange rate, or saving motives) a deficit shock may even coincide with decreasing
yields rather than increasing. In line with this intuition, a number of studies show that
international bond demand pressure has significantly reduced the US government long
term yields in recent years (e.g. Warnock and Warnock, 2009 ; Beltran et al. 2013).
This background suggests no clear theoretical relationship between government deficit
and interest rates.2
Empirical studies are also inconclusive concerning the relationship between the gov-
ernment fiscal position and sovereign yields. For instance, a number of studies using linear
regression models have not been able to identify any effect of fiscal positions on interest
rates and attribute their results to the Ricardian equivalence theorem (see, for instance,
Evans, 1985 ; Evans, 1987 ; Evans and Marshall, 2007). Another part of the literature
have used a similar methodology but focused on projected deficits did find positive and
significant impacts of deficit on long-term yields (Laubach, 2009). Studies that employ
nonlinear techniques also find a positive impact of government deficit on yields (Hamilton,
1988 ; Dillen, 1997 ; Ardagna, 2004 ; Gruss and Mertens, 2009 ; Dewachter and Toffano,
2012. Specifically, Dewachter and Toffano employ a Markov-switching model to identify
two fiscal policy regimes: an active regime when debt is unsustainable; and a passive
regime when debt is sustainable. They show that the active fiscal policy regime carries a
significantly positive premium over the passive regime for US long-term sovereign yields.
The aim of this chapter is to answer the question whether larger deficits always cause
higher interest rates. Is is it possible that this relationship depends on the context in
which larger deficits are incurred? In particular, do the sustainability of fiscal policy
and the stance of monetary policy towards inflation matter to appraise the relationship
between deficits and bond yields?
To answer these questions, we proceed in two steps. First, we identify different fis-
cal and monetary policy regimes in the United States between 1967Q1 and 2012Q1 with
Markov-switching regressions of simple feedback rules: a deficit rule and Taylor (1993)
rule. These rules model the dynamic behavior of the fiscal and monetary instruments,
respectively. We distinguish a Sustainable vs. Unsustainable fiscal policy regime and a
2The impact of government deficit on interest rates is also analyzed from the saving-investment identity.
In particular, if a rise in government deficit implies a decline in national saving then the interest rate must
increase in order to maintain the saving-investment identity (Buiter, 1977). However, if private saving
increases by the same amount as government deficit (in anticipation of a future tax burden) then the
interest rate will not respond to the increase in government deficit. This is the essence of the Ricardian
equivalence theorem presented in Barro (1974). In the same way, if capital inflows are infinitely elastic,
then a rise in government deficit will leave the interest rate unaffected but it will cause an appreciation
of the domestic currency. Additionally, the interest rate will respond very little to the worsening of the
fiscal position if the central bank is ready to buy government debt.
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Hawkish vs. Dovish monetary policy regime. The sustainable fiscal policy regime is con-
sistent with debt-stabilization, as opposed to the unsustainable fiscal policy regime. The
Hawkish monetary regime corresponds to a regime where monetary policy actively com-
mits to respond more than proportionally to inflation developments whereas the Dovish
regime corresponds to a regime where the Taylor principle does not hold. We first esti-
mate the fiscal policy alone before estimating the two rules jointly. The joint estimation
gives us four macroeconomic regimes that correspond to different theoretical properties of
the fiscal-monetary policy-mix. The combination Sustainable-Hawkish yields Ricardian
predictions and corresponds to the common assumption present in Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium models. The combination Unsustainable-Dovish corresponds to
what the literature has called the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (Woodford, 1996 ;
Chung, Davig and Leeper, 2004 ; Davig and Leeper, 2007 ; Davig and Leeper, 2011).
The combinations Sustainable-Dovish and Unsustainable-Hawkish give an indeterminate
equilibrium or an explosive path of inflation inconsistent with equilibrium, respectively.
Second, we estimate the dynamic responses of output growth, inflation, the primary deficit
and nominal yields to a fiscal policy shock with local projections. The methodology eas-
ily accommodates regime-specific dynamics. We provide responses from the single regime
(linear) estimation, the two-regimes case and the four-regimes case.
In this chapter, we extend the framework of Dewachter and Toffano (2012) along
four dimensions. First, we study the response of yields, inflation and output to deficit
shocks to provide more insight about the channels of transmission. Second, we use local
projections rather than iterating forward a univariate AR(1) process. Local projections
are essentially direct forecasts with varying horizons of the variables of interest. Third,
we report the effective response to a shock rather than the difference in responses between
regimes. Fourth, we also analyze to which extent the stance of monetary policy affects
the transmission of fiscal shocks.
Results can be summarized as follows. First, macroeconomic policies exhibit several
switches during our sample. The identified periods and their statistical properties corre-
spond to notable economic events and are corroborated by a narrative approach. Fiscal
policy has been unsustainable in the years 1973-75, 2002-3 and 2008-10. These periods
correspond to sharp drops in tax revenues or large increases in government spending.
Monetary policy has been active during two long periods: 1980-1990 and 1994-2000. The
first episode of Hawkish policy corresponds to the Volcker-Greenspan Chairmanships of
the Fed while the second refers to the fight against inflationary pressures in the mid-90s
documented by Goodfriend (2002). Second, regime-dependent impulse responses provide
interesting results. Deficit shocks in the unsustainable regime are inflationary and stimu-
late output. Yields also increase. At the 5 quarters horizon, output, inflation and yields
have increased by 40, 50 and 30 basis points, respectively. We should also note that short
maturities react much more strongly than long yields such that the slope of the yield
curve, that is the difference between long and short rates, decreases. In the sustainable
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regime, the responses of output, inflation and yields are negative and the slope of the yield
curve increases. The difference between the two regimes amounts to 110 basis points for
the 5-years yields. Third, the stance of monetary policy has an influence on the effects
of deficit shocks on yields and output. For the output in particular, a dovish monetary
policy stimulates the economy but an unsustainable fiscal policy provides an additional
boost. For the yields, the FTPL and Indeterminate regimes exhibit a Slope effect (i.e.
short-term yields react more strongly than long yields) of deficit shocks while the Ricar-
dian regime exhibit a Level effect (i.e. the magnitude of the responses of yields of different
maturities is similar).
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The following section describes
the methodology. In particular, we cover the identification of fiscal and monetary policy
regimes with the Markov-switching framework. We also describe in more details the local
projections technique and how we apply it to the research question. The core results
can be found in Section 2.3. This section presents the macroeconomic regimes identified
and their regime-switching properties as well as the dynamic responses of output growth,
inflation, the primary deficit ratio and nominal yields to deficit shocks conditioned on the
different regimes. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Markov-switching models
Regime-switching models assumes that the Data Generating Process is nonlinear and
consists of a mixture of distributions from which the observed realization is drawn. In
other words, observations alternate between discrete states of the world. The aim of
regime-switching regressions is therefore to determine, at each point in time, which is the
most likely regime from which the observation is drawn. Such models have been put forth
by Hamilton (1989) and are now frequent in the literature.
For the majority of the applications, normality of the distribution is assumed in the
different regimes. The optimization relies on the Expectations-Maximization (EM) algo-
rithm. The intuition is as follows: the states of the Markov chain are unobserved and are
considered as missing data. Those missing data are then replaced by their conditional
expectations in the complete data likelihood function. The procedure is as follows:
1. Arbitrarily choose the starting values of the parameters to be estimated
2. Expectations-step: compute the conditional expectations of the missing data as they
appear in the complete data log-likelihood function
3. Maximization-step: maximize the likelihood function with respect to the set of
parameters to be estimated. Missing data are substituted by their conditional ex-
pectations
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4. Assess the convergence according to a certain criterion and repeat steps 2 and 3
until convergence is reached.
The optimization produces three outputs. The first is the set of parameters that govern
each regime. The second is the probability, at each point in time, of being in a particular
regime. The third outcome is the transition probabilities. The latter governs the transition
of one regime to and from another.
In the current application, we use a first-order Markov-switching process with transi-
tion matrix P , whose elements are pij = Pr[st+1 = i |st = j ]. For two states, P takes the
form:
P =
[
p11 1− p22
1− p11 p22
]
(2.1)
Elements on the diagonal of Equation (2.1) give the persistence of the regime. The
higher the value, the more persistent is the regime. The average duration of the regime
is given by 1
(1−pii) .
2.2.2 Macroeconomic policy rules
2.2.2.1 Fiscal policy rule
We derive the fiscal policy rule and the deficit consistent with debt-stabilization that
will be useful to identify the fiscal policy regimes. We start with the standard debt-
accumulation equation:3
Bt = Bt−1 + ibt ∗Bt−1 +Dt (2.2)
where Bt is public debt, it is the average nominal interest rate on bonds and Dt is the
primary deficit. Note that positive values of the primary deficit are associated to deficits,
negative values to surpluses.
Expressing (2.2) as a ratio of current GDP yields:
Bt
Yt
=
(
1 + ibt
) Bt−1
Yt
+
Dt
Yt
=
(
1 + ibt
)
(1 + ζt)
Bt−1
Yt−1
+
Dt
Yt
(2.3)
or expressed in ratios,
bt =
(
1 + ibt
)
(1 + ζt)
bt−1 + dt (2.4)
where ζt is the growth rate of output between t-1 and t.
An economy naturally decreases its debt ratio if the nominal growth rate is positive
and larger than the average interest rate paid on debt.
Stabilizing the debt ratio implies bt = bt−1 in (2.4) such that we can express the
primary deficit required to stabilize the debt ratio as:
3This equation neglects the seignoriage term which is marginal in the US case.
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dSt =
(
ζt − ibt
1 + ζt
)
bt−1 (2.5)
The above expression can be understood as the deficit that the economy can afford,
given its output growth and interests paid on its debt. Debt stabilization is achieved
either through reduced deficits if ibt > ζt or surpluses if i
b
t < ζt.
The fiscal policy rule takes the following form (e.g. Favero and Monacelli, 2005 ;
Dewachter and Toffano, 2012):
dt = ρ
sFt dt−1 +
(
1− ρsFt
)
d¯t + σ
sF 
sFt
t (2.6)
d¯t = c
sFt + γs
F
t
y (yt − y∗t ) + δs
F
t dSt (2.7)
where dt is the government primary deficit-to-GDP ratio and corresponds to the fiscal
policy instrument, ρ is the smoothing parameter in the deficit dynamics and captures
inertia in fiscal policy, d¯t is the target deficit and t is the error term. In Equations (2.6)
and (2.7), c, γ, and δ are parameters, yt stands for real GDP and y∗t is the real potential
output. The difference (yt − y∗t ) is the output gap and controls for the counter-cyclical
component of fiscal policy in d¯t, and dSt is the stabilizing deficit. Is it important to note
that the coefficients and the variance in Equations (2.6) and (2.7) are indexed by an
indicator variable sFt = {1, 2} which corresponds to the fiscal policy stance.
In line with the taxonomy of Leeper (1991), we define a passive (or Sustainable)
fiscal policy a policy that aims at debt-stabilization as opposed to an active fiscal policy
(Unsustainable) which targets macroeconomic effects, irrespective of the debt-to-GDP
dynamics. For the case at hand, we identify the sustainable regime as the regime where
the target deficit is compatible with the stabilizing deficit in the long run. In other words,
fiscal policy is categorized as sustainable if all the following conditions hold: |ρ(st)| < 1
(non-explosive deficit dynamics); c(st) = 0; and δt = 1 (e.g. Dewachter and Toffano,
2012). In the empirical estimation, we remove the cyclical component in dSt series implied
by Equation (2.5) by applying the HP-filter setting a value of λ = 1600 for quarterly data
so as to obtain a smooth long-run trend for the stabilizing deficit.4
2.2.2.2 Monetary policy rule
We use a standard Taylor (1993) rule to model the central bank's reaction function (e.g.
Leeper, 1991 ; Davig and Leeper, 2007 ; Davig and Leeper, 2011):
rt = a
sMt + γs
M
t
pi (pit − pi∗) + γs
M
t
y (yt − y∗t ) + s
M
t
t , (2.8)
4We remove one year of observations at the beginning and at the end of the dataset in order to
prevent the well-documented end-point bias of the HP-filter contaminating our results (e.g. Mise, Kim
and Newbold, 2005).
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where rt is the policy instrument of the central bank, a is a constant, pit is the realized
inflation, pi∗ is the target inflation rate of the central bank. The difference (yt − y∗t ) is
the output gap. The coefficients and the variance in Equation (2.8) are indexed by an
indicator variable sFt = {1, 2} which corresponds to the fiscal policy stance. In line with
Leeper (1991), we define active (or Hawkish) monetary policy when the central banks vary
the policy rate more than proportionally to inflation, thus respecting the Taylor principle
with γpi > 1. A passive monetary policy (Dovish) does not respect the Taylor principle.
2.2.2.3 Combining fiscal and monetary rules
We model the monetary policy rule separately under the assumption that the central bank
does not take into consideration whatever policy the government implements.5
Such combinations yield, in theoretical models, starkly different outcomes for the price
level and interest rates. The combination SustainableHawkish yields Ricardian results
in the sense that any increase in government deficit is not perceived as an increased net
wealth for households (Barro, 1974). However, agents perfectly anticipate that larger
deficits today will have to be repaid by higher taxes in the future. Households therefore
save more today in order to be able to be able to pay the increased taxes in the future
such that the net present value of their wealth has not changed. Aggregate Demand
remains unchanged and so do the price level as well as interest rates. The combination
UnsustainableHawkish yields, on the other hand, an explosive path for the price level.
Indeed, a larger deficit that generates inflation would make the central bank react more
than proportionally to inflation, increasing the nominal interest rate. Such an increase
in the interest rates would benefit households who would see their wealth increase, thus
pushing Aggregate Demand upwards. Keeping Aggregate Supply constant, the price
level would increase, to which the central bank must respond more than proportionally.
This would therefore have a spiral effect inconsistent with equilibrium (see Leeper and
Leith, 2016). Empirically, however, this is not worrisome because agents can anticipate
that there will be a switch towards an equilibrium-compatible policy in the future. The
combination SustainableDovish yields indeterminate results as no authority anchors the
price level. The last combination, UnsustainableDovish corresponds to what is called the
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level in the literature. If the government increases its deficit by
emitting nominal debt, the nominal wealth of households increases due to larger interest
payments received. If their net wealth increases, households will consume more, drive
Aggregate Demand up and with it the price level. if future surpluses do not adjust
strongly to current real debt, then the debt level grows indefinitely, which is inconsistent
with equilibrium properties. It is thus the central bank's responsibility to ensure that real
debt is stabilized. In fact, the central bank needs to allow inflation to persist such that
5Alternatively, we can model the dynamics of both the fiscal and monetary rule in a multivariate
framework with four regimes. Doing so, we stress that the determination of macroeconomic aggregates
and sovereign yields is a joint fiscal-monetary process. Identified monetary regimes are sensibly similar
under both specifications such that results are qualitatively similar to this alternative.
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the real burden of debt is non-explosive. As a consequence, surprise inflation depresses
the current value of future interest payments. In other words, the government trades
surpluses for inflation. As a by-product, interest rates increase due to higher inflation.
2.2.3 Local projections
The local projections technique was first introduced by Jordà and popularized by Auer-
bach and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2013, 2017) and Owyang et al. (2013) to study the
nonlinear impacts of fiscal policy shocks. Technically, the Impulse Response Functions
(IRFs) computed with the local projections consist of regressing the dependent variable
at t+h, where h is the horizon considered, onto a set of explanatory variables at t−1 and
a shock variable at t. Additionally, one can include control variables. The particularity
of the technique is that the model is re-estimated for every horizon h considered. The
IRFs at horizon h and inference can be read directly in the form of the coefficient in front
of the shock and its standard error. Indeed, the coefficient for the shock is ∂dependentt+h
∂shockt
,
which is the general definition of an impulse response function.
Local projections have several advantages over traditional Vector Autoregressions
(VAR). First, if an econometric model is ill-specified, a direct forecast will perform better
than an iterative forecast. Indeed, the prediction error is exponential in a VAR compared
to linear in the local projections. Second, the local projections do not constrain the shape
of the IRFs as is the case with VARs. As such, local projections offer more flexibility.
This property derives from the direct vs. iterative forecast distinction. Third, the number
of parameters to estimate is smaller in the local projections than in the VAR. The last
advantage is specific to regime-dependent models. Local projections do not require to
model the dynamics of the regimes. That is, the only necessary information is the type
of regimes the economy is in at the moment of the shock. VARs, however, need to take
into account the likelihood of staying or switching to and from a particular regime when
computing IRFs.
Local projections have nonetheless potential shortcomings as well. The first pertains
to the identification of the shock. In traditional VARs, identification is usually carried out
by a triangular factorization of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. For the
local projections, the shock is a time series that needs to have the econometric properties
of shocks: centered around zero and i.i.d. Identification is thus performed outside of
the regressions. One therefore needs to ensure that the economic content of the series
corresponds to the shocks one wants to interpret the responses of. The second caveat is
that inference is usually less precise in local projections than in VARs because the model
trades off bias for variance.
In this research, we are interested in the responses of output, the price level, deficit and
sovereign yields. We estimate the local projections for each dependent variable separately.
Equations (2.9) to(2.12) correspond to the linear (or single-regime) version of the local
projections for real output growth, inflation, the deficit and sovereign yields.
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yt+h − yt−1
yt−1
= β̂shockt+h · shockt (2.9)
+ ΣJj=1
[
βyj,t+h · gt−j + βpij,t+h · pit−j + βdj,t+h · dt−j + βj,t+h · qmj,t+h
]
+ αyt+h + β
X
t+hXt + deterministicst + ηt+h
zt+h − zt−1
zt−1
= β̂shockt+h · shockt (2.10)
+ ΣJj=1
[
βyj,t+h · gt−j + βpij,t+h · pit−j + βdj,t+h · dt−j + βj,t+h · qmj,t+h
]
+ αPt+h + β
X
t+hXt + deterministicst + ηt+h
dt+h = β̂shockt+h · shockt (2.11)
+ ΣJj=1
[
βyj,t+h · gt−j + βpij,t+h · pit−j + βdj,t+h · dt−j + βj,t+h · qmj,t+h
]
+ αdt+h + β
X
t+hXt + deterministicst + ηt+h
qmt+h − qmt−1 = β̂shockt+h · shockt (2.12)
+ ΣJj=1
[
βyj,t+h · gt−j + βpij,t+h · pit−j + βdj,t+h · dt−j + βj,t+h · qmj,t+h
]
+ αqt+h + β
X
t+hXt + deterministicst + ηt+h
where α is a constant, z is the price level, qm is the yield of maturity m, Xt is a vector
that contains exogenous variables and deterministicst can contain temporal trends and
seasonal dummies. The equations above accommodate up to J lags. All coefficients are
indexed by t+h because they vary with the horizon of the regressions.
The left-hand side of Equations (2.9) and (2.10) aim to determine the growth rate
of output and prices due to a deficit shock while Equation (2.12) determines the yield
difference due to a deficit shock. Equation (2.11) resembles an AR(1) process and provides
information about the persistence of the deficit shocks.
In their nonlinear forms, Equations (2.9) to (2.12) read:
yt+h − yt−1
yt−1
= ΣKk=1Ik · β̂shockt+h · shockt (2.13)
+ ΣKk=1Σ
J
j=1Ik·[
βyj,t+h · gt−j + βpij,t+h · pit−j + βdj,t+h · dt−j + βj,t+h · qmj,t+h
]
+ ΣKk=1Ik · αyt+h + βXt+hXt + deterministicst + ηt+h
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zt+h − zt−1
zt−1
= ΣKk=1Ik · β̂shockt+h · shockt (2.14)
+ ΣKk=1Σ
J
j=1Ik·[
βyj,t+h · gt−j + βpij,t+h · pit−j + βdj,t+h · dt−j + βj,t+h · qmj,t+h
]
+ ΣKk=1Ik · αPt+h + βXt+hXt + deterministicst + ηt+h
dt+h = Σ
K
k=1Ik · β̂shockt+h · shockt (2.15)
+ ΣKk=1Σ
J
j=1Ik·[
βyj,t+h · gt−j + βpij,t+h · pit−j + βdj,t+h · dt−j + βj,t+h · qmj,t+h
]
+ ΣKk=1Ik · αdt+h + βXt+hXt + deterministicst + ηt+h
qmt+h − qmt−1 = β̂shockt+h · shockt (2.16)
+ ΣKk=1Σ
J
j=1Ik·[
βyj,t+h · gt−j + βpij,t+h · pit−j + βdj,t+h · dt−j + βj,t+h · qmj,t+h
]
+ ΣKk=1Ik · αqt+h + βXt+hXt + deterministicst + ηt+h
where Ik is an indicator for the regime k. The specifications above ensure that the de-
pendent and the independent are stationary. In terms of explanatory variables, Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2017) also use the growth rates of output and inflation, the fiscal
policy variable in level and the interest rate in level.
In the application, temporal lags are set to 1 and deterministics include temporal
trends up to the second power. The chosen maturity for the yield is three years. The
vector Xt contains the oil price and is treated as exogenous. We choose as indicator Ik
the smoothed probabilities from the Markov-switching regressions (2.6) and (2.8). We
believe that this corresponds more closely to agents assessment of the current state of the
economy.6 As the shock series, we use the residuals t from Equation (2.6) in its single,
two and four regimes form.7
6We could also create as many dummy variables as there are regimes that take the value 1 if the
probability of being in that specific regime is above .5. While this choice would help clarify the regime-
specific responses by setting the influence of all other regimes to zero, it is nevertheless a simplification.
However, in our case, probabilities are generally very close to 0 and 1 such that the distinction makes little
difference on the results. If anything, using dummy variables make the dynamic responses less smooth.
7Alternatively, one can use the residuals per regime as shock series. This choice, however, does not
affect our results.
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2.2.4 Data sources and transformations
The data come from publicly available databases. Primary deficit is defined as Federal
Government Expenditures (line 23 of NIPA Table 3.2) minus Government Receipts (line 1
of NIPA Table 3.2) minus Interest Payments (line 32 of NIPA Table 3.2). A positive value
therefore indicates a deficit. While nominal GDP is provided in line 1 of NIPA Table 1.1.5,
the potential nominal GDP series is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
output gap is computed as the annual rate log difference between real GDP and potential
real GDP. Output growth is the yearly growth rate of real GDP. The price level is given
by the seasonally-adjusted Consumer Price Index. Inflation is computed as a yearly rate.
The debt series comes from the Dallas Fed and is available at a monthly frequency. We
select the privately held gross federal debt at market value as a measure of debt so as
to remove holding by the Central Bank and governmental institutions. We then divide
the debt stock at the end of the quarter by the current nominal GDP series. Finally, the
yields come from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (H15) and cover
the nominal Treasury constant maturities of the US government for the maturities of 1-,
3-, 5- and 10-years. Yields are available at a daily frequency, so we take the last value of
the quarter when transforming the data to quarterly series.
2.3 Empirical results
2.3.1 Fiscal and monetary policy stances
Figure 2.1 summarizes the estimation of historical episodes of fiscal and monetary policy
switches in the United States between 1967Q1 and 2012Q1. Tables 2.1 and 2.3 report
details on the rules where we also include estimation results for the single-regime reaction
functions for benchmark analysis.
Our historical episodes of fiscal policy regimes displayed in Figure 2.1 (top panel)
are in line with the literature (see for example Chung, Davig and Leeper, 2004 ; Davig
and Leeper, 2007 ; Davig and Leeper, 2011 ; Favero and Monacelli (2005) ; Dewachter
and Toffano, 2012). We find that fiscal policy has mostly been passive during the whole
sample with a handful of short bursts of fiscal activism. We identify four passages of
unsustainable fiscal policy. The first and second episodes match the years 1973 and 1975
and correspond to the fiscal policy program initiated by the Ford administration in hope
of restoring economic prosperity in the US. The third event of active fiscal policy occurred
between 2001 and 2003 and is linked to the successive tax cuts under the Bush presidency.
Finally, the last occurrence of fiscal activism started in late 2008 following the financial
crisis and lasted up until 2010.
Second, US monetary policy has been active during two major periods: the first
period ranges from the beginning of the 1980s till 1992 and corresponds to the Volcker-
Greenspan era. The second episode of active monetary policy took place between the
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Figure 2.1  Smoothed probabilities for fiscal and monetary regimes
Note: the figure reports the estimated smoothed probabilities from the fiscal policy rule (2.6) in the top
panel and from the monetary policy rule (2.8) in the bottom panel.
mid-1990s and 2000. Goodfriend (2002) observed that the Fed needed to operate without
challenging the credibility it had built with its efficient preemptive fight against inflation
in 1994-1995 when it was confronted with an economic boom and potential inflationary
pressures. Since 2000 onward, the Fed has accommodated inflation, reacting less than
proportionally to the rise in prices. Following the recession of 2001, the Fed reduced its
policy rate from 6.5 percent at the beginning of 1991 to reach 1.75 percent in December
2001. The inflation rate did not follow the same path, resulting in negative real rates.
Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012) reach the same conclusion, claiming that US monetary
policy has been loose since 2000.
Panel (a) of Table 2.2 reports that fiscal policy evolves in a counter-cyclical way as was
expected. It is also clear that the stabilizing deficit does significantly influence the current
deficit-to-GDP ratio. The last feature could in fact conceal evidence of a succession of
active and passive fiscal stances where the dominant regime is the sustainable regime. We
therefore allow the fiscal policy rule to swing across regimes using our Markov-switching
setup. It appears that the Markov-switching regression offers a better fit as indicate the
Log-Likelihood values. Notice that it is not possible to test the null hypothesis of a single
regime against the alternative of several regimes with Likelihood ratios because there are
parameters that are only identified under the alternative (Cho and White, 2007). It is,
for instance, the case of the transition probabilities.
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Table 2.1  Estimates of fiscal policy rule
Estimates of fiscal policy rule (1967Q1:2012Q1)
c ρ γ δ pSS pUU Log Lik.
Panel (a) Single-regime model
-0.003*** 0.862*** -0.135*** 1.032*** 674.60
(0.0004) (0.02) (0.016) (0.099)
Panel (b) Markov-switching model:
|ρsFt =Sust| < 1, csFt =Sust. = 0, δsFt =Sust. = 1, δsFt =Unsust. < 0
Sustainable 0 0.945*** -0.036*** 1 0.97 704.58
(0.00) (0.00)
Unsustainable
-0.001*** 0.657*** -0.301*** -0.006 0.72
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: The table reports the estimates of the feedback policy rule in Equation (2.6). We report the
estimates for each regression separately together with their standard errors in parenthesis. Superscripts
***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. Numbers in italic are fixed parameters.
Passive fiscal policy experiences a large persistence (expected duration of 30 quarters),
small innovations, and a primary deficit dynamics consistent with debt stabilization as
per restrictions. The active fiscal regime is typically characterized by smaller inertia (its
expected duration is estimated at around 4 quarters) and larger variance innovations.
Most importantly, an active fiscal policy is inconsistent with debt stabilization (the coef-
ficient δ is not significant) and hence fiscal policy does not take the stabilizing deficit into
account in the unsustainable regime.
Table (2.2) presents the results of the single-regime and Markov-switching estimation
of Equation (2.8). We can observe that monetary policy would be categorized as passive
throughout the sample in the single-regime case. However, this hides periods when the
Taylor principle holds and periods when it does not. The Hawkish regime (strong response
to inflation) is characterized by a higher Federal Funds rate on average, and a counter-
cyclical response of the policy rate. The Dovish regime (feeble response to inflation)
exhibits a positive co-movement with economic activity and lower interest rates.
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Table 2.2  Estimates of monetary policy rule
Estimates of monetary policy rule (1967Q1:2012Q1)
a γpi γy pNT,NT pT,T Log Lik.
Panel (a) Single-regime model
-0.024*** 0.89*** 0.137* 386.47
(0.002) (0.042) (0.078)
Panel (b) Markov-switching model: γ
sMt =Taylor
pi > 1 ; γ
sMt =Non−Taylor
pi < 1
Dovish 0.017** 0.756*** 0.443*** 0.97 476.76
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hawkish
0.04*** 1.071*** -0.434*** 0.95
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: The table reports the estimates of the Taylor rule in Equation (2.8). We report the estimates
for each regression separately together with their standard errors in parenthesis. Superscripts ***, **, *
indicate significance levels of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. Numbers in italic are fixed parameters.
2.3.2 Macroeconomic policy mix
We provide the estimation results from the policy mix in Figure 2.2. The top panel
reports the joint estimation of Equations (2.6) and (2.8). First, we can observe that the
Explosive regime (Unsustainable-Hawkish) never occurs during our sample. Second, the
joint regimes usually inherit the properties of the individual regimes, with the notable
exception of the period at the end of the sixties. Indeed, monetary policy is categorized
as active in the joint estimation whereas it was passive when estimated individually. In
the bottom panel, we compute the combined smoothed probabilities. In other words, we
report the Hadamard product of the smoothed probabilities of the fiscal and monetary
rules taken separately. For the rest of the analysis, we use the combined version of the
rules.8
Panel (a) of Table 2.3 provides the estimates of (2.6) and (2.8) jointly estimated in the
Markov-switching framework. In the estimation procedure, we group the regimes two by
two such that they share the same characteristics from the fiscal rule and the monetary
rule, respectively. In other words, coefficients for the fiscal rule are the same between
regimes 1 and 2, and between regimes 3 and 4 whereas coefficients for the monetary rule
8Impulse response functions from the joint estimation can be found in Appendix A.2.1. Results are
qualitatively similar.
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Figure 2.2  Combining fiscal and monetary policy rules
Note: the figure reports the estimated smoothed probabilities from the joint estimation of fiscal policy
rule (2.6) and monetary policy rule (2.8) in the top panel and the combined probabilities of (2.6) and
(2.8) in the bottom panel.
are the same between regimes 1 and 3, and between regimes 2 and 4. Consequently, the
transition matrix P has 16 elements.9 Notice that the Taylor principle has been enforced
in the Ricardian (Sustainable-Hawkish) and Explosive regimes but that this constraint is
not binding. The properties of the fiscal rule in the 4-regimes framework are generally
in accordance with the coefficients presented in Table 2.1. For the monetary policy rule,
the regime-switching regressions correctly disentangle periods when the Taylor principle
holds from those when it does not hold. In the former, the central bank behaves counter-
cyclically, raising its policy rate when output growth is low, while it behaves pro-cyclically
in the latter.
Panel (b) provides useful information about the transition probabilities and the fit of
the model. First, the two longer-lasting regimes are the Indeterminate and the Ricardian
regimes (11 quarters), with the FTPL regime following at 4 quarters. The Explosive
regime is, of course, not persistent. The diagonal elements give the probability of staying
in the considered regime. Since the Explosive regime is non-persistent and does not occur
in our sample, we will focus our comments on the first three regimes. In particular, it
9We chose this specification rather than letting the coefficients in the four regimes be different because
the number of parameters to estimate would become very large, jeopardizing the convergence of the
Maximum Likelihood estimation. As a comparison, we estimate 26 parameters against 48 if coefficients
were free across all four regimes.
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Table 2.3  Estimates of fiscal and monetary policy rules
Estimates of fiscal and monetary policy rules
(1967Q1:2012Q1)
Panel (a) Markov-switching model:
|ρ| < 1, cIndeterminate.,Ricardian = 0, δIndeterminate,Ricardian = 1,
γRicardian,Explosivepi > 1, γ
Indeterminate,FTPL
pi < 1
Fiscal rule c ρ δ γ
Indeterminate
/ Ricardian
0 0.936*** 1 0.042***
(0.00) (0.00)
FTPL /
Explosive
-0.003*** 0.64*** -0.0001 -0.363***
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Monetary
rule
a γpi γy
Indeterminate
/ FTPL
0.017*** 0.824*** 0.538**
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00)
Ricardian /
Explosive
0.03*** 1.191*** -0.538***
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel (b) Transition probabilities
Indeterminate FTPL Ricardian Explosive Log Lik.
Indeterminate 0.91 0.27 0.06 0.00 1194.48
FTPL 0.06 0.73 0.00 0.00
Ricardian 0.04 0.00 0.91 1.00
Explosive 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00
Note: the table reports the results from the joint regime-switching estimation of the fiscal and monetary
policy rules (2.6) and (2.8). The standard errors can be found in parenthesis below the value of the
coefficient. The superscripts *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
is almost as likely to switch to the FTPL or Ricardian regime from the Indeterminate
regime (6% vs. 4% chance of switching, respectively). However, starting in the Ricardian
regime, we have a 6% chance of switching to the Indeterminate regime. Interestingly, we
have a 27% chance of switching from the FTPL regime to the Indeterminate regime. We
can conclude from the analysis of both the bottom graph of Figure 2.1 and Panel (b)
of Table 2.3 that fiscal and monetary policies do not switch synchronously. This would
have been the case had larger values been found at the crossroad between the FTPL and
Ricardian regimes. Second, the log-likelihood value from the regime-switching regressions
is higher than the sum of the log-likelihoods of the two single-regime rules, indicating
that regime-switching models are better suited for the analysis. This is confirmed by
comparing Information Criteria in Table 2.4. The advantage of Information Criteria is
that they penalize the number of parameters estimated.
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Table 2.4  Information criteria for fiscal and monetary rules
Rule Case AIC BIC HQIC
Fiscal rule Single-regime -7.278 -7.191 -7.243
Regime-Switching -7.500 -7.233 -7.389
Monetary rule Single-regime -4.339 -4.280 -4.315
Regime-Switching -5.041 -4.813 -4.949
Fiscal and
Monetary rules
Single-regime -12.070 -11.910 -12.000
Regime-Switching -12.400 -11.453 -12.014
Note: the table reports Information Criteria for the different rules under the single regime or regime-
switching specification. We report the Akaike (AIC), Bayes-Schwarz (BIC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQIC)
Information Criteria. Information Criteria have been re-scaled by the number of observations. A lower
value of the Information Criterion indicates a better fit, taking into consideration the number of param-
eters estimated.
2.3.3 Dynamic responses to government deficit shocks
In what follows, we present the responses of output growth, inflation, deficit and nominal
yields to a deficit shock. The shock has been re-scaled such that, on impact, the deficit-to-
GDP ratio rises by one percentage point. This re-scaling ensures that we can compare the
responses of the variables of interest across the different regimes.10 We also present the
90% Newey-West confidence interval obtained from the local projections. Jordà (2005)
suggests that the Newey-West lag correction be increasing with the horizon of the impulse
response. We therefore set the Newey-West lag to h. The horizontal axis corresponds to
the number of quarters after the shock while the vertical axis gives the response of the
variable considered in percentage points.
2.3.3.1 Benchmark analysis - single regime
We report the IRFs to a deficit shock in the single regime case in Figure 2.3. Results
indicate that deficit shocks in the single regime are persistent. GDP and CPI exhibit
a counter-intuitive negative response for a few quarters. Indeed, conventional theory
predicts that larger deficits lead to higher inflation. However, negative inflation responses
have also been found in the literature (see, for instance, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko,
2017). A deficit shock does not significantly reduce the 5-years nominal yield. A similar
exercise for other maturities (1-year, 5-years, 10-years) presented in Figure 2.4 indicates
that the yields responses are generally uniform across maturities, though the negative
tendency in the responses is stronger for long maturities.11
10This re-scaling has little influence on the conclusions drawn from the exercise because the coefficient
β̂shockt+0 ranges from 0.94 to 1.02 without re-scaling for the different regimes considered.
11Paul Krugman also notices this negative relationship and provides interesting insights in a few of
his blog posts. See, for instance, https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/deficits-and-interest-
rates/ and https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/deficits-and-interest-rates-the-history/.
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Figure 2.3  Impulse responses of dependent variables to deficit shocks  single
regime
Note: the figure presents the responses of output growth, inflation, deficit and the 5-years nominal yield
to a 1 percentage point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio. The solid line represents the point estimate
and is derived from the local projections (2.9) to (2.12). The shaded area corresponds to the Newey-West
90% confidence interval bounded by the dashed lines. For each horizon h, the Newey-West lag correction
is set to h.
2.3.3.2 Fiscal policy regimes
We now consider the responses of our four dependent variables to a one percentage point
deficit shock in Figure 2.5 depending on the Sustainable/Unsustainable regimes. To fa-
cilitate reading, only one set of confidence bands are plotted at a time. On the top row,
the shaded area corresponds to the confidence bands of the unsustainable fiscal policy
regime, while the bottom row plots the confidence interval from the sustainable regime.
Several conclusions can be drawn from Figure 2.5. First, the responses of output growth,
inflation and interest rates are of opposite signs in the two regimes. While a deficit shock
in the unsustainable regime increases output and inflation, a shock in the sustainable
regime depresses output and slightly reduces the prices. As a consequence, a deficit shock
raises the price level by about 1 percentage point after 4 years. Second, turning to the
deficit we can see that shocks in the unsustainable regime are much less persistent than
in the sustainable regime. Finally, the 5-years yield increases by 30 basis points at a 5
quarters horizon whereas it decreases by around 85 basis point in the sustainable regime.
The decrease is significant from impact to the 6th quarter. There is therefore more than
a one percentage point premium between the two regimes. These findings show that, on
average, the government will have to pay a higher debt service cost to finance additional
deficit if its debt is not sustainable.
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Figure 2.4  Impulse responses of nominal yields to deficit shocks  single
regime
Note: the figure presents the responses of nominal yields of maturities 1-, 3-, 5-, 10-years to a 1 percentage
point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio. The solid line represents the point estimate and is derived
from the local projections (2.12) with the corresponding maturity. The shaded area corresponds to the
Newey-West 90% confidence interval bounded by the dashed lines. For each horizon h, the Newey-West
lag correction is set to h.
The responses of the four maturities considered inherit the properties described above.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to assess the influence of deficit shocks on the maturity
spectrum. In the unsustainable regime, short-maturity yields respond much more, both
economically and statistically, that long-maturity yields. At the peak response at quarter
5 of about 40 basis points for the 1-year yield, the 10-years yield only rises by 20 basis
point, and this increase is barely significant. In the sustainable regime, all the responses
are negative and significant up until the 7th quarter after the shock. Though the response
of yields turns significant after the 12th quarter, we suggest that these results be taken
with a grain of salt. Ramey (2012) points that local projections may become unreliable for
large horizons. In fact, due to the nature of the local projections, the dataset is iteratively
reduced as the horizon increases.
2.3.3.3 Combining fiscal and monetary rules
Figure 2.7 presents the impulse response functions in the four-regimes case. Under this
specification, the responses of output and the price level highly depend on the regime
considered. A deficit shock in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL  Unsustainable-
Dovish) or Indeterminate (Sustainable-Dovish) regime significantly raises output while the
opposite holds for the Ricardian regime. Notice that the response of output in the FTPL
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Figure 2.5  Impulse responses of dependent variables to deficit shocks 
sustainable vs. unsustainable fiscal policy regimes
Note: the figure presents the responses of output growth, inflation, deficit and the 5-years nominal yield
to a 1 percentage point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio. The solid lines represent the point estimate
and are derived from the multi-regimes local projections (2.13) to (2.16). The shaded area corresponds
to the Newey-West 90% confidence interval bounded by the dashed lines. For each horizon h, the Newey-
West lag correction is set to h. The first row reports the confidence bands from the unsustainable regime
while the second row reports the confidence bands from the sustainable regime.
is positive while it is negative in the other regimes. We posit that the stance towards
inflation of the central bank plays an important role. As the central bank expects the
price level to rise following a positive deficit shock, it raises its policy rate to dampen the
inflationary effects of deficits. Since this rise in the policy rate is more than proportional
to inflation developments, the real interest rate increases. As a consequence, households
save more and enterprises produce less. Output therefore exhibits a negative response. It
should be noted that deficits significantly create inflation only in the FTPL regime. Lastly,
the responses for yields remain different across regimes. Yields in the FTPL regime rise by
about 30 basis points until the fifth quarter while the yields responses in the Indeterminate
or Ricardian regime are negative. Notice that the stance of monetary policy plays a role
in addition to the fiscal policy. Indeed, we can clearly see that the positive sign of the
response of yields is due to the sustainability of fiscal policy because the Ricardian and
Indeterminate regimes share the same features for fiscal policy. However, a central bank
that responds more strongly to inflation decreases the yields even further. Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2017) posit that negative response for yields are still plausible because
markets may view fiscal stimulus as a way not only to accelerate the economy but also
to reduce risks associated with a prolonged slump. They also note the importance of
monetary policy that can accommodate or offset fiscal policy. The authors also advance
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Figure 2.6  Impulse responses of nominal yields to deficit shocks  sustainable
vs. unsustainable fiscal policy regimes
Note: the figure presents the responses of nominal yields of maturities 1-, 3-, 5-, 10-years to a 1 percentage
point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio. The solid line represents the point estimate and are derived
from the multi-regimes local projections (2.12) with the corresponding maturity. The shaded area corre-
sponds to the Newey-West 90% confidence interval bounded by the dashed lines. For each horizon h, the
Newey-West lag correction is set to h. The first row reports the confidence bands from the unsustainable
regime while the second row reports the confidence bands from the sustainable regime.
that fiscal stimulus in a slump may still stimulate the economy such that a larger crisis is
averted.
We can see from Figure 2.8 that the effects of a deficit shock on the yields are not
homogeneous across maturities or regimes. In particular, it seems that short maturities are
more responsive than long maturities, both in terms of values and statistical significance.
We can remark that the regime does have an influence on the response of the shape of the
yield curve. Indeed, deficit shocks in the Ricardian regime make all yields vary by roughly
the same amount, indicating a Level effect (in the sense of Litterman and Scheinkman,
1991). Deficit shocks in the Indeterminate and FTPL regimes mostly affect the Slope
of the curve because short maturities respond much more strongly than long maturities.
Deficit shocks in the FTPL regime flattens the yield curve while deficit shocks in the
Indeterminate regime steepens the yield curve.
These results indicate that a more thorough analysis of the effects of fiscal policy shocks
on the shape of the yield curve is needed to confirm whether the shape of the yield curve
is affected by the type of regimes we consider. In particular, the government may use the
average maturity of marketable debt outstanding as another policy instrument to weather
the negative outcome of larger deficit. In periods of distress, the government is better
off emitting short-term debt so as to avoid locking-in a higher interest rate for a long
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Figure 2.7  Impulse responses of dependent variables to deficit shocks  fiscal-
monetary policy mix
Note: the figure presents the responses of output growth, inflation, deficit and the 5-years nominal yield
to a 1 percentage point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio. The solid lines represent the point estimate
and are derived from the multi-regimes local projections (2.13) to (2.16). The shaded area corresponds
to the Newey-West 90% confidence interval bounded by the dashed lines. For each horizon h, the Newey-
West lag correction is set to h. The first row reports the confidence bands from the FTPL regime, the
second row the confidence bands from the Indeterminate regime and the third row from the Ricardian
regime.
period of time. Figure 2.9 shows that the average maturity has changed substantially
across time (see, for instance, Greenwood and Vayanos, 2008).12 The dip in 2008-9 is
particularly interesting in this respect. It is possible that the responses presented above
reflect not only the effect of deficits but also the ripples of debt management policies.
The framework presented above could be further developed to include a more struc-
tural approach. For instance, the current model presented here cannot disentangle the
contents of the yields responses between expectations regarding output growth or inflation
and default risk due to larger debt. However, this is not the central question in this chap-
ter. We provide a tool to assess the likely path of government debt financing costs after a
fiscal policy shock depending on the regime in which the shock takes place. In addition to
this, the model could take the shape of the yield curve into account. An efficient and deep
bond market ensures that arbitrage opportunities are exhausted such that bond prices at
each moment in time reflect both the time series dynamics and cross-sectional relations.
We could, for instance, jointly estimate the different maturities under the restriction that
there is a Level, Slope and Curvature factor (Litterman and Scheinkman, 1991). This
12The document is accessible at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/quarterly-refunding/Documents/Q12017CombinedChargesforArchives.pdf
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Figure 2.8  Impulse responses of nominal yields to deficit shocks  fiscal-
monetary policy mix
Note: the figure presents the responses of nominal yields of maturities 1-, 3-, 5-, 10-years to a 1 percentage
point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio. The solid lines represent the point estimate and are derived
from the multi-regimes local projections (2.16). The shaded area corresponds to the Newey-West 90%
confidence interval bounded by the dashed lines. For each horizon h, the Newey-West lag correction is set
to h. The first row reports the confidence bands from the FTPL regime, the second row the confidence
bands from the Indeterminate regime and the third row from the Ricardian regime.
would, however, require Maximum Likelihood estimation rather than OLS.
Another potential extension would be to use the bond yields to improve the identifi-
cation of the regimes. The yields dynamics would be jointly modeled together with the
fiscal and the monetary policy rules. We expect that high levels and volatility of yields
would match episodes of fiscal activism. This would in turn precise the environment in
which the government operates.
2.4 Conclusion
We have presented an empirical framework that aims to answer the question whether
larger deficits always cause higher inflation and sovereign yields. We have applied regime-
dependent local projections to US data and have shown that larger deficits do not always
lead to higher debt servicing costs. In fact, the sign of the relationship depends on the
level of sustainability of fiscal policy. When debt is unsustainable, larger deficits do cause
higher inflation, output and nominal yields. Interestingly, larger deficits are associated
with smaller output, inflation and yields in the sustainable regime. Additionally, larger
deficits in the unsustainable fiscal policy regime reduce the slope of the yield curve because
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Figure 2.9  Weighted average maturity of marketable debt outstanding
Source: US Treasury, Office of Debt Management in the Fiscal Year 2017 Q1 Report.
the 1-year rate rises by 30 basis points at the 5 quarters horizon when the 10-years
only rises by 20 basis points. The difference between the response of the yields in the
unsustainable regime and the response of the yields in the sustainable regime can be as
large as 110 basis points. Taking into account the monetary policy stance brings another
light on the issue. Monetary policy can either fight or accommodate inflation. When
monetary policy accommodates inflation, deficit shocks have a tendency to raise output.
The response of the yield curve exhibits regime-dependence. While yields in the Ricardian
regime (Sustainable-Hawkish) respond negatively by about the same value, indicating
a Level effect, the yield curve in the FTPL (Unsustainable-Dovish) and Indeterminate
(Sustainable-Dovish) regimes flatten and steepen the yield curve, respectively. These new
findings thus contribute to the debate about the macroeconomic impacts of government
deficit shocks. However, a definitive answer on the effects of fiscal policy on the yield
curve requires a more structural approach.
Chapter 3
Nonlinear Impacts of Fiscal Policy on
the Yield Curve
3.1 Introduction
The theoretical literature has proposed several channels through which fiscal policy can
affect the economy, but different theories proposed have reached starkly different conclu-
sions. On the one hand, the New Keynesian theory predicts that an expansionary fiscal
policy creates a shift in Aggregate Demand and a change in the composition of Aggregate
Demand, either through a direct increase in goods purchases if the government raises its
consumption without changing taxes, or via an improvement in households' disposable
income via taxes which will increase private consumption and therefore Aggregate De-
mand. If the government finances its deficit by issuing debt it competes with private
borrowers for loanable funds. The demand for loanable funds increases and, if the supply
for loanable funds remains the same, so does the interest rate. This rise in the interest
rate crowds out part of private investment. In the short run, enterprises increase the use
of the factors of production to face the increased demand. However, prices and wages
are sticky, such that national income rises. Since there is less private investment in the
economy, the long run stock of capital decreases. As a consequence, the marginal product
of capital rises, and with it the interest rate. As the interest rate is higher than before,
the local currency appreciates.
On the other hand, forward-looking Ricardian households understand that an increase
in the stock of debt today, via a reduction of taxes, for example, induces higher interest
payments in the future that would be financed through higher taxes. These households
may thus decide to save in order to support higher future taxes. Thus, the increase in
private savings will exactly match the decrease in public savings such that the equilibrium
interest rate on the market for loanable funds will remain unchanged. These arguments,
however, rest on the assumption that government consumption does not vary. If a tax re-
duction today is met by a decrease in government spending tomorrow, it can still generate
45
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wealth effects and would stimulate consumption and reduce national saving.1
In line with these ambiguous predictions empirical studies have not been able to reach
a consensus regarding the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates. Gale and Orzsag (2003)
and Barth et al. (1991) provide extensive reviews of empirical results. The latter sur-
veyed 42 empirical studies and report that 17 studies found a predominantly significant,
positive effect of deficits on interest rates, 6 found mixed results and 19 found predomi-
nantly insignificant or negative results (Barth et al., 1991). More recent studies suggest
a significant link between deficits and interest rates (e.g. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba,
2002 ; Dai and Philippon, 2005 ; and Laubach, 2009). For instance, Dai and Philippon
(2005) show that a one percentage point increase in the deficit ratio increases the 10-year
rate by 25 basis points after three years. Laubach (2009) produces similar estimates for
the US using projected budget deficits.
Another strand of the literature has assumed a nonlinear relationship between fiscal
policy and bond yields. For instance, Davig and Leeper (2007) and Davig and Leeper
(2011) identify Active and Passive fiscal and monetary policies, in the words of Leeper
(1991), and show that the response of the short-rate in a calibrated model differs greatly in
sign and magnitude across the two regimes. Nonlinearities are particularly relevant in this
context because it conditions the behavior of households, the government and the central
bank. In particular, whether the monetary or the fiscal authority dominates the other
has different implications for the price level dynamics. In the case of investors, whether
fiscal policy is compatible with debt stabilization or not is crucial for their decisions.
Dewachter and Toffano (2012) investigate the link between fiscal deficits and bond
yields across fiscal policy regimes in the USA. Using regression techniques, they show
that unsustainable deficits are associated with higher bond yields whereas no statistical
relationship is found between government deficit and bond yields in periods when debt
is sustainable. In a related study, Houssa and Hubert (2015) use local projections to
analyze the dynamic impact of government deficit shocks on bond yields in the United
States. They find that a primary deficit shock in the United States significantly increases
bond yields in the unsustainable fiscal regime as opposed to a significant decrease in bond
yields in the sustainable fiscal regime but that this effect lasts around 8 quarters.
One important insight from the literature discussed above is that nonlinearity is im-
portant in uncovering the link between fiscal policy and interest rates. However, these
studies are not able to bind different maturities in a consistent manner and this is the
reason why models of the term structure are needed. Term structure models are capa-
ble of decomposing long rates into expected future short rates and risk premia. Bond
risk premia represent the compensation demanded by investors for exposures associated
1In a related literature, Woodford (1996) pioneered the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. This theory
predicts that an increase in debt that is not is offset but future changes in taxes or spending generates a
wealth effect for households and increase Aggregate Demand. If Aggregate Supply does not change, both
goods market and government's budget clearing conditions require that the price level increases enough
to match future real debt with its initial value.
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to fundamental risks. As such, understanding movements in bond risk premia provides
valuable information on market participants' valuation of risks.
The seminal paper of Ang and Piazzesi (2003) extends a latent yield curve term struc-
ture model with macro factors such that the relevant state vector for bond pricing consists
of both latent and observable factors. In their setup, they impose independence between
latent and macro factors. As a result, macro variables determine bond yields, but not the
reverse. Ang, Dong and Piazzesi (2005) and Diebold and Li (2006) allow for bidirectional
macro-finance linkages and show that macro factors are much more important when bidi-
rectionality is enforced. This framework has been successfully applied and extended in
subsequent studies (e.g. Dewachter and Lyrio, 2006).
Recently Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton (2014) have challenged the assumption that
macroeconomic factors can be recovered from a collection of bond yields. They assert that
this restriction can lead to a misspecified model and could bias the estimation of the term
premium. They therefore relax what they call the macro-spanning condition: macroe-
conomic factors do not enter the pricing kernel of bonds, but determine expectations of
future short rates.
In this chapter, we investigate the nonlinear impact of fiscal policy on the yield curve.
To achieve this, we propose a regime-dependent term structure model that incorporates
the three standard yield curve factors (level, slope and curvature) and three macroeco-
nomic factors (inflation, economic activity and government primary deficit). We proceed
in two steps. First, we do not impose no-arbitrage conditions in the vein of Martins (2012).
This model free of no-arbitrage conditions allows the macroeconomic variables to have a
contemporaneous impact on the yield curve. We distinguish between two economically-
grounded fiscal policy regimes: a sustainable versus an unsustainable path of government
debt. The regimes are identified through a regime-switching feedback fiscal policy rule
similar to Favero and Monacelli (2005), Dewachter and Toffano (2012) and Houssa and
Hubert (2015). In order to assess the quantitative response of yields to fiscal policy
shocks, we identify deficit shocks with sign restrictions. In a second step, we quantify the
risk premium embedded in US zero-coupon yields under the two regimes. We therefore
follow Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton (2014) and impose that the macro factors are un-
spanned by the yield curve. The literature has shown that there is additional information
in macroeconomic factors that is not included in bond yields and risk premia (see, for
instance, Duffee, 2002, 2011, 2012 ; Cooper, 2009 ; Ludvigson and Ng, 2009).
We show that accounting for fiscal policy regime changes is economically meaningful
to understand the dynamics of bond yields and risk premia. A one percentage point
increase in the primary deficit-to-GDP raises interest rates by between 50 to 100 basis
points at the 12-quarters horizon, depending on the regime and maturity considered. If
we decompose the total effect on yields into their components, we can see that the bulk
of the movement in yields is due to the level and, to a lesser extent, the slope factor, with
a more pronounced decrease in the slope of the yield curve in the unsustainable regime.
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY ON SOVEREIGN YIELDS 48
Variance decomposition indicates that fiscal policy shocks are mostly important in the
unsustainable regime, where its share can be twice as large as in the sustainable regime.
Risk premia associated with the unsustainable regime are consistently larger than their
sustainable counterparts, indicating that investors demand a premium to hold bonds of a
government that runs an unsustainable fiscal policy.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 covers the method-
ology and describes the features of the model. In particular, we cover the identification of
the economic regimes and we present the regime-dependent term structure model without
imposing the no-arbitrage conditions. We also explain in this section how the impulse
response functions take into account the history of regime switches. Section 3.3 presents
the data collection and treatment for the analysis. The fiscal regimes uncovered, impulse
response functions and variance decompositions are found in Section 3.4. We devote
Section 3.5 to the quantification of the risk premium. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Fiscal policy
We follow the strategy of Favero and Monacelli (2005) and Dewachter and Toffano (2012)
to identify fiscal policy regimes. We proceed in three steps. First, we define the standard
debt accumulation equation:2
bt =
(
1 + ibt
1 + ζt
)
bt−1 + dt, (3.1)
where bt denotes the debt-to-GDP ratio at time t, ibt is the average interest rate paid on
the outstanding stock of debt at t− 1, and ζt represents the growth rate of nominal GDP
between t− 1 and t.
Second, stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio implies that bt = bt−1. Hence, we obtain
the debt-stabilizing deficit measure dSt by substituting the equality bt = bt−1 in Equation
(3.1):
dSt =
(
gt − ibt
1 + ζt
)
bt−1. (3.2)
Stabilization is achieved via primary surpluses in the case where ibt > ζt or via restricted
deficits if ζt > ibt .
Third, we reproduce the analysis of Dewachter and Toffano (2012) and Houssa and
Hubert (2015) to identify fiscal policy regimes. We assume that fiscal policy follows a
fiscal rule similar to Favero and Monacelli (2005) where the current primary deficit-to-
GDP ratio dt can be expressed as:
2This equation neglects the seignoriage term which is marginal in the US case.
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dt = ρ
sFt dt−1 +
(
1− ρsFt
)
d¯t + σ
sF 
sFt
t (3.3)
d¯t = c
sFt + γs
F
t
y (yt − y∗t ) + δs
F
t dSt (3.4)
where dt−1 is the first lag of the primary deficit ratio and captures inertia in fiscal policy,
d¯t is the target deficit and is composed of a constant c, the output gap (yt−y∗t ) to control
for the natural counter-cyclical behavior of fiscal policy, and the stabilizing deficit dSt .
The error term s
F
t
t is assumed to be i.i.d.
Each of the coefficients is indexed by the superscript sFt that gives the stance of fiscal
policy at time t. For the empirical estimation, sFt can take two values. The stance of fiscal
policy and the values of the coefficients are uncovered by estimating expression (3.3) in
a first-order Markov-switching framework with transition matrix P whose elements pij
represents the probability of being in regime i at time t if the data generating process was
in regime j at time t− 1. Formally, this gives pij = Pr
[
sFt = i|sFt−1 = j
]
.
The main advantage of Markov-switching regressions over linear regressions with
dummy variables is that the identification of regimes is determined by the data and
not a priori by the researcher. Another advantage is that Markov-switching regressions
give a probability rather than a 0/1 distinction. The ratio 1
pii
gives the average duration
of regime i, enabling the researcher to gain knowledge about the probable regime several
periods in the future.
This reaction function allows the government to react differently to debt developments
depending on the value of the stabilizing deficit. Following the taxonomy of Leeper (1991),
we define passive (or sustainable) fiscal policy if the government aims at stabilizing the
debt-to-GDP ratio whereas active (or unsustainable) fiscal policy targets macroeconomic
variables, irrespective of the debt-to-GDP dynamics. Empirically, it corresponds to the
question whether the target deficit d¯t aims towards the stabilizing deficit dSt in the long run.
That is, if
∣∣∣ρsFt ∣∣∣ < 1 (the relation is non-explosive), csFt =Sustainable = 0 and δsFt =Sustainable =
1. We identify the Active regime as a regime where δs
F
t =Unsustainable < 1. A coefficient
δ < 1 implies that government does not increase surpluses as much as would be necessary
to stabilize the debt. A negative sign for δ indicates that the government increases the
deficit when a reduced deficit or a surplus is required.
In the empirical estimation, we remove the cyclical component of the raw stabilizing
deficit dSt series implied by Equation (3.2) using the Hodrick-Prescott filter setting a value
of λ = 1600 for quarterly observations so as to obtain a smooth long-run trend for the
stabilizing deficit. Doing so, we stress that debt sustainability is a long-run goal and
actual fiscal policy is allowed to deviate from it in the short run. In this respect, this is
a small deviation of the rule set forth by Favero and Monacelli (2005).
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3.2.2 A term structure model without no-arbitrage conditions
In this section, we lay out the empirical term structure model with macroeconomic factors
where the no-arbitrage conditions are not imposed. The setup closely follows Afonso and
Martins (2012). The model consists of two distinct parts that include yield curve factors
on the one side, and macro variables on the other. The yield curve factors are computed
separately from macroeconomic information. Yields are collected in the vector Yt which
contains rates for J different maturities. We summarize these yields by means of portfolios
Pt such that Pt = WYt where W is a full-rank weighting matrix that transforms observed
yields into portfolios of yields. For our analysis, we take W as the loadings coming from
the eigenvector-eigenvalue decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of observed
yields. We therefore select the first three principal components and call them Level,
Slope, and Curvature given the effect a shock on each of these principal components has
on the yield curve (Litterman and Scheinkman, 1991). The decomposition is regime-
specific because a different combination of the latent factors may better explain yields in
times when fiscal policy is unsustainable.
Diebold and Li (2006, pp. 361-362) and Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2006, p333)
have stated that it is not clear whether no-arbitrage conditions are necessary or desirable
for macro-finance modeling. Their argument is that if the data is consistent with the
no-arbitrage assumption, then imposing such restrictions should not greatly improve the
statistical properties of the model. If, however, the data is not consistent with no-arbitrage
restrictions, then imposing it would decrease the forecasting ability of the model.
We augment the yields factors by including macroeconomic variables collected in the
vector Mt. We include yearly core inflation, the output gap and the primary deficit
over GDP. We chose the primary deficit as the fiscal policy instrument for two reasons.
One, the primary deficit is the combination of decisions regarding taxes and government
spending. Part of the literature uses taxes as the fiscal instrument (e.g. Davig and Leeper,
2007 ; Davig and Leeper, 2011) whereas others consider government spending as the main
fiscal instrument (see, for example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013). However, tax
collection may depend on the business cycle, on which the government may not have
a definitive influence. Government spending, on the other hand, stems from a direct
decision of the government. There is also evidence that governments jointly use taxes and
spending as instruments (Devries et al., 2011). Second, primary deficits do not include
interest payments. We believe that it is an important consideration when dealing with
the interplay between deficits and sovereign interest rates. Using deficits that include
interest payments would be detrimental to the quality of the analysis. Indeed, if deficit
shocks influence the cost of debt financing, future deficits may rise or fall solely because
the average interest rate paid on debt has risen or fallen, and not because of an action of
the government.
We gather the yield curve factors and the macroeconomic variables in the vector Zt =[
M
′
t , P ′t
]
such that the number of factors isN =L+M, where L is the number of principal
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components andM the number of macroeconomic factors. Our model thus contains six
observable risk factors. In the single-regime case, we set up a Vector Autoregression model
of order 1 that takes the form:
Zt = µ+ ΦZt−1 + t, t ∼ N (0,ΣN ) (3.5)
where Zt represents the new information that market participants obtain at time t. The
parameters µ represent the constant terms, Φ is the feedback matrix that stacks the
coefficients of the regressions together, t is the vector of residuals, and Σ is the variance-
covariance matrix of the residuals. Though longer lags could be informative for the
dynamic responses, we chose to remain parsimonious and as close as possible to most of
the literature on term structure models that enforce the no-arbitrage conditions.
In more details, Equation (3.5) gives:
Zt =
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
µM
µP
]
+
[
ΦMM ΦMP
ΦPM ΦPP
]
Zt−1 + t
=
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
µM
µP
]
+
[
ΦMM ΦMP
ΦPM ΦPP
][
Mt−1
Pt−1
]
+
[
Mt
Pt
]
(3.6)
and
Σ = E[t, t] =
[
ΣMM ΣMP
ΣPM ΣPP
]
. (3.7)
The variables in the VAR are ordered by decreasing order of exogeneity. In particular,
we set up the yield curve factors after the macroeconomic variables such that the yield
curve can respond to macro news contemporaneously. However, shocks stemming from
the yield curve do not affect macroeconomic variables contemporaneously. Within the
macro block, we order inflation first, then the output gap and finally the fiscal policy
instrument. This ordering supposes that the fiscal policy instrument may be directly
affected by inflation and output development through automatic stabilizers, for instance.
The primary deficit is found in third position to fit the documented policy lag imple-
mentation (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). When we compute impulse response functions,
the responses of the yields are obtained by multiplying the responses of the yield curve
components by the first three columns of W .
3.2.3 Regime-dependent dynamics
In the subsequent empirical application we allow the dynamics to be regime-dependent.
In this sub-section, we precise how the regime-dependence feature enters the empirical
estimation.
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Equations (3.6) and (3.7) become:
Zt =
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
µM
µP
]k
+
[
ΦMM ΦMP
ΦPM ΦPP
]k
Zt−1 + kt
=
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
µM
µP
]k
+
[
ΦMM ΦMP
ΦPM ΦPP
]k [
Mt−1
PLt−1
]
+
[
Mt
PLt
]k
(3.8)
and
Σk =
[
ΣMM ΣMP
ΣPM ΣPP
]k
(3.9)
where the superscript k stands for the regime one considers.
We base the regimes on Equation (3.3) such that they carry a clear economic interpre-
tation. The regimes therefore represent periods during which the economic environment
has specific properties. As an alternative, one could estimate a regime-switching VAR
directly, but it would be difficult to assert what are the driving forces behind the regimes
switches.
We estimate the VAR by Maximum Likelihood (Hamilton, 1989 ; Kim, 1994) where
stationarity of both regimes is imposed. The stationarity criterion states that the modulus
of the largest eigenvalue should be strictly inferior to one. In order to overcome the
difficulty to reach the global optimum, we start the optimization procedure from a hundred
sets of random parameter values that respect the stationarity criterion centered around
the OLS coefficients. We then select the best parameter values combination based on the
value of the log-likelihood of the VAR.
We estimate Equation (3.5) by interacting the constant and the six factors Mt and
Pt with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the probability that fiscal policy is
unsustainable is larger than 0.5. An alternative would be to use the smoothed probabilities
of each regime as such. We choose the first option because the probabilities are, in general,
either close to 1 or close to 0, making the distinction dummy variable/probabilities nil.
Secondly, interpretation is clearer since the other regime does not contaminate the first
in the way model parameters are estimated. Log-Likelihood ratio tests indicate that the
improved fit of the dependent variables between the single- and multi-regimes cases is
statistically significant. Table B.1 in Appendix B.2 provides the results of the tests.
3.2.4 Impulse response functions
3.2.4.1 Algorithm
In order to identify economic shocks, one needs to transform the estimated residuals t
into structural shocks vt = SRt, where S is a unique decomposition of the variance-
covariance matrix Σ and R is a rotation matrix. For the recursive identification strategy,
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S is the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix, and R is the identity
matrix. For the sign restrictions identification scheme, the matrix R is replaced by a
rotation matrix that preserves orthogonality of the structural shocks but rotates them
such that the responses of some of the variables respect certain conditions set a priori by
the researcher and grounded in economic theory. The shocks are therefore set-identified
such that only the rotations that are consistent with the restrictions established a priori
are kept.
The algorithm is as follows:
1. An orthogonal rotation matrix is randomly selected from the uniform distribution
(see, among others, Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha, 2010 ; Baumeister and
Hamilton, 2015).
2. Compute the impulse response functions for that particular rotation.
3. If the draw respects the restrictions, it is stored whereas if it fails to respect the
criteria, it is discarded.
4. Repeat steps 1 through 3 until the number of accepted draws is large enough (500
in this case).
We later summarize the collection of accepted draws by its median value and a confidence
interval around the median. Fry and Pagan (2011) have proposed an alternative measure
for the summary of the impulses response functions on the grounds that the median
response may not be a response produced by the model. They suggest reporting the
impulse responses closest to the median instead.
We can thus rewrite Equation (3.6) for the single regime as:3
3We omit the superscript k for ease of exposition. The regime-dependent version of the model would
read:
Zt =
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
µM
µP
]k
+
[
ΦMM ΦMP
ΦPM ΦPP
]k
Zt−1 + SRkt
=
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
µM
µP
]k
+
[
ΦMM ΦMP
ΦPM ΦPP
]k [
Mt−1
Pt−1
]
+ SR
[
Mt
Pt
]k
=
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
µM
µP
]k
+
[
ΦMM ΦMP
ΦPM ΦPP
]k [
Mt−1
Pt−1
]
+
[
νMt
νPt
]k
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Zt =
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
µM
µP
]
+
[
ΦMM ΦMP
ΦPM ΦPP
]
Zt−1 + SRt
=
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
µM
µP
]
+
[
ΦMM ΦMP
ΦPM ΦPP
][
Mt−1
Pt−1
]
+ SR
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
Mt
Pt
]
=
[
µM
µP
]
+
[
ΦMM ΦMP
ΦPM ΦPP
][
Mt−1
Pt−1
]
+
[
νMt
νPt
]
(3.10)
Following Hamilton (1994), expresssion (3.10) can be written as a MA (∞) process
such that:
Zt = µ+ vt + Ψ1vt−1 + +Ψ2vt−2 + · · · = Ψ (L) vt (3.11)
where Ψh = Φh and L stands for the lag operator.
Consequently, element (i, j) of the matrices Ψh can be interpreted as the impulse
response function of variable i to a shock in variable j at time t+ h since ∂Zt+h
∂vt
= Ψh.
3.2.4.2 Taking regime persistence into account
We compute the impulse response functions in a way that preserves the information
contained in the transition matrix P . Impulse response functions of shock j are essentially
the difference between a forecast of Zt at horizon h where a shock occurred in variable j
and a forecast where no shock occurred. When forecasting the VAR, we need to take into
account that the coefficients of the VAR differ by regimes and that the one period forecast
between h− 1 and h will depend on the coefficients of regime 1 or regime 2 according to
the transition matrix P . Therefore, a forecast h periods ahead should take into account
the history of switches from one regime to the other.
The transition matrix P is extremely informative about the likelihood of occurrence
of the k-regime h periods ahead. If there are no absorbing regimes (i.e. a regime in which
the data-generating process is locked), the diagonal elements of (P )h will tend to the
long-term likelihood of occurrence of the regimes. Let us call H¯ the number of periods
necessary for the transition matrix P to converge to its long-term likelihood of occurrence
of each regime.
Figure 3.1 presents the method for h = 2. Panels (a) and (b) give the history of
switches if the shock occurs in the sustainable or unsustainable regime, respectively. At
each horizon h = 1, . . . , H one can observe a switch or a non-switch. This feature is
represented by the straight lines between the nodes. We also associate a probability to each
straight line that corresponds to the probability pij in P . In order to compute the impulse
response functions, we iterate forward using the dynamics pertaining to the previous node.
For instance, the top-right branch is computed as
[
ΦS
]2
whereas the bottom-right branch
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Figure 3.1  Regime-switching impulse response functions
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(b) Starting from regime U:
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Note: U and S stand for the Unsustainable and Sustainable regimes, respectively.
is computed as ΦU · ΦS. Those branches have a likelihood of occurrence of 0.9025 and
0.034, respectively. We compute 2H¯ possible histories of switches (i.e. at each horizon
h = 1, . . . , H¯ one can observe a switch or a non-switch) for h ≤ H¯. We then weight
the different paths by their likelihood of occurrence such that highly unlikely histories
carry little weight in the final value of the IRF. For h > H¯ we consider that the regime
occurring at horizon H¯ will last indefinitely.4
4Because of computational limits from the statistical software, the highest H¯ achievable is 19 periods.
However, choosing H¯ = 10 or H¯ = 15 makes little difference. To circumvent this physical limitation,
we can compute the histories of switches by simulation. We draw from the uniform distribution at each
horizon h and compare the value of the draw to the probability of switching to another regime. If the
value of the draw is smaller than the probability of switching, the data-generating process remains in the
regime it was in and switches otherwise. Taking 10 ∗ 2H draws, where H is the maximum horizon of the
computed IRFs, and averaging gives similar results to the analytical method.
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3.3 Data
We use the same yields dataset as Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton (2014) (JPS henceforth).
The final dataset ranges from the first quarter of 1972 to the last quarter of 2011. To
express monthly yields at a quarterly frequency we take the last observation of the quarter.
The maturities used are 6 months, 1 through 5 years, 7 years and 10 years.
The principal components are extracted by decomposing the variance-
covariance matrix of the eight standardized observed maturities into eigenvalues and eigen-
vectors as in Litterman and Scheinkman (1991). Consistent with previous estimates (e.g.
Cochrane and Piazzesi , 2005 ; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2009) the first three principal com-
ponents explain 97.9, 1.9 and 0.14% of the total variance of observed yields, respectively.
The literature (e.g. Litterman and Scheinkman, 1991) coined them level, slope and curva-
ture. The level factor evenly loads on all maturities, the slope factor loads negatively on
short maturities and positively on long maturities while the curvature factor is U-shaped
and thus loads positively on short and long maturities but negatively on medium maturi-
ties. These results are standard in the literature (see, for instance, Ang and Piazzesi, 2003
; Afonso and Martins, 2012). Although the first principal component captures almost all
the variation, we found it important to consider three principal components due to their
economic content put forth by the literature. For instance, the slope of the yield curve
is a good predictor for business cycle turning points (Keen, 1989 ; Estrella and Mishkin,
1998). Note, however, that the loadings have been rescaled according to the following
rules as in JPS such that the scores of the principal components have the same scale:5,6
LoadingnewLevel =
LoadingoldLevel
Σ8i=1Loading
old
Level
(3.12)
LoadingnewSlope =
LoadingoldSlope
LoadingoldSlope (10y)− LoadingoldSlope(6m)
(3.13)
LoadingnewCurv. =
LoadingoldCurvature
Load.oldCurv. (10y)− 2 · Load.oldCurv. (2y) + Load.oldCurv. (6m)
(3.14)
Figure 3.2 presents the empirical loadings from the single, sustainable, unsustainable
regimes and compares them to those obtained by imposing no-arbitrage. Several conclu-
5Since principal components are, by construction, independent from each other, a rescaling of one of
the principal components has no impact on the others.
6We also used an alternative measure for yield curve factors, as in Afonso and Martins (2012), results
are robust to this specification:
Levelt =
[
y
(6m)
t + y
(2y)
t + y
(10y)
t
]
/3
Slopet =
[
y
(10y)
t − y(6m)t
]
Curvaturet =
[
y
(10y)
t − 2 ∗ y(2y)t + y(6m)t
]
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sions can be drawn from the exercise. First, loadings generally respect the shape presented
in the literature. Second, the loadings in the unsustainable regime are more erratic than in
the other configurations. However, the loadings of the level factor broadly remain around
1. Third, the difference between the empirical loadings and their no-arbitrage counter-
parts is small, although the difference with the unsustainable regime is more pronounced.
Using empirical loadings or no-arbitrage loadings would therefore make little difference
for the results.
Figure 3.2  Comparison of empirical and no-arbitrage loadings
Note: the figure presents the empirical and no-arbitrage level, slope and curvature components of the US
yield curve between 1972Q1 and 2011Q4. The no-arbitrage loadings come from the model presented in
section 3.5. The regime-specific empirical loadings are obtained by extracting the principal components
of the yields observed during the two distinct regimes.
Economic activity is captured by the CBO output gap calculated as the log difference
between actual nominal GDP and nominal potential GDP. Inflation is the yearly growth
rate of Consumer Price Index less Energy and Food prices. Bauer and Rudebusch (2015)
stress that the use of core CPI inflation is supported by the statements of monetary
policymakers. Typically, very volatile series do not greatly influence inflation expectations.
To estimate the fiscal feedback rule in Equation (3.3) we compute the primary deficit-
to-GDP ratio as total government expenditures minus total taxes and interest payments,
divided by nominal GDP. A positive value indicates deficit while a negative value indicates
surplus. See Appendix B.1 for details on the computation of the data.
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Table 3.1  Estimates of fiscal policy rule
Estimates of fiscal policy rule (1972Q1:2011Q4)
c ρ γ δ σ p q LL
Panel (a) Single-regime model
0.0004 0.862*** -0.157*** 0.652*** 584.07
(0.0005) (0.021) (0.0179) (0.103)
Panel (b) Markov-switching model: |ρst=S | < 1, cst=S = 0, δst=S = 1, δU < 0
Sustainable
0 0.937*** -0.043*** 1 0.97 615.37
(0.00) (0.00)
Unsustainable
-0.0006*** 0.608*** -0.226*** -0.005 0.67
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Note: The table reports the estimates of the feedback policy rule presented in section 3.2.1 between
1972Q1 and 2011Q4. We report the estimates for each regression separately together with their standard
errors in parenthesis. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate significance levels of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
Numbers in italic are fixed parameters.
3.4 Empirical results
3.4.1 Fiscal policy regimes
We estimate Equation (3.3) from 1971Q4 until 2011Q4. Panel (a) of Table 3.1 provides
some interesting features. First, fiscal policy is quite persistent, as the autoregressive co-
efficient indicates. Second, fiscal policy behaves in a counter-cyclical manner as expected.
Notice also that the stabilizing deficit enters with a positive sign in the single-regime
case. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than one, indicating that the
government does not react strongly enough to developments in the stabilizing deficit. The
fit is significantly improved when fiscal policy is allowed to switch from a sustainable to
an unsustainable regime and vice-versa as indicates the Information Criteria in Table 3.2.
Moreover, the non-stabilizing regime is characterized by a negative δ coefficient. Such
negative coefficient implies that the government increases its deficit when larger surpluses
are needed. We also see that fiscal policy reacts much stronger to economic developments
in the unsustainable regime than in the sustainable regime.
The literature on fiscal preferences shifts is extensive and different fiscal policy reaction
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Table 3.2  Information criteria for fiscal policy rule
Case AIC BIC HQIC
Single-regime -7.238 -7.142 -7.200
Regime-Switching -7.530 -7.280 -7.428
Note: the table reports Information Criteria for the different rules under the single-regime or regime-
switching specification. We report the Akaike (AIC), Bayes-Schwarz (BIC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQIC)
Information Criteria. Information Criteria have been re-scaled by the number of observations. A lower
value of the Information Criterion indicates a better fit, taking into consideration the number of param-
eters estimated.
Figure 3.3  Fiscal policy regimes
Note: The figure reports the smoothed probabilities of occurrence of the two regimes presented. For the
rest of the analysis, the regime is considered unsustainable if the smoothed probability of being in the
unsustainable regime is larger than 0.5.
functions have been proposed (see, for example, Bohn, 1998 ; Davig and Leeper, 2007,
2011 ; Favero and Monacelli, 2005) ; Afonso and Martins, 2012). In line with Dewachter
and Toffano (2012), we find that fiscal policy has been predominantly passive except for
four short-lived episodes of unsustainable fiscal policy. Those episodes match documented
discretionary fiscal policy decisions. The first episode is matched with the 1973 recession
that saw a drop in tax revenue while the second episode corresponds to the President
Ford's tax cuts following the oil shock and the 2-years long recession of 1973-1975. US
government has generally run positive primary deficits throughout the sample with the
exception of the nineties that saw a strong buildup of surpluses. This trend was put to
an halt and even reversed with the successive tax cuts of the Bush administration in 2002
and 2003. The fiscal stimulus packages of 2008 and 2009 (Economic Stimulus Act ($152
billions) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ($803 billions) complete the
set of unsustainable fiscal episodes. Those periods correspond to extreme events: either
large increases in spending, or sharp decreases in government revenue.
Our estimates of unsustainable fiscal policy compare well against the fiscal policy rule
developed by Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011). They estimate a regime-switching fiscal
policy rule for the United States between 1949 and 2004 where the government adjusts
taxes as a function of government debt, output, and the level of government spending.
The authors estimate the following rule:
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τt = γ
sFt
0 + γ
sFt
b bt−1 + γ
sFt
y (yt − y∗t ) + γs
F
t
g gt + σ
sF
τ 
sFt
t (3.15)
where τ is tax revenues less transfer payments, bt is the debt held by the public divided by
GDP, (yt − y∗t ) is the output gap and gt is current government purchases. The superscript
sFt stands for the fiscal policy regime. Notice that the variance is regime-dependent.
Removing transfers from tax revenues partly removes the natural movement of tax revenue
due to automatic stabilizers.
The identification of sustainable and unsustainable fiscal policy hinges on the sign
of the response of tax revenues to the lagged value of debt. A positive co-movement
indicates a sustainable fiscal policy while a negative sign indicates an unsustainable fiscal
policy. Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) identify fiscal policy as unsustainable in 1955-67,
1969-1971, 1975, 1979-86, and 2002-2004.7 The start of these periods broadly correspond
to the start of the periods we uncover, although their regimes are more persistent.
There are two main differences between Equations (3.3) and (3.15). The first is that
Davig and Leeper consider that the principal fiscal policy instrument are taxes and that
they react to developments in government spending. The rule of Favero and Monacelli
(2005), on the other hand, considers the final outcome of developments in both taxes and
government spending and removes the effect of borrowing on the budget. Secondly, recall
that dSt =
(ζt−ibt)
(1+ζt)
∗ bt−1. The multiplying factor in front of the lagged value of the debt
is time-varying and oscillates around 1, whereas it is fixed to 1 in the rule of Davig and
Leeper. In some sense, we relax this embedded assumption in Davig and Leeper's rule.
3.4.2 Impulse response functions
An alternative identification strategy is to impose a priori the sign of the response of some
variables of the VAR. Those restrictions are dictated by economic theory. We slightly
adapt the identification strategy of Forni and Gambetti (2010). A positive aggregate
demand shock raises both output and the price level, but decreases the deficit-to-GDP
ratio whereas a positive aggregate supply shock raises output but reduces the price level.
The response of the deficit is left unrestricted. A positive deficit shock raises the primary
deficit to GDP ratio as well as inflation and output. With this identification, we can
disentangle private aggregate demand shocks from public aggregate demand shocks. We
impose such restrictions from impact to three quarters after the shock. We summarize
the restrictions in Table 3.3.
One advantage of the sign restrictions is that shocks identified through this method do
not suffer from doubts about the timing and exogeneity of variables included in the VAR.
The identification, however, is not exact as is the case with the Cholesky decomposition.
7Additional information can be found in Appendix B.6.
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Table 3.3  Sign restrictions
Variable\Shock Aggregate Supply Aggregate Demand Deficit
Inflation - + +
Output + + +
Deficit/GDP ? - +
Note: A question mark indicates that the response is left unrestricted. The longest horizon up until
which the sign restrictions apply is fixed at three quarters after the shock.
Figure 3.4 presents the impulse responses from a one percentage point deficit shock
identified with sign restrictions together with its corresponding 90% confidence bands
based on 500 accepted draws. Panel (j) presents the response of the primary deficit
to a public demand shock. The persistence of the shock differs greatly across regimes,
although both are extremely persistent. A deficit shock raises inflation and output, as per
the restrictions. However we can see that the positive response of output is short-lived
and even turns negative after twelve quarters. The response on inflation is, however,
undoubtedly positive and persistent for both regimes. Turning to the yields responses, we
can detect a difference between regimes. In the sustainable case, yields increase with a
delay of ten quarters, whereas the response of yields in the unsustainable regime is much
quicker. In fact, all yields in the unsustainable regime significantly increase after the third
quarter. In particular, the 1-year rate increases by 53 basis points on impact while the
increase for the 10-years is only 16 basis points and is not significant. At the 12-quarters
horizon, yields in the unsustainable regime have increased by 68 basis points for the 1-
year, and 50 basis points for the other maturities. The yields in the sustainable regime,
in contrast, increase by 1 percentage point for the 1-year, and 80 basis points for the 10-
years. Though the increase in sovereign interest rates is larger in the sustainable regime,
the confidence bands markedly differ across the two regimes. Public demand shocks are
identified much more precisely in the unsustainable regime. If we decompose the variation
of yields into their principal components, we can see that it is mostly the level factor that
drives the responses, as was expected. However, it is interesting to see that the slope
decreases from impact up until the 12th quarter when fiscal policy is unsustainable while
the response in the sustainable regime exhibits a delay.
Our results are larger than what the literature has presented. Dai and Philippon
(2005), for example, report that a shock of 1 percentage point to the deficit increases the
10-years bond by about 25-35 basis points. Their identification is different, as they use
the identification strategy presented in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Laubach (2009)
uses the projected deficit/GDP and reach a similar magnitude as Gale and Orszag (2003)
in their survey. We posit that this difference is due to the identification strategy. Indeed,
the sign restrictions identification allows public demand shocks to have a larger influence
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on the variables included in the VAR than would be allowed by a Cholesky decomposition
where the deficit variable is ordered last. Indeed, a large share of the effect of fiscal policy
on output would already be captured by the output shock because the output shock
appears before in the ordering.
Figure 3.4  Impulse response functions
Note: The figure presents the responses of the yields and variables included in the VAR to a one-percentage
increase in the deficit. The shocks are identified with sign restrictions. The horizon of the restrictions
corresponds to the dark shade. The light shade gives the 90% confidence bands of the unsustainable regime
(left axis) around its median in solid line while the dashed and circled lines pertain to the sustainable
regime (right axis). Both axes give the response of the variables in percentage points.
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3.4.3 Forecast error variance decomposition
We present the median variance decomposition of shocks in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 at horizons
of 1, 4, 20 and 40 quarters. Variance decomposition gives the share of the response that
can be attributed to each shock, at a specific horizon. We group the unidentified shocks
under the term Others.
Generally speaking, identified shocks explain between 30 and 45% of the variance of
yields. Aggregate Supply shocks are generally not informative as their share remains
stable but under 10% irrespective of maturity, regime or horizon. Most of the explained
share of yields variance therefore hinges on private and public demand shocks. Notice
that the single regime and the sustainable regime are generally in accordance such that
the comments that pertains to the sustainable regime are also valid for the single regime.
Two principal conclusions can be drawn from the variance decomposition. First, the im-
portance of deficit shocks increases with the horizon considered. It therefore appears that
deficit shocks matter more at long horizons than at short horizons. In parallel, the influ-
ence of Aggregate Demand shocks decreases with the horizon in the unsustainable regime
while the opposite holds for the sustainable regime. There is therefore a substitution be-
tween private and public demand shocks. Second, It is interesting to see that the shares
of the Aggregate Demand and deficit shocks do differ across regimes. In particular, the
importance of deficit shocks in the unsustainable regime can be twice as large as the im-
portance of the deficit shocks in the sustainable regime. The analysis of the unsustainable
regime is informative because the total share of explained shocks is consistently larger in
the unsustainable regime than under the sustainable regime. Forecast Error Variance
Decomposition for the sign restrictions identification therefore stresses the importance of
considering fiscal policy regimes as well as deficit shocks. With deficit shocks identified
with sign restrictions, our estimates of the importance of deficit shocks fall between Ang
and Piazzesi (2003) and Dai and Philippon (2005). Typically, the former find that their
macro factors explain up to 85% of the total variance of impulse response functions for
short bonds and 50% for long bonds while the latter estimate that fiscal policy shocks
explain up to 12% of the variance in yields from 1 quarter to 10-years at a 40 quarters
horizon.
3.5 Risk premium accounting
3.5.1 A dynamic term structure model with unspanned macro
risks
The model above is silent about the quantification of the risk premium embedded in the
US term structure of interest rates. Indeed, the risk premium is the difference between a
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Table 3.4  Median variance decomposition for yields (1-year, 3-years)
Shock to: Others Supply Demand Deficit
1-year
Single
Horizon: 1 73 7 12 8
4 70 6 15 9
20 57 6 19 19
40 56 5 19 20
Unsustainable
Horizon: 1 62 3 10 24
4 62 3 10 24
20 55 3 9 34
40 56 4 7 34
Sustainable
Horizon: 1 75 7 10 8
4 74 6 11 8
20 58 6 21 16
40 55 6 23 17
3-years
Single
Horizon: 1 68 7 15 10
4 67 6 17 10
20 59 4 19 18
40 55 5 19 21
Unsustainable
Horizon: 1 70 5 16 9
4 68 4 16 12
20 55 3 12 29
40 56 4 10 31
Sustainable
Horizon: 1 73 5 13 9
4 70 6 15 10
20 58 5 21 16
40 56 5 20 18
Note: The table reports the variance decomposition for yields of maturity 1- and 3-years. The rows may
not sum to 100 due to rounding. The shocks are identified with sign restrictions. Unidentified shocks are
grouped under the label Others.
risk-averse and a risk-neutral world. The model in Section 3.2.2 still suffers from potential
arbitrage opportunities. This section fills this gap and presents a multi-regime dynamic
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Table 3.5  Median variance decomposition for yields (3-years, 5-years)
Shock to: Others Supply Demand Deficit
5-years
Single
Horizon: 1 68 6 15 11
4 69 6 16 10
20 59 4 18 19
40 57 4 17 22
Unsustainable
Horizon: 1 74 6 15 5
4 71 5 16 8
20 56 3 12 29
40 55 4 10 31
Sustainable
Horizon: 1 71 6 13 10
4 70 7 12 11
20 59 5 19 16
40 57 5 20 18
10-years
Single
Horizon: 1 76 5 11 9
4 75 4 10 10
20 59 5 15 21
40 57 5 15 23
Unsustainable
Horizon: 1 70 7 18 5
4 67 7 18 8
20 55 4 11 30
40 54 4 10 33
Sustainable
Horizon: 1 71 7 13 9
4 70 7 13 10
20 59 5 17 18
40 57 5 18 20
Note: The table reports the variance decomposition for yields of maturity 1- and 3-years. The rows may
not sum to 100 due to rounding. The shocks are identified with sign restrictions. Unidentified shocks are
grouped under the label Others.
term structure model with unspanned factors. As a consequence, we need to slightly
modify the model presented in Section 3.2.2. Joslin, Singleton and Zhu (2011) have
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proved that, from a collection of J yields, there exists a rotation of L < J latent factors
that is observationally equivalent to observed yields portfolios, provided zero measurement
error is assumed for the latent factors. We can therefore treat our observable level, slope
and curvature factors as latent in the dynamic term structure model (DTSM).
We depart from the usual view predominant in term structure modeling that all rel-
evant information about the state of the economy is embedded in the yield curve, what
Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton (2014) have called the macro-spanning condition. As a
consequence, variation in macro variables is not perfectly correlated with the yield curve.
Evidence suggests that there is indeed unspanned macroeconomic variation (see Joslin,
Priebsch and Singleton, 2014 ; Duffee 2002, 2011, 2012 ; Cooper, 2009 ; Ludvigson and
Ng 2009).8
Any no-arbitrage term structure model is fully described by three elements: a time
series representation of the risk factors under the real-world, risk-neutral probability mea-
sures and an equation that links the short-rate to the priced risk factors. In our DTSM
with unspanned macro risks, the first element is given by re-organizing Equation (3.6)
such that yield factors are ordered first. Although this has no influence on the values of
the parameters Φ, it does have an influence on the Cholesky decomposition of ΣPP which
is used to compute the scaled market prices of risk (see Equations (3.18) and (3.19)).
Placing the yields portfolios first ensures that (ΣPP)
−1/2 does not contain information
about macroeconomic innovations.
The risk factors under the real-world probability measure P therefore follow a Vector
Autoregression (VAR) of order 1 of the form:
Zt =
[
Pt
Mt
]
=
[
µP
µM
]
+
[
ΦPP ΦPM
ΦMP ΦMM
]
Zt−1 + t
=
[
Pt
Mt
]
=
[
µP
µM
]
+
[
ΦPP ΦPM
ΦMP ΦMM
][
Pt
Mt
]
+
[
Pt
Mt
]
(3.16)
and
Σ = E[t, t] =
[
ΣPP ΣPM
ΣMP ΣMM
]
. (3.17)
Assuming no-arbitrage, there exists a risk-neutral probability measure Q that can be
used to price government bonds. The stochastic discount factor mt+1 that defines the
change of probability measure between P− and Q−measures is exponentially affine and
takes the form:
8See also Appendix B.5 for an application of the several tests of the macro-spanning condition set
forth by the literature.
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mt+1 = exp
(
−rt − λ
′
tλt
2
− λ′tP,t+1
)
(3.18)
where the scaled market prices of risk are given by:
λt = (ΣPP)
−1/2 (λ0 + λ1Zt) (3.19)
with λ0 =
[
λP0
]
LxL
, λ1 =
[
λP1 LxL λ
M
1 LxM
]
.
Second, for unspanned macro risk term structure models, it is important to make a
distinction between the total set of risk factors and the set of priced risk factors. The
whole set of risk factors is denoted by Zt and includes both macro and yield curve risk
factors while the priced factors only include the yield curve risk factors. The priced risk
factors under the risk-neutral probability measure Q follow a VAR that is independent of
the macro factors because macro risk factors are not spanned by the yield curve:
Pt = µQP + ΦQPPPt−1 + QP,t, QP,t ∼ N
(
0,ΣQ
)
(3.20)
The only way macro factors enter the model is as additional predictors in the VAR in
Equation (3.5). The macro factors will therefore affect real-world expectations of future
yields. The bottom-left corner of expression (3.6) is crucial as it determines the effects
of macro variables on expectations of yields. If this part of the feedback matrix Φ is
restricted to zero, macro variables completely drop out of the model. They can neither
affect bond pricing under the risk-neutral probability measure nor the real-world factors
dynamics. In that case, we end up with a yields-only model, where only Pt are the risk
factors.
Third, the one-period interest rate is an affine function of the priced risk factors (i.e.
the risk factors that enter the bond pricing equation) and is given by:
rt = ρ0 + ρ
′
1Pt. (3.21)
As opposed to spanned macro risks, the one-period interest rate only loads on the first
L principal components and not on the macroeconomic factors. Joslin, Priebsch, and
Singleton (2014) argue that having macroeconomic factors determine the short-rate in
the risk-neutral measure would bias the estimation of the risk premium.
The specification of the prices of risk in expression (3.19) corresponds to the essentially-
affine class of Duffee (2002) such that the prices of risk have a constant component λ0 and
a time-varying component λ1. They measure the additional expected return required per
unit of risk in each of the shocks in t (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2015). Notice that there
are as many rows as there are priced risk factors, and as many columns are there are risk
factors. Since macro factors are not priced factors, there are only L rows in λ0 and λ1
butM+L columns. As noted by JPS, the market prices of risk are an affine function of
the whole set of risk factors Zt despite the fact that the only priced risks are the Pt. It
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY ON SOVEREIGN YIELDS 68
follows that agents are sensitive to broader information than just yield curve factors.
Equations (3.19) to (3.21) imply that the log price p(n)t of an n-period bond at time t
is determined by an affine function that links the log bond price to the priced risk factors:
p
(n)
t = −
(
An +B
′
nPt
)
(3.22)
The no-arbitrage condition is written as:
p
(n+1)
t = Et
[
mt+1
(
p
(n)
t+1
)]
(3.23)
and states that longer bonds are risk-adjusted expected shorter bonds.
To obtain no-arbitrage loadings An and Bn one needs to solve the following difference
equations: An+1 = An +B
′
nµ
Q + 1
2
B
′
nΣPPΣ
′
PPBn + A1
B
′
n+1 = B
′
nΦ
Q
PP +B1
(3.24)
with initial conditions A1 = ρ0 and B1 = ρ1 so as to satisfy rt = p
(1)
t .
Once we have solved the difference equations for bond prices, yields can be computed
as:
y
(n)
t = −
p
(n)
t
n
= an + b
′
nPt (3.25)
where an = −An/n and bn = −Bn/n for n = 1, 2, 3, . . .
3.5.2 Regime-dependence of the DTSM
The second adaptation to our term structure model pertains to the dynamics of the
risk factors under the P−measure. We restrict the top-left corner of Φ and Σ to be
the same across regimes because the regime-switching feature should only matter for the
expectations of future yields and should not enter the bond-pricing equation. As such,
the regime-switching feature is not priced by market participants (see, for instance, Dai,
Singleton and Yang (2007) for a term structure model where regime shifts are priced) but
does influence their expectations. In some sense, the regime-switching properties are not
spanned by the yield curve. These restrictions are consistent with the unspanned macro
risks attribute of the model: yields factors matter for the characterization of the cross-
section of yields while both yields factors and macro factors determine the expectations
of the state of the economy.
Equations (3.6) and (3.7) become:
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Zt =
[
Pt
Mt
]
=
[
µP
µM
]k
+
[
ΦPP ΦkPM
ΦkMP Φ
k
MM
]
Zt−1 + t
=
[
Pt
Mt
]
=
[
µP
µM
]k
+
[
ΦPP ΦkPM
ΦkMP Φ
k
MM
][
Pt
Mt
]
+
[
Pt
Mt
]k
(3.26)
and
Σk = E[t, t] =
[
ΣPP ΣkPM
ΣkMP Σ
k
MM
]
. (3.27)
where the superscript k stands for the regime one considers.
We see that despite the identical top-left corner of the Φ matrix, the complete Φ
is regime-dependent. As a consequence, the variance-covariance matrix is also regime-
dependent. Notice that the top-left corner of Σk is especially important as it enters the
no-arbitrage model and thus determines the no-arbitrage loadings A, Bn, a, bn as well as
the market prices of risk and excess returns. Typically, as ΣPP does not depend on the
regime considered, it enters the recursive differential equations in (3.24) equally for both
regimes. Consequently, the short-rate loadings in (3.21) are also unaffected.
We select the best parameter values based on the procedure described in Section 3.2.3.
3.5.3 Market prices of risk
The market prices of risk transform the risk factors dynamics under P into the risk factors
dynamics under Q and vice-versa. More specifically,
µQP = µP − ΣPPλ0 (3.28)
ΦQP = ΦPP − ΣPPλ1 (3.29)
Scaled market prices of risk are thus given by:ΣPPλ0 = µP − µ
Q
P
ΣPPλ1 = [ΦPP ΦPM ]−
[
ΦQPP 0LxM
] (3.30)
The largest difference in bond risk premia will presumably come from the market
prices of risk in Equation (3.30) because ΦkPM can greatly differ. Similarly, most of
the differences across regimes of the responses of the dependent variables will be due to
different parameter values in Φk and Σk.
3.5.4 Excess returns
Recall that the price of a bond of maturity n at time t is given by:
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P
(n)
t = exp (− (An +BnPt)) (3.31)
The Expected Excess Returns are therefore computed as:
rx
(n)
t = Et
[
log
(
P
(n−1)
t+1
)
− log
(
P
(n)
t
)]
− rt (3.32)
= Et [−An−1 −Bn−1Pt+1 − (−An −BnPt)]− rt (3.33)
Notice that only Pt+1 is unknown at time t. Reworking expression (3.33) yields:
rx
(n)
t = (An − An−1) + (BnPt −Bn−1 ∗ Et+1 [Pt])− rt (3.34)
= (An − An−1) + (BnPt −Bn−1 ∗ Pt ∗ [ΦPP ΦPM ])− rt (3.35)
Table 3.6 provides information about the scaled market prices of risk. The price of risk
gives the compensation required by bondholders to be exposed to this risk. The prices of
risk should be understood as the sensitivity of risk premia to the exposure of shocks. A
positive value in column i implies a positive co-movement of the risk premium with the
exposure to risk i. Conversely, a negative value should be considered as a hedge.
First, although JPS impose some zero-restrictions on the prices of risk motivated
by improvement in Information Criteria, we obtain the same signs of the co-movements
between the exposures to level, slope, curvature shocks and the expected excess returns
on the yields portfolios level, slope and curvature as JPS, whether we consider the single,
sustainable or unsustainable regime. Exposures to deficit shocks have ambiguous effects
on the level, slope and curvature portfolios depending on the regime one considers. Indeed,
while the sign and magnitude of the pro-cyclicality of the risk premium associated to the
curvature portfolio induced by exposure to deficit shocks is the same for the three cases,
we can see that the sensitivity to deficit shocks is markedly larger in the unsustainable
regime for the slope portfolio. It is also worth nothing that the exposure to deficit shocks
has a positive co-movement with the level risk premium in the unsustainable regime, as
compared to a negative co-movement for the single and sustainable regime.
We present the one-period expected excess returns for a selection of maturities in
Figure 3.5. Similarly to the IRFs, we consider that expectations h periods ahead take
into account the history of switches until h. With one-period forecast and two regimes,
this amounts to:
P∗, k=it =
[
µk=iP + [ΦMP , ΦPP ]
k=i ∗ Zt−1
]
∗ pii
+
[
µk=jP + [ΦMP , ΦPP ]
k=j ∗ Zt−1
]
∗ pij
(3.36)
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Table 3.6  Scaled market prices of risks λ0 and λ1
Exposure to: const L S C Inflation Output Deficit
Single
Lt -0.001 -0.067 -0.022 0.175 0.086 0.046 -0.008
St 0.002 0.052 -0.122 -0.077 -0.061 -0.108 -0.040
Ct 0.003 -0.054 -0.023 -0.272 0.011 0.038 0.059
Unsustainable
Lt -0.001 -0.099 -0.05 0.126 0.055 0.001 0.015
St 0.003 0.091 -0.102 -0.013 -0.029 0.001 -0.104
Ct 0.008 -0.077 -0.039 -0.328 -0.046 0.018 0.055
Sustainable
Lt 0.001 -0.099 -0.05 0.126 0.112 0.044 -0.003
St -0.001 0.091 -0.102 -0.013 -0.096 -0.111 -0.034
Ct 0.005 -0.077 -0.039 -0.328 0.040 0.038 0.060
Note: The table reports the scaled market prices of risks in the single, sustainable and unsustainable
regimes. Portfolios of bonds are found in the rows while the risks factors are found in columns. The
column const corresponds to the time-fixed price of risk λ0 while the rest of the columns correspond to
entries of the time-varying prices of risk λ1.
where the asterisk denotes a forecast, i is the regime considered and j the other regime.
We therefore provide a counterfactual for the analysis of bond risk premia: what would
have been the risk premium at time t had fiscal policy been sustainable or non-sustainable?
The estimated risk premia broadly correspond to risk premia described in Cochrane
and Piazzesi (2005, 2009) with a clear business-cycle pattern. Strong negative excess
returns match with the start of the monetary experiment of 1979-1982. It is clear that
unsustainable fiscal policy consistently implies higher risk premia than in the sustainable
or single regime, although the difference is less pronounced for long maturities. This
difference is particularly large in the second half of the nineties. It is worth noting,
however, that this pattern vanishes from 2010 onward where we see that risk premia
associated with the sustainable regime are larger than in its unsustainable counterpart for
short maturities. We conjecture that this feature is due to the accommodative monetary
policy that was taking place at the time. Notice also that risk premia associated with the
unsustainable fiscal policy regime experience a sharp decrease in periods of unsustainable
fiscal policy while sustainable fiscal policy risk premia increase during those periods.
3.6 Conclusions
We have presented an empirical term structure model that emphasizes the role fiscal pol-
icy on sovereign yields and have estimated it between 1972 and 2012. With this in mind,
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Figure 3.5  One-period expected excess returns
Note: The figure reports the one-period expected excess returns for US yields between 1972Q1 and
2011Q4 according to the two types of regimes we consider. The solid line pertains to the unsustainable
regime while the dashed line refers to the sustainable regime. The gray area corresponds to episodes of
unsustainable fiscal policy.
we introduce macroeconomic variables alongside the usual three yield curve factors: level,
slope and curvature. Inflation, the output gap and the primary deficit thus complete the
set of risk factors that determine bond yields dynamics. The particularity of our model is
that the behavior of the risk factors that describe bond yields dynamics is allowed to de-
pend on the sustainability of debt. Such a criterion is derived from the debt-accumulation
equation such that the regimes identified are grounded in theory. In order to disentangle
sustainable from unsustainable periods, we apply a regime-switching regression model to
a simple feedback rule that determines the current primary deficit as a function of past
deficits, the business cycle and the deficit that is required to stabilize the debt-to-GDP.
We show that fiscal policy in the United States has been predominantly sustainable, with
a few episodes of unsustainable fiscal policy. Typically, the model identifies the periods
of 1972, 1975, 2002-3 and 2008-9 as unsustainable. These correspond to well-documented
decisions where governments either reduced taxes or increased spending dramatically.
In order to conclude on the effect of fiscal policy shocks on the yield curve, we present
impulse response functions where the shocks are identified with sign restrictions. The
impulse response functions and the variance decomposition show that conditioning on
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fiscal regimes is not trivial. Sovereign yields typically increase by 50 to 68 basis points after
three years following an unexpected deficit shock in the unsustainable and sustainable
regime, respectively. Though the increase is large in the sustainable regime, deficit shocks
are better identified in the unsustainable regime. Sovereign yields also respond more
quickly in the unsustainable regime. If we decompose the total effect on yields into their
components, we can see that most of the movement in yields is due to the level and, to a
lesser extent, the slope factor, with a more pronounced decrease in the slope of the yield
curve in the unsustainable regime. Variance decomposition indicates that the influence of
deficit can be twice as important in the unsustainable regime compared to its sustainable
counterpart and that there is a substitution between private and public demand shocks
across the two regimes.
We also characterize the risk premium embedded in the US yield curve by imposing
no-arbitrage restrictions on the dynamics of the risk factors. Following Joslin, Priebsch
and Singleton (2014), we relax what they call the macro-spanning condition, that is,
macroeconomic factors determine expectations of future yields but do not enter the bond-
pricing equation. The risk premium derived from the model is broadly consistent with
the literature, with the particularity that risk premia in the unsustainable fiscal policy
regime are consistently larger than in the sustainable regime.
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Chapter 4
Cross-Border Risks in the Eurozone
Bond Markets
4.1 Introduction
Following the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010, academics and policymakers have
shifted their focus towards understanding the causes and consequences of contagion in
bond markets. When the Credit Rating Agency Moody's downgraded Portugal on July
5, 2011, it stated that the possible involvement of the private sector for further financing
schemes in Greece would have repercussions on Portuguese financing opportunities.1 The
Portuguese downgrade and increasing fears of a Greek default led investors to rapidly sell
Spanish and Italian bonds even if there were no negative announcements regarding their
economic outlook.2
The anecdotal evidence highlighted above suggests that developments in foreign coun-
tries may affect the domestic bond market under scrutiny in a non-trivial way. It therefore
seems natural to empirically assess the importance of those potential spillover effects. In
this respect, the Eurozone is particularly relevant because it offers a framework where
monetary policy applies uniformly to the member states but where fiscal policy remains a
decentralized decision. Modeling contagion is especially meaningful for macroprudential
policies because this framework can take into account direct and indirect effects of macroe-
conomic policies. Additionally, analyzing risk transmission within a monetary union is
1According toMoody's, one of the reasons motivating the downgrade was twofold: [First, t]he growing
risk that Portugal will require a second round of official financing before it can return to the private
market, and [second,] the increasing possibility that private sector creditor participation will be required
as a pre-condition. [. . . ] European policymakers have grown increasingly concerned about the shifting
of Greek debt held by private investors onto the balance sheets of the official sector. Should a Greek
restructuring become necessary at some future date, a shift from private to public financing would imply
that an increasingly large share of the cost would need to be borne by public sector creditors. To offset
this risk, some policymakers have proposed that private sector participation should be a precondition for
additional rounds of official lending to Greece.
2Contagion and the European debt crisis, Keynote lecture by Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the
ECB at the Bocconi University/Intesa Sanpaolo conference on Bank Competitiveness in the Post-crisis
World Milan, 10 October 2011.
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sensible because the exchange rate channel of transmission between member states cannot
play a role.
The present research aims to quantify the extent of the transmission of sovereign risk
from one country of the eurozone to the rest of the Union. In particular, I want to
determine how much of domestic spreads is attributed to foreign factors and whether
there is heterogeneity in the eurozone in that respect. With this objective in mind,
I employ a macro-finance model with spatial linkages where the domestic spreads vis-
à-vis a common risk-free rate explicitly includes domestic, foreign and common factors.
Introducing spatial linkages is particularly relevant in the European context where capital
markets are integrated and cross-border financial flows are unrestricted. Moreover, using
spatial econometrics techniques provides an additional transmission channel of economic
shocks.
I contribute to the literature along three dimensions. First, I construct a multi-market
macro-finance model for euro area countries where domestic bond spreads depend on three
types of factors: domestic, foreign, and global. Foreign factors are modeled as a weighted
average of developments in other countries of the zone. Global factors represent the
general state of the economy and does not depend on domestic developments. Second, the
multivariate setup allows me to obtain richer dynamic responses thanks to cross-equations
coefficients. In contrast, univariate regressions would be silent on the effect of foreign
fiscal policy on domestic inflation, for example. Third, I propose a new transmission
mechanism that relies on the exposure of domestic commercial banks to foreign sovereign
debt. The mechanism is as follows: in an integrated market where free movement of
capital is allowed, domestic commercial banks may hold foreign debt as an asset. If
economic conditions worsen in the foreign economy, the demand for its debt will decrease,
driving down the price of the bonds. The commercial bank that currently holds the
bond therefore sees the net present value of its claims shrinking. Its loan-to-assets ratio
increases as a consequence, which in turn increases its risk of default. The bank may
then adjust its amount of loans to the private sector, reducing credit to the private sector.
Less investment means smaller domestic growth. A recession is therefore imported from
abroad.
In terms of closest neighbors in the literature, Dewachter et al. (2015) study the
influence of external factors in domestic spreads for five euro area countries. They conclude
that the importance of external factors is sizeable and that this influence is country-
dependent. I also extend the framework of Dewachter, Houssa and Toffano (2012) by
including financial variables so as to consider both the macro side of the economy as
well as its financial aspects. A third article closely related to this research is Debarsy et
al. (2018) whose aim is to detect heterogeneity in the spatial transmission of sovereign
bond spreads for 41 advanced and emerging economies. Their setup is different than mine
because they consider univariate regressions whereas I present here a multivariate model.
I estimate the model on monthly data for ten eurozone countries for the period
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY ON SOVEREIGN YIELDS 77
2002M10 to 2017M3, which captures both expansions and downturns in Europe. The
common factors include global and European variables in the form of a World Real Eco-
nomic Activity (WREA) index (Kilian, 2009), the VSTOXX index that captures volatility
in the European stock market (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012) and proxies the Global Fi-
nancial Cycle (Rey, 2015), and finally principal components that summarize the Overnight
Index Swaps (OIS) curve to capture the European risk-free rate. Domestic factors include
inflation, the output gap, the primary deficit and the Country-Level Indicator of Financial
Stress (CLIFS) provided by the ECB. I use the impulse response functions of a Spatial
Vector Autoregression model to analyze the transmission of shocks in one country of the
Union to another. This modeling choice allows me to characterize the sources of move-
ments in the domestic bond market. Variance decomposition then helps quantify to which
extent global, foreign and domestic shocks matter for domestic macroeconomic policies.
I identify the shocks in a similar way to Dewachter, Houssa and Toffano (2012). That is,
I impose a double-sorting prior to the Cholesky decomposition: by economic size of the
country, and by the sluggishness of the variables considered such that bigger countries
and slow-moving variables are ordered first.
In accordance to the literature (e.g. Debarsy et al., 2018 ; Beirne and Fratzscher,
2013), results indicate that spatial components provide additional information to explain
bond yields differentials. The main results can be summarized as follows. First, countries
from the core (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland) do not generate
spillovers. This statement is true for both big and small countries. On the other hand,
there is evidence of spillovers within the periphery (Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal). In
particular, Italian shocks generate large spillovers to Spain, Ireland and Portugal. For
every one percentage point increase in the 5-years Italian spread, the spreads of Spain,
Ireland and Portugal increase by 90, 60 and 95 basis points, respectively. Second, around
25% of domestic spreads are due to external factors: common factors account for 10%
of domestic spreads, foreign factors (i.e. factors from other countries of the eurozone)
for 15%. There is considerable heterogeneity in this respect. Periphery countries tend to
depend more heavily on external factors than countries in the core. For example, 40% of
Portuguese spreads are due to foreign factors. This heterogeneity suggests the existence
of two euro areas, on the one side a series of insulated core countries, and on the other
side an archipelago of periphery countries.
The results have important implications for the conduct of macroprudential policies in
Europe. First, Italy should be closely watched because of (i) the contagion it can create
and (ii) the degree of exposure to its debt. Second, adjustment packages for small countries
should be managed as a system and should incorporate the idea that domestic policies
may have little effect on the country's spreads if a large proportion of it is explained by
external factors. Third, the results suggest that increased coordination among European
countries may be beneficial in terms of financing costs for governments. In particular,
a strengthening of the fiscal union appears to be a solution to weather sovereign risk
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contagion.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. I present the relevant related
literature in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 describes the empirical methodology while Section
4.4 presents the data and their transformation prior to the analysis. I present the results
and their policy implications in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, respectively. Section 4.7 presents a
few avenues that could be explored in the future. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
Economists have understood early on that the assessment of the transmission of macroe-
conomic shocks across countries was of particular importance. Eichengreen et al. (1996)
and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) provide evidence of contagion across countries due to
trade linkages and financial connectedness, respectively. Theoretical macroeconomic mod-
els have tried to incorporate these features in Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) models, mostly in a two-country model. Galí and Monacelli (2005), for instance,
present a DSGE model of a small open economy where the transmission mechanism from
foreign variables to domestic variables hinges on the volatility of the exchange rate that
the Central Bank is willing to accept. They stress the importance of the degree of open-
ness of the economy as well as the role of world output fluctuations. Adolfson et al. (2007)
extend the closed-economy framework of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) by
introducing the exchange rate channel. This channel of transmission rests on the assump-
tion that there is incomplete exchange rate pass-through, that is price stickiness in the
local currency. These frictions can therefore generate larger real domestic effects from for-
eign shocks than under a perfectly flexible exchange rate. Indeed, Robertson and Wickens
(1997) note that a free-floating exchange rate ensures that nominal foreign shocks do not
influence domestic inflation. The mechanism is as follows: as foreign inflation increases,
the nominal exchange rate appreciates such that the real exchange rate remains the same
and does not affect domestic inflation. Since domestic inflation remains the same, there
would be no real effects. In the case of a peg, nominal and real shocks can have effects
on the domestic economy.
Despite the growing number of theoretical models that attempt to address the trans-
mission of macroeconomic shocks across countries, the issue mostly remains empirical.
Two main strands of the literature related to my study are worth noting. The first stresses
the importance of global factors to explain domestic variation. Kose, Otrok and White-
man (2003), for instance, point to the existence of a  world business cycle  obtained
through dynamic latent factor model to estimate common components in 60 countries
worldwide. They show that this global factor accounts for most of the variation in the
aggregates and that regional factors only play a minor role. The argument is even stronger
for business cycles in advanced economies than for developing countries. Based on this
idea, researchers have produced indices of global economic activity (e.g. Kilian, 2009 ;
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Ravazzolo and Vespignani, 2017). Leduc and Liu (2016) complement the field regard-
ing the importance of global factors with a DSGE model that incorporates labor search
frictions such that uncertainty shocks generate real effects. When uncertainty increases,
firms tend to postpone their hiring decision, and it results in fewer job position being
filled. Domestic aggregate demand falls because households wealth decreases.
As Rigobon (2016) reports, the literature has proposed a large variety of methods to
deal with the issue of spillovers and contagion: (extreme) correlations, principal compo-
nents, event studies or regressions. The empirical literature on spillovers has produced
an abundant body of evidence and suggests that foreign determinants contain valuable
information about the domestic economy. Such literature typically uses spatial econo-
metrics techniques or Global Vector Autoregressions (GVAR) popularized by Pesaran,
Schuermann and Weiner (2004) to detect and quantify the spatial transmission of shocks.
The shocks considered range from labor market shocks (Bettendorf, 2013) to credit shocks
(Fadejeva, Feldkircher and Reininger, 2015 ; Bettendorf, 2016) and exchange rate shocks
(Kelejian, Tavlas and Hondroyiannis, 2009). Particularly relevant is the literature dealing
with the assessment of contagion effects on the sovereign bond market. Following the
deterioration in the solvency of a country in a monetary union, investors may want to
safeguard their returns and reduce their exposure to the particularly risky asset. This
drop in the demand for the risky asset would drive up its yield and consequently worsen
the debt sustainability of an already fragile country. The increased instability would cast
doubt upon the strength of the monetary union and would translate into higher yields for
the whole monetary union. Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), for example, analyze to which
extent bond spreads are explained by the fundamentals of the country under consideration
or by contagion, that is, correlation in excess of what could be explained by economic
fundamentals. They present evidence of such contagion during the 2008-2011 crisis. This
echoes Caporin et al. (2015) who show that the contagion effect remains stable across the
periods considered. Recently, Debarsy et al. (2018) investigate the question of spatially-
dependent bond yields spreads for 41 advanced and emerging economies. In their model,
the spreads vis-à-vis the 10-year US bond yield exhibit both a contemporaneous spatial
lag structure as well as a spatio-temporal lag structure. Splitting the sample into ad-
vanced and emerging economies allows them to compare the strength of the transmission
mechanism within and between these two groups. Specifically, they show that spatial
linkages are stronger in advanced economies than in emerging economies.
The open-economy modeling framework of the term structure of interest rates postu-
lates that domestic capital markets are closely related to their external counterparts. The
recent works by Traczyk (2013), Dewachter et al. (2015), Bauer and de los Rios (2012)
and Borgy et al. (2011) fall into this category. This strand of the literature concludes
that common (or external) factors account for a large proportion of the observed varia-
tion of bond yields. More precisely, Traczyk (2013) build a no-arbitrage dynamic term
structure model for Canada, Germany, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom
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where he augments domestic factors (inflation, output growth, short-term rate and the
yield spread) with foreign factors (short-term rate, inflation, output growth) weighted by
the importance of the ten biggest trading partners. Principal component decomposition
of the yields of the countries considered points to the existence of a common level fac-
tor and, to a lesser extent, a slope and curvature factor. Dewachter et al. (2015) build
a multi-country affine term structure model for five countries of the Eurozone with un-
spanned domestic factors, in the same vein as Bauer and de los Rios (2012). A factor
is unspanned if it describes the time series properties of bond yields but does not enter
the pricing equation (Joslin, Priebsch, Singleton, 2014). For each country in the anal-
ysis, they distinguish factors according to two dimensions: spanned vs. unspanned and
common vs. domestic. The first two principal components of the Overnight Index Swaps
are introduced alongside domestic spreads such that the domestic bond pricing equation
includes both a common and an idiosyncratic component. As a consequence, several bond
markets are conditioned on the same risk-neutral probability measure. Other macroeco-
nomic factors and euro-wide spreads indicators fill the unspanned category. They find
that common economic fundamentals account for 40 to 60% of the variance of bond yield
spreads whereas idiosyncratic risk factors account for about 12% of the variance of bond
yield spreads. The rest of the variance is explained by non-fundamental factors common
to all countries.
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Spatial linkages in a macro-finance model
To emphasize the spatial link across markets, I build a Spatial Vector Autoregression
(SpVAR) model where both the temporal and spatial dimensions of the panel of coun-
tries are taken into account. Models in spatial econometrics assume a structure among
the spatial units analyzed. This structure is set a priori and must correspond to an
economically-relevant mechanism to be interpreted.
The Spatial VAR specification differs from the Global VAR specification in several
aspects. First, spatial lags in GVAR are restricted to appear with a temporal lag. The
Spatial VAR is therefore more flexible in that we can assume that spatial lags enter the
equations contemporaneously, with a lag, or both. Second, the GVAR approach supposes
that the coefficients for the foreign variables are country-specific, which leads to a rapid
explosion of the number of parameters to estimate. In this article, I restrict the spatial lag
coefficients to be identical across all countries. The Spatial VAR specification presented
here is therefore parsimonious in the number of parameters to estimate.
Let us define Zi,t the vector of L demeaned risk factors of country i at time t. The
vectors Z∗i,t and Z
∗
i,t−1 contain the spatial components of the domestic equations and
correspond to a weighted average of foreign variables at time t and t − 1, respectively.
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Exogenous variables are denoted by Ht and contain exogenous factors common to the M
countries. The Spatial VAR(1) for each country i takes the form: Zi,t = ΦiZi,t−1 + ΓZ∗i,t + ΞZ∗i,t−1 + κiHt + i,tHt = ΦHHt−1 + H,t (4.1)
The square matrix Φi is a feedback matrix capturing the temporal dynamics of the
L factors in Zi,t for country i = 1, . . . ,M . The vector i,t contains i.i.d. shocks with
mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Σi. Notice that Ht follows an autonomous
VAR of order 1 such that H,t and i,t are uncorrelated. Equation 4.1 assumes that
common variables in Ht have a contemporaneous effect onto the Zi but Ht is insulated
from feedback effects from Z. These foreign factors are specific to each country and are
computed according to the following rules:Z∗i,t = Ωi (Z1,t, · · · , ZM,t)Z∗i,t−1 = Ωi (Z1,t−1, · · · , ZM,t−1) (4.2)
where Ωi is the ith row of a matrix of non-zero entries except for the variables pertaining to
country i that represents the strength of the linkages between the countries considered.
The spatial dependence of each element l = 1, . . . , L of Z∗i,t and Z
∗
i,t−1 is given by the
so-called spatial lags and spatio-temporal lags coefficients Γ and Ξ, respectively:
Γ =
 γ11 · · · γ1L... . . . ...
γL1 · · · γLL
 and Ξ =
 ξ11 · · · ξ1L... . . . ...
ξL1 · · · ξLL
 (4.3)
Elements on the diagonal of Γ give the own spatial lags whereas the off-diagonal
elements of Γ capture the cross-spatial lags. Analogously, elements on the diagonal of Ξ
give the own spatio-temporal lags whereas the off-diagonal elements of Ξ capture the cross-
spatio-temporal lags. Such a structure allows, for example, foreign inflation developments
to have an effect on domestic output contemporaneously or with a lag. Exposure to
the common variables Ht, represented by the coefficients in κi, is contemporaneous but
different across countries.
Notice that the model presented in Equation (4.1) nests the standard VAR put forth
by Sims (1980) if Γ = 0 and Ξ = 0. It also nests cross-sectional spatial models if we
assume that Φi = 0 and Ξ = 0 (see, for instance, Anselin, 1988 ; Cliff and Ord, 1973 ;
Elhorst, 2003 ; Kapoor et al., 2007).
Stacking theM country-by-country equations yields (Beenstock and Felsenstein, 2007): Z˜t = Φ˜Z˜t−1 + Γ˜Ω˜Z˜∗t + Ξ˜Ω˜Z˜∗t−1 + κ˜Ht + i,tHt = ΦHHt−1 + H,t (4.4)
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where Φ˜ = IM ⊗ Φi, Γ˜ = IM ⊗ Γ, Ω˜ = IL ⊗ Ωi , κ˜ = IM ⊗ κ, Ix stands for the identity
matrix of size x and ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
For the rest of the analysis, Zt includes the yearly inflation rate, the output gap,
the primary deficit over GDP and the Country-Level Indicator of Financial Stress. The
last element aims at capturing domestic uncertainty. The vector Ht contains a measure
of the global business cycle, a measure of European uncertainty and the first principal
components of the OIS curve for which the number of components retained will be specified
later on. Introducing common variables in the model is useful because it ensures that
observed spatial diffusion is not due to unobserved common variables.
Notice that it is not possible to estimate Equation (4.1) by OLS due to the presence
of the spatial components Γ˜. Indeed, there is an obvious problem of endogeneity because
Zi,t appears on the left-hand side and the right-hand side of Equation (4.4). I therefore
estimate the model by Maximum Likelihood for each equation l = 1, . . . , L separately
and impose stationarity on the dynamics of Zli. Stationarity criteria need to take both
the temporal and the spatial dynamics into account. The VAR for the common variables
is estimated by OLS.
The log-likelihood function to be maximized for each variable l is given by (Parent
and LeSage, 2011):3
lnLl = − (M/2) ln (piσ2l ) + ln |IM − γllΩ| −
e′l,tel,t
2σ2l
el,t = Z˜l,t − Φ˜lZ˜l,t−1 − Γ˜lΩ˜Z˜∗l,t − Ξ˜lΩ˜Z˜∗l,t−1 − κ˜lHt
(4.5)
The stationarity conditions are developed in Parent and LeSage (2011) for the uni-
variate case and are given by:
φll + (γll + ξll) |ω¯max| < 1 if γll + ξll ≥ 0
φll + (γll + ξll) |ω¯min| < 1 if γll + ξll < 0
φll − (γll − ξll) |ω¯max| > −1 if γll − ξll ≥ 0
φll − (γll − ξll) |ω¯min| > −1 if γll − ξll < 0
(4.6)
where |ω¯min| and |ω¯max| are the minimum and maximum moduli of Ω.
Since the parameters governing the own spatial lag γll and own spatio-temporal lag
ξll are common across countries but the parameter governing the own temporal lag φll
is not, the restrictions in (4.6) are applied on the largest temporal lag across countries.
Note, however, that imposing stationarity equation by equation is not equal to imposing
stationarity of the VAR as a whole. As a consequence, I ensure that the restrictions
imposed equation by equation also hold for the SpVAR. Written in a more compact form,
equation (4.4) gives:
3The subscripts l indicate the variable for which the optimization is performed.
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
(A+BL)Zt = t
A = IM − ΓW
B = − (Φ + ΞW )
(4.7)
where L stands for the lag operator. The Wold representation of (4.7) is obtained by
dividing both sides by C = A − BL. The model is stationary if the moduli of the
eigenvalues of C lie within the unit circle.
Dewachter, Houssa and Toffano (2012) stress that the Maximum Likelihood estimate
is biased because the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the panel estimation
creates an endogeneity issue (see, for instance, Lee and Yu, 2010) and that the presence
of country-specific temporal lags creates what is called the incidental parameter problem
(see, among others, Neyman and Scott, 1948 ; Lancaster, 2000). They address the first
problem by stating that lagged observed variables are independent from the current error
terms. The bias in dynamic panel regressions is of the order 1/T (Nickell, 1981). For the
second problem, Beenstock and Felsenstein (2007) provide a value for the downward bias
of the temporal lags:
b = −
1+φ
T−1
(
1− 1−φT
T (1−φ)
)
(
1− 2φ
(1−φ)(T−1)
(
1− 1−φT
T (1−φ)
)) (4.8)
where the bias tends to zero as T goes to infinity. The two problems highlighted above
are likely to be small in my setup since I cover 10 countries over 173 periods and I control
for the bias in the estimation of the temporal lags.
4.3.2 Impulse response functions
I identify the common, foreign, and domestic shocks recursively by applying the standard
Cholesky decomposition to the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals i,t from (4.4).
Identification of common shocks is, however, carried out separately due to the separability
of Equation (4.4). Common shocks are identified with the Cholesky triangular factoriza-
tion. The identification of the remaining shocks hinges on two implicit assumptions.
First, as for regular VARs, the ordering of the variables matters. Second, the ordering
of the countries matters as well in the case of a multi-country analysis. Regarding the
first assumption, the vector of domestic variables contains macroeconomic and financial
variables. I therefore order the macroeconomic variables (inflation, economic activity and
primary deficit) first and then the financial variables (CLIFS and principal components
of sovereign spreads), consistent with the idea that financial variables react contempora-
neously to macro news. Within the macro block, macroeconomic variables are ordered
according to their exogeneity: inflation can have a contemporaneous effect on economic
activity and the fiscal policy variable (Afonso and Martins, 2012). Economic activity may
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also influence the fiscal policy variable through the automatic stabilizers and is thus or-
dered second. The fiscal policy variable is the last macro variable because we can expect
considerable lag between the implementation of the policy and its effect on the economy
(Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). This structure is repeated both in the domestic part of
the regression and in the spatial lags. I follow Dewachter, Houssa and Toffano (2012) and
order the countries according to their economic size in terms of GDP. Doing so is con-
sistent with the idea that bigger countries do not respond contemporaneously to shocks
in smaller countries. Taken together, these two assumptions amount to grouping all the
series of inflation first, then of the output gap series, fiscal policy and finally the financial
variables. This re-ordering of Equation (4.4) only has an influence on the orthogonalized
impulse response functions and variance decompositions.
These two sets of identifying restrictions require a matrix R that will reorder the
variables and shocks accordingly. Let us define the re-ordered shocks, as in Dewachter,
Houssa and Toffano (2012), as ηt = Rt. The Cholesky decomposition of the ηt gives
ηt = Qvt where Q is the Cholesky factorization of the variance-covariance matrix of
ηt and vt are the structural shocks ordered first by variable, then by country. Having
performed the Cholesky factorization, we can rearrange the vector of residuals to their
initial ordering by applying the following transformation:
t = R
−1QRR−1t vt (4.9)
We can therefore recover the original ordering of the structural shocks, that is ordered
first by country and then by variable.
I bootstrap the estimation in order to obtain inference that is not based on point esti-
mates. I consider 500 bootstraps for which the stationarity conditions hold. Technically,
I use block bootstraps with a window of 24 observations. Such a choice ensures that the
time dimension of the model is preserved. The window is optimally chosen by adapting
the Hall and Horowitz (1996) rule for an AR(1) process in the Künsch's (1989) model to
the spatial case here. Typically, the autoregressive coefficient φ in the Hall and Horowitz
(1996) rule is replaced by φll + (γll + ξll) |ω¯max| ∀l = 1, . . . , L by analogy with (4.6).
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Economic variables
The data covers the period from October 2002 to March 2017 and include ten countries:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal
and Spain. I excluded Luxembourg because sufficient information about yields was not
available. I also discarded Greece because the country did not have access to market
funding for some of the sample. The observed yields would therefore not reflect market
sentiment about the solvency of the Greek government.
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The data can be divided into three categories according to their geographical breadth
and economic content. The first group contains economic information about the global or
pan-European economic situation. In particular, it covers the global economic cycle and
statistics about the European stock market as well as bond market. I include Kilian's
World Real Economic Activity (WREA) index (Kilian, 2009) following Kose, Otrok and
Whiteman (2003) who provide evidence of a world business cycle. Regarding the Euro-
pean stock market, I computed the monthly return on the Eurostoxx50 index. Introducing
the stock market into the model helps assess the general sentiment of financial markets. I
also selected the VSTOXX index which provides information about the expected volatility
of the Eurostoxx50 index several months ahead and proxies changes in the risk appetite
(Gambacorta, 2014 ; Blasqués et al. 2016 ; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). The method-
ology to construct the VSTOXX index is fairly similar to the VIX and their time series
properties are similar. Using one or the other would therefore have little influence on the
results. I proxy the European risk-free rate against which domestic spreads are computed
by the Overnight Index Swaps yield curve. The yields for the common yield curve are
obtained from the OIS rates at 6-months. When unavailable, OIS data are spliced with
Euribor 6-months swap rates. The maturities considered are 3- ,6- ,12-months and 2-, 3-,
4-, 5-, 7-, 10-years. As it is standard in the literature (e.g. Littermann and Scheinkman,
1991), I decompose the OIS yield curve into its principal components. I retain the first
two principal components based on the criteria that the eigenvalue of the component
should be larger than one. The second group contains country-specific macroeconomic
and financial situation, namely the inflation, output gap and the deficit ratio as well as the
Country-Level Indicator of Financial Stress. In particular, the Country-Level Indicator
of Financial Stress can be understood as local volatility measures. The inflation, output
gap and primary deficit series come from Eurostat. Inflation is computed as the yearly
growth rate of the monthly HICP. The output gap is computed as the percentage devia-
tion from quarterly potential output. Potential output is obtained by decomposing real
GDP into trend and cycle with the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothness parameter
set to 1600 for quarterly data. Primary deficit is defined as net lending minus interest
payments divided by nominal GDP such that positive values indicate deficit. When the
original data were not already seasonally adjusted, I removed seasonality with the X13
procedure of the US Census Bureau. Quarterly series of the output gap and primary
deficit were interpolated to monthly frequency with the Chow and Lin (1971) method
with the country-specific Economic Sentiment Indicator and the Industrial Production
Index provided by the ECB as high-frequency variables. In the case of Ireland, the ESI
has been replaced by the Consumer Sentiment Indicator due to data availability. The
Country-Level Indicators of Financial Stress come from the ECB and are available at a
monthly frequency.
Country-specific yields data at par value come from Bloomberg and are readily avail-
able at a monthly frequency. The country-specific yields cover the same maturities as
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the OIS curve and are bootstrapped according to the Fama-Bliss (1987) procedure to
obtain zero-coupon yields. 4 I compute the principal components of the spreads between
the country-specific zero-coupon yields and the OIS yields of corresponding maturity.
These spreads capture country-specific default and liquidity risks (Duffie and Singleton,
1999) and form the third group. The number of principal components to retain for the
spreads corresponds to the maximum number of principal components which eigenvalues
are greater than one in each of the ten countries. Alternative criteria and the number of
factors that would be retained are found in Table 4.1.
I define the following vectors used in Equation (4.1):
Zi,t =

pii,t
(yi,t − y¯i,t)
deficiti,t
CLIFSi,t
SpreadPC1i,t
SpreadPC2i,t

(4.10)
Ht =

V STOXXt
StockReturnst
WREAt
OISPC1t
OISPC2t

′
(4.11)
I report the results of the selection procedure for the number of principal components
to retain for the analysis in Table 4.1. Two main criteria can be used to select the
appropriate number of principal components: (i) the eigenvalue of the component should
be larger than one, and (ii) the share of the total observed variation that we want to keep.
I use the eigenvalue criterion and select the number of principal components accordingly
for the OIS curve and the domestic spreads.
4.4.2 Transmission mechanism
The transmission of shocks from one country to another is modeled by the Ω matrix that
captures the strength of the linkages among countries. Since I focus on the temporal
and spatial transmission of sovereign spreads across the euro area, the spatial structure is
given by the exposure of domestic banks to sovereign debt of other euro area countries. 5
4In finance, bootstrapping is a method to construct a zero-coupon yield curve from interest-bearing
yields.
5I consider the total amount of financial assets in the form of foreign government debt securities since
it better encompasses the exposure of domestic banks to sovereign risk.
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Table 4.1  Number of principal components to retain
Variable \
Criterion
Eigenvalue>1 cum. R2 > 90% cum. R2 > 95% cum. R2 > 99%
OIS curve 2 1 1 2
Spreads 2 3 4 7
Note: the table reports the number of principal components to retain according to various selection
criteria. The variables to be decomposed into principal components are found in rows and the criteria
are found in columns. The first criterion suggests that a principal component should be retained if
its eigenvalue is larger than one. The other criteria propose to keep as many principal components as
necessary such that the principal components explain more than 90, 95 or 99% of the variation observed
in the variables.
The Transparency Exercice of the European Banking Authority is based on supervisory
reporting and is published once a year since 2011 and covers a set of banks active in the
countries considered (132 in 25 EU countries for the 2017 Report). I use the Transparency
Exercise of December 2016 for the rest of the analysis. This choice of transmission matrix
Ω emphasizes the role of the financial sector in the transmission of shocks across countries.
Two mechanisms are at play when domestic banks act as intermediaries between the for-
eign and domestic markets. First, in an integrated market where movement of capital is
unrestricted, domestic commercial banks may hold foreign debt as an asset. The commer-
cial bank that currently holds the bond therefore sees the net present value of its claims
shrinking. Its loan-to-assets ratio increases as a consequence, which in turn increases its
risk of default. The bank may then adjust its amount of loans to the private sector, reduc-
ing credit to the private sector. Less investment means smaller domestic growth such that
economic slowdown is imported from abroad. Second, if economic conditions worsen in
the foreign economy, the demand for its debt will decrease, driving down the price of the
bonds. Banks may therefore be tempted to liquidate their risky position and buy bonds
from another country (i.e. flight to safety argument). Playing on the relative strength
of demand and supply of debt may transmit shocks through the asset composition of
domestic banks. This portfolio revaluation mechanism is therefore a suitable candidate
for the transmission of economic and financial shocks.
Table 4.2 reports, for each reporting country in the row dimension, the share of
sovereign debt of each counterparty country (in the column dimension) in percent of
the total value of assets held by the reporting domestic banks. The total assets come
from the Bank for International Settlements. The numbers presented in this table are
likely to be an underestimation of the actual holdings of sovereign debt due to the limited
coverage of the reporting banks in the EBA dataset. Nevertheless, we can see that around
8.5% of the total assets of Belgian reporting banks takes the form of French sovereign debt
or that Portuguese banks hold 3.3% of their portfolio in the form of Spanish debt.
Figure 4.1 presents a visual representation of Table 4.2 sorted by the core-periphery
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Figure 4.1  Heatmap of the transmission matrix sorted by core/periphery
and economic size
Note: the figure is a visual representation of the exposure of domestic commercial banks to foreign
sovereign debt. The scale is given in decimal points. A darker shade indicates a larger share.
dichotomy and economic size within each group.6 Some comments are worth mentioning.
First, all countries of the euro area are generally mildly to strongly exposed to debt issued
by the core countries and much less to small periphery countries like Ireland or Portugal.
Second, the countries in the core have an even smaller exposure to debt from periphery
countries than countries in the periphery. Nevertheless, Italy stands out because most
countries hold Italian debt, reinforcing the equivocal status of Italy in the core/periphery
dichotomy.7 Lastly, Spanish debt represents a large share in Portuguese banks' portfolio.
A potential drawback for the choice of bank exposure to sovereign debt in December
2016 is that the banks could have safeguarded themselves against problematic countries
after the European debt crisis such that exposure to certain countries is lower than what
it was before the crisis. This could hamper the transmission of shocks from Portugal
or Spain, for example. One may argue that the transition matrix is not constant over
time and that it is endogenous as it is the result of investment decisions rather than ex-
ogenously determined. Notice that most transition matrices used in the literature suffer
from this problem, except physical distance and contiguity. Indeed, trade intensity nega-
tively depends on the distance between geographical units (Tinbergen, 1962). Economic
6Traditionally, the periphery countries refer to Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece.
7Despite being a member of the G7, Italy is often considered as part of the periphery due to the state
of its public finances and competitiveness.
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centers importance may therefore vary across time. Distance based on economic centers
may therefore also exhibit time-varying properties. Having established that virtually all
transition matrices suffer from this problem except the contiguity matrix, one needs to
assess to which extent the time-varying properties of the transition matrices hinder the
analysis.
To check this issue, I collected data from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
from the IMF. This dataset contains the reported value of a country's foreign assets on
each counterpart country. Notice, however, that foreign assets include all counterparty
sectors (households, official sector and financial institutions) such that this metric captures
more than foreign sovereign debt exposure. Data are collected on 31st December of
each year between 2001 and 2012 and semi-annually for the subsequent years.8 Given
the availability of the data, I can track the evolution of portfolio shares spanning three
recessions. Two conclusions can be drawn from the exercise. First, the country shares
in the portfolios are relatively stable as can be seen in Figure 4.2. The debtor countries
are found in columns while the creditor country is found in rows. The ratio of the mean
share onto its standard deviation gives values well above 2.5 in most cases, indicating that
the dispersion around the mean is low. Second, there is no clear pattern in the temporal
evolution of the positions. In particular, there is no clear evidence that the sovereign debt
crisis in Europe led to a definitive decline in the exposure towards periphery countries.
Notice also that if there is a trend in the evolution of the exposures, this trend has been
fairly gradual throughout the sample period. As a consequence, the issue of endogeneity
of the transmission matrix appears to be limited.9 I therefore continue the analysis with
the EBA measure with the caveat that potential time-variation in the spatial transmission
may provide additional insight for the issue at hand. Table C.3 in Appendix C.2 provides
a comparison of the fit with alternative spatial transmission matrices.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Impulse response functions
In this section, I present a selection of Impulse Response Functions from the set of 65
IRFs available. I report the median response of a 1 unit increase in the shock variable
based on 500 stationary draws together with the 90% confidence interval derived from the
empirical distribution of the draws. I have re-scaled the impulse responses by the value
on impact of the shocked variable, which corresponds to one standard deviation of the
shocked variable. Given the re-scaling of the shocks, I can assess the relative importance
8Starting in June 2013, the data are made available on a semi-annual basis. However, not all countries
report their holdings at that frequency and this is the reason why I limit myself to December 2001 through
December 2012, June 2014 and 2015, December 2015, December 2016 and June 2017.
9Recently, Blasqués et al. (2016) and Qu, Lee and Yu (2017) have devised spatial models which
accommodate a time-varying transmission matrix.
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of the responses depending on the origin of the shocks. Comparing shocks with different
scales would hamper the analysis.
4.5.1.1 Common shocks
Volatility shocks produce heterogeneous responses in terms of magnitude and significance
as can be seen in Figure 4.3. Generally speaking, countries traditionally categorized
in the periphery tend to respond more than the core countries. In addition, periphery
countries see their spread statistically increase. The shape of the response is, however,
country-specific. Indeed, while Italy sees a direct and long-lasting effect, the response
of Spain is short-lived. Ireland and Portugal exhibit a delayed response of their spread,
quickly decreasing for the first but long-lasting for the second. In terms of economic
significance, a one unit shock in the VSTOXX corresponds to 40% of its variance, such
that one should multiply the responses in Figure 4.3 by 2.5 to obtain the responses to a
one standard deviation shock of the VSTOXX. For instance, the response of the Spanish
spread amounts to just under 1 basis point. Volatility in the European stock market
therefore has little influence on domestic spreads.
Figure 4.3  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the Volatility Index
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the VSTOXX. The IRFs are
Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary bootstraps
while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval on the empirical distribution of the
IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the volatility index increases by one unit.
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Figure 4.4 reports the responses of a one percentage point increase in the 5-years
OIS rate. In order to compute the responses, I apply the following method: first, the
two components are shocked. Second, the responses to each shock are then weighted by
the loadings of the first two principal components of the OIS yield curve given by the
eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition. Third, I sum the weighted responses and finally,
I divide by the initial response of the 5-years OIS rate. The core-periphery distinction
is particularly pronounced here. While core countries spreads do not respond to the
impulsion, the periphery countries have a tendency to see their spreads decrease. The
magnitude is in general inversely correlated with the economic size of the country. Italy
reduces its spread by 4 basis points initially, while Portugal, after an initial increase, sees
its spread reduced by 15 basis points.
Figure 4.4  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years OIS rate
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years OIS rate. The IRFs
are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary bootstraps
while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval on the empirical distribution of the
IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the 5-years OIS rate increases by one unit.
4.5.1.2 Domestic shocks
I report the simulated responses of the 5-years spread of European countries to a shock
in another country of the zone in Figures 4.5 to 4.8. I selected as origins of the shocks
Germany, Italy, Belgium and Portugal because Germany is the largest country in the
eurozone and the largest in the core countries, while Italy is the largest in the periphery
countries. I also selected Belgium and Portugal to cover small economies in the core and
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Figure 4.5  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years German spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years German spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the German spread increases by one
percentage point.
periphery countries, respectively.
The computation of the spread shock is as follows: each component of the spread is
shocked by their respective variance. I then multiply the responses by the loadings of
each component and sums the responses. I later scale them such that the country spread
has increased by 1 percentage point with respect to the baseline in order to be able to
compare the relative strength of the responses across countries.
Both the core-periphery and big-small dichotomies matter. Indeed, a one percentage
point increase in the German spread does not produce any significant response in its
neighboring countries, with the exception of Ireland. As such, Germany confirms its status
of reliable debtor such that countries exposed to its debt should not see their solvency
re-evaluated. If anything, periphery countries tend to decrease their spreads, although
this is not statistically significant. This result is particularly interesting because despite
a sizeable exposure to German debt, German spread shocks do not propagate further.
However, when the Italian spread increases by one percentage point, it generates ripple
effects to Spain, Ireland and Portugal. A shock from a large country in the periphery
therefore typically affects other peripheral countries in a non-trivial way. The responses
are also economically meaningful: the responses range from 60 basis points in Ireland to
1.5 percentage point in Portugal. Interestingly, even with a low exposure to Italian debt,
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Figure 4.6  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years Italian spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years Italian spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the Italian spread increases by one
percentage point.
periphery countries experience spillover effects.
Notice, however, that small economies, whether in the core or the periphery, do not
significantly affect the perceived solvency of their neighbors. Using panel spatial regression
techniques on daily data from EMU countries for the period January 2007 to September
2013, Muratori (2014) reports that the spatial coefficients in sovereign spreads regressions
for core and periphery countries are fairly similar across the two groups. The model
presented here, however, does not make a distinction between the two groups ex-ante.
Notice also that the persistence of the shock differs across the core-periphery dimension.
German and Belgian shocks are shorter-lived than shocks originating in Italy or Portugal.
The takeaway from this exercise is that Italy should be watched more closely than any
other country from the zone regarding the potential contagion effects across bond markets.
This result reinforces the idea of risk-spreading at the expense of risk-sharing, in the view
of Andrew Haldane.10 Indeed, any network is a shock absorber and a shock transmitter
at the same time. The first dimension allows the shocks to disperse within the network. If
the shock is too large for the system to handle, the network may then amplify the shock.
In the case of our simulation, Italy appears to be a systemic player in a network prone to
10Andrew Haldane: Managing Global Finance as a system, speech given in October 2014 at the
University of Birmingham.
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Figure 4.7  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years Belgian spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years Belgian spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the Belgian spread increases by one
percentage point.
risk-spreading, at least to other periphery countries.
4.5.2 Forecast error variance decomposition
Table 4.3 reports the share of each type of shocks in the total variance of the variable
considered at a given horizon averaged across the ten countries. The first column gives
the share of the variance in the forecast error that is due to common shocks (volatility,
real economic activity, stock returns, and OIS curve). Column 2 aggregates all domestic
shocks and column 3 aggregates all foreign shocks. The sum of common, domestic and
foreign shocks should be equal to 100 minus rounding errors. Three results stand out.
First, domestic shocks remain the biggest driver of the variables included in the analysis.
Indeed, domestic shocks explain between 95 and 60% of the forecast error between a one-
month and 3-years horizon. The influence of domestic shocks is decreasing with time.
Deficits remain a domestic issue as domestic factors still account for 83% of the forecast
error after three years. Second, foreign factors matter more for financial variables than
for macro variables. Inflation, however, seems to exhibit sizeable spillover effects. Third,
foreign factors have a bigger influence on financial variables compared to common shocks
while the reverse is true for macroeconomic variables. This indicates a strong co-movement
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Figure 4.8  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years Portuguese spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years Portuguese spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the Portuguese spread increases by one
percentage point.
in macroeconomic aggregates coupled with important spillovers in financial variables.
Turning to the variance decomposition for the spreads averaged by country in Table
4.4, we can see that numbers are comparable across the maturities. For the sake of
clarity, I will therefore focus on the 5-years spreads. The first column gives the share of
the variance in the forecast error that is due to common shocks (volatility, real economic
activity, stock returns, and OIS curve). Column 2 aggregates all domestic shocks and
column 3 aggregates all foreign shocks. The sum of common, domestic and foreign shocks
should be equal to 100 provided there are no rounding errors. Spreads are mostly explained
by shocks to themselves. Around 70% of the variation can still be attributed to spread
shocks at the 3-years horizon. Consistent with Table 4.3, foreign shocks are the second
most important driver of spreads. They explain around 16% of the spread forecast error
variance. Foreign factors therefore do have a sizeable influence on domestic spreads.
Lastly, common factors explain around 10% of the variation in the 5-years spread.
The numbers presented above hide in fact an important heterogeneity across countries
of the zone. Table 4.5 fills this gap. In addition to the four countries for which I presented
the impulse response functions, I report the results for Spain and Ireland. We can again
group countries according to their size and whether they belong to the core or periphery
countries. Two conclusions can be drawn from Table 4.5. First, countries from the core
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Table 4.3  Average variance decomposition by types of shocks - domestic
variables
Common
shocks
Domestic
shocks
Foreign
shocks
Inflation
Horizon: 1 2 89 9
4 7 81 12
12 17 69 14
36 25 61 13
Output
Horizon: 1 2 93 5
4 5 89 6
12 12 81 6
36 18 76 6
Deficit
Horizon: 1 2 94 4
4 4 91 5
12 8 87 5
36 11 83 5
CLIFS
Horizon: 1 2 80 17
4 5 75 20
12 8 72 20
36 12 69 19
PC1 Spreads OIS
Horizon: 1 3 82 15
4 5 81 14
12 9 79 13
36 13 75 12
PC2 Spreads OIS
Horizon: 1 2 79 19
4 4 77 19
12 6 76 18
36 7 75 18
Note: the table reports the variance decomposition of the domestic variables based on the median impulse
response, averaged by country. The first column gives the share of the variance in the forecast error that
is due to common shocks (volatility, real economic activity, stock returns, and OIS curve). Columns 2
aggregates all domestic shocks and column 3 aggregates all foreign shocks. The sum of common, domestic
and foreign shocks should be equal to 100 minus rounding errors. The horizon is given in months.
do not depend much on common or foreign shocks. This is true for small or big countries.
Countries in the core seem therefore insulated from outside shocks. Second, countries in
the periphery, on the other hand, heavily depend on common and foreign shocks, between
40 and 60%. Within the periphery countries, it is interesting to confront large and small
countries. The influence of common factors on Italian spreads is rapidly increasing with
the horizon, reaching 50% at a 3-year horizon. Foreign shocks, on the other hand, have
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little impact. For smaller countries, foreign shocks appear more important than common
shocks. In particular, Irish and Portuguese spreads are explained at 30-40% by foreign
shocks.
Dewachter et al. (2015) also document heterogeneity in the extent with which eco-
nomic, idiosyncratic and euro-wide spreads shocks determine domestic sovereign spreads.
In their setting, economic shocks relate to fundamental drivers of sovereign spreads
(volatility and uncertainty, output, inflation and deficit ratio as well as the OIS curve).
Their idiosyncratic shocks correspond to domestic spread shocks in our setting. They
report that Italy and Belgium tend to rely more on economic determinants than France
or Spain (between 55% and 60% against 40% and 35%). Interestingly, French spread
is barely affected by idiosyncratic factors while Belgian and Italian idiosyncratic shocks
explain 15 to 20% of the spreads. Discrepancies in the results, however, probably stems
from the way foreign spreads enter the equation for the domestic spreads. Indeed, the
euro-wide spreads of Dewachter et al. (2015) are treated as common across countries with
a country-specific coefficient whereas I model foreign spreads as country-specific with a
common coefficient. The results of Debarsy et al. (2018) also suggest heterogeneity in the
diffusion process across various groups of countries. Using the dichotomy advanced vs.
emerging economies, they document that shocks to one group of countries are not confined
to the countries of the group but spread to all countries. The strength of the spillover
effects is, however, stronger for the direction Advanced to Emerging than Emerging to
Advanced. Here, I have considered a subset of their advanced economies and have showed
that some countries remain isolated from adverse macroeconomic shocks. Definitive re-
sults for advanced economies may thus require more granularity.
4.6 Policy implications
The results highlighted above are particularly interesting in light of macroprudential pol-
icy. Indeed, it is often thought that stabilizing the macroeconomic situation of central
players will somehow trickle down to secondary players. I have shown here, however,
that there seems to exist two euro areas: one euro area which is a collection of isolated
islands and another e whose members are closely connected to each other in some sort
of archipelago. Policies that would target a reduction in bond yields spreads of good
students would, in fact, prove ineffective to solve issues (and reduce spreads) in bad
students. Conversely, if policies are instead targeted at problematic countries strongly
tied to their neighbors, they can generate larger positive effects than if they were taken
in isolation. The conclusion that spread shocks in core countries do not propagate be-
yond their borders is even more surprising given the share of core countries debt held by
domestic banks (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2). Indeed, one would have expected a larger
transmission from core to periphery than within periphery countries. In particular, I have
stressed that Italy should be the most closely watched country in the eurozone due to its
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Table 4.4  Average variance decomposition by types of shocks - domestic
spreads
Common
shocks
Domestic
shocks
Foreign
shocks
1-year Spread
Horizon: 1 3 80 17
4 4 79 16
12 7 77 16
36 10 76 15
5-years Spread
Horizon: 1 3 79 18
4 5 79 16
12 8 77 15
36 12 74 14
10-years Spread
Horizon: 1 2 78 20
4 4 77 20
12 7 75 18
36 10 72 17
Note: the table reports the variance decomposition of the 1-, 5- and 10 years domestic spread based on
the median impulse response, averaged by country. The first column gives the share of the variance in
the forecast error that is due to common shocks (volatility, real economic activity, stock returns, and OIS
curve). Columns 2 aggregates all domestic shocks and column 3 aggregates all foreign shocks. The sum
of common, domestic and foreign shocks should be equal to 100 minus rounding errors. The horizon is
given in months.
importance for other countries, especially those in the periphery. Implementing policies
that reduce Italian spreads would benefit peripheral countries.
Of course, this conclusion should be moderated by the issue that the economic content
of spreads is not absolute. Indeed, historical decompositions presented in Dewachter et al.
(2015) for the five countries included in their analysis (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Spain) show that the idiosyncratic component of bond yields spreads is less important
than economic and non-fundamental components. Policies aimed at specific macroeco-
nomic aggregates in large core countries may still generate positive outcomes in periphery
countries. The results presented here therefore also suggest that stronger coordination
may improve the efficiency of domestic policies.
This research follows the strand of the literature that follows what was called in the
literature real linkages (Debarsy et al., 2018), that is transmission that is due to formal
relationships across spatial units. There is another strand of the literature that focuses on
informational channels. The transmission mechanism is different in this type of models.
Market participants do not gather all relevant information but rather use one or several
spatial units as proxy for other spatial units. In other words, there could be contagion
that is not related to fundamentals (Pritsker, 2001). Following an adverse shock to one
country, market participants will re-evaluate the situation of countries they judge similar.
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Table 4.5  Country-wise variance decomposition by type of shock - domestic
5-years spread
Common shocks Domestic shocks Foreign shocks
Germany
Horizon: 1 5 87 8
4 4 86 9
12 7 83 10
36 7 83 10
Italy
Horizon: 1 7 83 10
4 14 76 10
12 30 60 9
36 51 42 7
Spain
Horizon: 1 4 40 56
4 5 45 50
12 7 47 45
36 14 44 42
Belgium
Horizon: 1 3 89 8
4 3 89 8
12 4 88 8
36 5 87 8
Ireland
Horizon: 1 1 70 29
4 2 69 29
12 4 71 25
36 4 73 23
Portugal
Horizon: 1 3 52 45
4 5 62 33
12 10 65 24
36 21 59 20
Note: the table reports the variance decomposition of the 5-years domestic spread based on the median
impulse response for a selection of countries. The first column gives the share of the variance in the
forecast error that is due to common shocks (volatility, real economic activity, stock returns, and OIS
curve). Columns 2 aggregates all domestic shocks and column 3 aggregates all foreign shocks. The sum
of common, domestic and foreign shocks should be equal to 100 minus rounding errors. The horizon is
given in months.
There is therefore spillover without having explicit relationships among spatial units. If
we could summarize countries in the periphery along a few dimensions (by computing
principal components, for instance), we could augment a classical Vector Autoregression
with the newly obtained factors in order to address differently the question whether there
exists spillover effects across eurozone bond markets.
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4.7 Potential extensions of the present research
There are various ways the current research could be extended. I list hereunder a few
potential candidates. First, I could investigate the importance of the informational chan-
nels, as explained in the previous section. Although the model may be easier to handle, it
would be at the expense of tractability. The real linkages are, in my view, preferable be-
cause the transmission mechanism is clearly identified. The informational channel would
be, however, an interesting complement to the current research.
Second, I could investigate if the chosen identification strategy is determinant for the
results obtained. As is the case with the Cholesky triangular factorization, the ordering of
the variables and the countries may have an influence on the impulse responses. Another
ordering that comes to mind is to sort countries by the schism of core-periphery and
then by economic size. Indeed, in the current ordering, the core-periphery distinction is
absent. Since Italy and Spain appear early in the country ordering, relegating them at
the seventh and eighth position could have an influence. Another avenue of improvement
regarding the identification of the shocks is to consider sign restrictions of the responses.
Identification by sign restrictions has the advantages that the ordering of the variables
is irrelevant and that some responses are forced to be compatible with economic theory.
However, it has the disadvantage that it selects shocks that are compatible with the
restrictions. There is thus identification uncertainty in this respect. To carry out this
extension, I could combine two sets of sign restrictions. The first set is derived from
Forni and Gambetti (2010) who identify , for a single country, a monetary policy shock,
a fiscal policy shock and aggregate demand/aggregate supply shocks. The second set of
restrictions is derived from De Santis and Zimic (2017). Their restrictions do not hinge
on the sign itself but on the magnitude of the responses. Their rationale is that a shock
in a country should produce larger domestic responses than in the foreign country. The
current setup would prove very difficult for this extension because of the numerous shocks
to identify. Convergence of the algorithm would be extremely slow because the difficulty
of the problem increases exponentially with the number of shocks and the number of
restrictions. One way to address this issue would be to group countries according to the
core-periphery dichotomy such that there would remain only two blocks of six variables.
Grouping could be made with an arithmetic or weighted average (by economic size or
principal components). We would, however, lose the transmission mechanism.
Third, sub-sample analysis could provide additional information. For instance, a di-
vision between core and periphery would probably be informative. Appending countries
that are too heterogeneous may lead to non-significant results because effects pertaining
to each sub-groups could cancel each other. It would therefore be interesting to check
whether the results presented above also hold for each sub-group taken separately. This
extension would be closer in spirit to Muratori (2014). I could also divide the sample
according to the time dimension. This would address the potential issue of time-varying
spatial diffusion. Given my dataset, I could distinguish between a period pre-European
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debt crisis, crisis, and post-crisis. I suspect that spatial transmission behaved differently
in those periods. Although less granular than our dataset, Haldane (2014) presents ev-
idence of that the correlation of bond yields tended to be much stronger before 2005
and that the correlation across assets between European periphery countries has, how-
ever, increased after the crisis. The sub-periods may also be endogenously determined.
I could, for instance, apply a Markov-switching filter to the data to extract a high- vs
low-uncertainty regime. Lastly, I could also estimate rolling-window regressions and as-
sess whether spatial diffusion is time-dependent. Very recently, Afonso et al. (2017) have
proposed a framework which allows them to assess whether the pricing of bond yields vary
across time. They find a pre- and post-European debt crisis regime. The latter regime is
characterized by a weaker link between spreads and fundamentals.
The current framework could also be adapted and be used as an early-warning system.
Indeed, the maximum likelihood estimation is versatile enough to accommodate various
functional form. One equation of the VAR would then be estimated with a spatial Pro-
bit/Logit model where the dependent variable would be the occurrence of a crisis. The
remaining equations of the VAR would then serve as auxiliary regressions to explain the
dynamics of the independent variables included in the Probit/Logit regression. The sug-
gested approach here would be close in spirit to Amaral, Abreu and Mendes (2010, 2014)
but with the advantage of the dynamic multivariate setup.
To summarize, the framework presented here remains fairly versatile and is open to
various sorts of extensions.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have built a macro-finance model that takes into account potential
spillover effects from neighboring countries. I have applied the model to euro area coun-
tries where the spatial transmission mechanism takes advantage of the relative exposure
of domestic commercial banks to foreign sovereign debt. The framework allows macroeco-
nomic and financial variables to generate contemporaneous as well as temporally lagged
spatial diffusion. Shocks are identified in such a way that financial variables react rapidly
with macro news and shocks in smaller countries do not directly affect larger countries,
although they can have feedback effects.
The results have shown that spillover effects of financial shocks are large for the pe-
riphery countries. Financial shocks from large core countries do not propagate to other
core countries, nor periphery countries. Spreads shocks from periphery countries, how-
ever, transmit to other periphery countries, but not to core countries. In particular, for
every percentage point increase in Italian spreads, Spanish, Irish and Portuguese spreads
increase by 90, 60 and 95 basis points on impact. Variance decompositions have shown
that foreign shocks matter more for financial variables than macroeconomic variables.
Typically, foreign variables are twice as important for financial variables than they are for
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macroeconomic variables. Around 10% and 15% of domestic spreads can on average be
explained by common and foreign factors. However, I have also documented important
heterogeneity in the behavior of eurozone members. Typically, countries differ according
to their economic size and whether or not they are part of the core or the periphery
countries. Smaller countries and countries from the periphery rely the most on common
and foreign factors compared to core countries.
The results highlighted above, and most importantly the evidence of sizeable hetero-
geneity in the eurozone countries, point towards the need for policies that are aimed at
specific countries rather than a one size fits all -type of policies. In particular, policymak-
ers that have systemic stability at heart should unveil and understand the strong linkages
across economies of the zone while trying to address the heterogeneity of the responses.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Macroeconomic Policy
Interactions and the Effects of Fiscal
Stimulus
A.1 Alternative fiscal policy rule
It is informative to confront our results to alternative measures of fiscal sustainability.
In particular, the tax rule of Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) seems particularly relevant.
Their rule posits that taxes may react to debt developments, controlling for the output
gap and government expenditures. The rule therefore reads:
τt = γ
sτt
0 + γ
sτt
b bt−1 + γ
sτt
y (yt − y∗t ) + γs
τ
t
g ωt + 
sτt
t (A.1)
where τ is tax revenues less transfer payments, bt is the debt held by the public
divided by GDP, (yt − y∗t ) is the output gap and ωt is current government purchases.
The superscript sτt stands for the fiscal policy regime under the Davig and Leeper rule.
Notice that the variance is regime-dependent. Removing transfers from tax revenues
partly removes the natural movement of tax revenue due to automatic stabilizers. The
identification of sustainable and unsustainable fiscal policy depends on the sign of the
coefficient γb. A positive sign indicates a sustainable fiscal policy while a negative co-
movement is evidence of an unsustainable fiscal policy. Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011)
identify fiscal policy as unsustainable in 1955-67, 1969-1971, 1975, 1979-86, and 2002-
2004. 1 We extend the analysis of Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) to the period 1949Q2 to
2014Q3 to estimate the rule, but the local projections are based on the 1967Q1-2012Q1
sample.
Figure A.1 reports estimates of sustainable and unsustainable fiscal policy according
to Equation A.1 while Figures A.2 and A.3 report the responses of the variables of interest
1Note that their estimation does not cover the period after 2007. Given the size of the stimulus pack-
ages put in place after 2008, it is very likely that periods post-2007 would be considered as unsustainable.
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Figure A.1  Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) fiscal policy rule
Note: the figure presents the estimated periods of unsustainable fiscal policy according to the Davig and
Leeper (2007, 2011) tax rule.
and the sovereign yields, respectively. We can see from Figure A.2 that the unsustainable
regime does not generate larger output or inflation. However, in the sustainable regime,
the negative responses of GDP and, to a lesser extent, CPI remain. Yields drop only in
the sustainable regime, and the 10-years exhibit a feeble positive response at long horizon.
Analysis of the effects of fiscal policy on the yield curve therefore seems dependent on
the sustainability criterion one uses. Nevertheless, the negative response of yields in the
sustainable regime remains a robust feature.
We believe that the rule (2.6) is more flexible than (A.1) for two reasons. First, Davig
and Leeper consider that taxes are the only fiscal instrument while we consider both taxes
and government spending since they are embedded in the primary deficit. In addition to
this, we also consider the impact of interest payments in the budget. Second, the rule of
Davig and Leeper has an implicit constraint on the coefficient γb. Indeed, recall that our
measure of the stabilizing deficit dSt is computed as d
S
t =
(ζt−ibt)
(1+ζt)
∗ bt−1. The multiplying
factor in front of the lagged value of the debt is therefore time-varying and oscillates
around 1 in our rule, whereas it is fixed to 1 in the rule of Davig and Leeper. These two
distinctions may explain the differences in the identification of regimes.
A.2 Alternative specification
A.2.1 Macroeconomic policy regimes obtained with joint estima-
tion of fiscal and monetary policy rules
We report the dynamic responses of the dependent variables and yields where the regimes
correspond to the joint estimation of the fiscal and monetary policy rules in Figures A.4
and A.5. Responses are qualitatively similar to the case where rules are combined. The
only difference lies in the responses of the yields in the FTPL. Their responses are no longer
statistically significant. Yet, their point estimate remains higher that the Indeterminate
and Ricardian regime.
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Figure A.2  Impulse responses of dependent variables to deficit shocks 
sustainable vs. unsustainable fiscal policy regimes from tax rule
Note: the figure presents the responses of output growth, inflation, deficit and the 5-years nominal yield
to a 1 percentage point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio. The solid lines represent the point estimate
and are derived from the multi-regimes local projections (2.13) to (2.16). The shaded area corresponds
to the Newey-West 90% confidence interval bounded by the dashed lines. For each horizon h, the Newey-
West lag correction is set to h. The first row reports the confidence bands from the unsustainable regime
while the second row reports the confidence bands from the sustainable regime. The regimes correspond
to Markov-switching estimation of the Davig and Leeper tax rule in Equation (A.1).
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Figure A.3  Impulse responses of nominal yields to deficit shocks  sustainable
vs. unsustainable fiscal policy regimes from tax rule
Note: the figure presents the responses of nominal yields of maturities 1-, 3-, 5-, 10-years to a 1 percentage
point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio. The solid lines represent the point estimate and are derived
from the multi-regimes local projections (2.16). The shaded area corresponds to the Newey-West 90%
confidence interval bounded by the dashed lines. For each horizon h, the Newey-West lag correction is
set to h. The first row reports the confidence bands from the unsustainable regime while the second
row reports the confidence bands from the sustainable regime. The regimes correspond to the Markov-
switching estimation of the Davig and Leeper tax rule in Equation (A.1).
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Figure A.4  Impulse responses of dependent variables to deficit shocks  fiscal-
monetary policy mix (joint estimation of fiscal and monetary policy rules (joint
estimation of regimes)
Note: the figure presents the responses of output growth, inflation, deficit and the 5-years nominal yield
to a 1 percentage point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio. The solid lines represent the point estimate
and are derived from the multi-regimes local projections (2.13) to (2.16). The shaded area corresponds
to the Newey-West 90% confidence interval bounded by the dashed lines. For each horizon h, the Newey-
West lag correction is set to h. The first row reports the confidence bands from the FTPL regime, the
second row the confidence bands from the Indeterminate regime and the third row from the Ricardian
regime.
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Figure A.5  Impulse responses of nominal yields to deficit shocks  fiscal-
monetary policy mix (joint estimation of regimes)
Note: the figure presents the responses of output growth, inflation, deficit and the 5-years nominal yield
to a 1 percentage point increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio. The solid lines represent the point estimate
and are derived from the multi-regimes local projections (2.13) to (2.16). The shaded area corresponds
to the Newey-West 90% confidence interval bounded by the dashed lines. For each horizon h, the Newey-
West lag correction is set to h. The first row reports the confidence bands from the FTPL regime, the
second row the confidence bands from the Indeterminate regime and the third row from the Ricardian
regime.
Appendix B
Appendix for Nonlinear Impacts of
Fiscal Policy on the Yield Curve
B.1 Data sources and treatments
Yields The yields data are provided by Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton (2014). They
reproduce the bootstrapping method of Fama and Bliss (1987) on US CRSP Treasury
coupon bonds where they first removed illiquid bonds and bonds with embedded options.
The resulting yields are unsmoothed 6-months, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10-years that cover the
period from January 1972 to December 2011. Since the rest of the estimation is done in
quarters, monthly yields are transformed to quarterly by taking the last observation of
the quarter.
Primary deficit Primary deficit is defined as Federal Government Expenditures (line
23 of NIPA Table 3.2.) minus Government Receipts (line 1 of NIPA Table 3.2.) minus
Interest Payments (line 32 of NIPA Table 3.2.) This difference is then divided by current
nominal GDP (line 1 of NIPA Table 1.1.5.)
Total debt The debt series comes from the Dallas Fed. We select the privately held
gross federal debt at market value as a measure of debt so as to remove holding by the
Central Bank and governmental institutions. We then divide it by current nominal GDP
series.
Output gap While nominal GDP is provided in line 1 of NIPA Table 1.1.5, the potential
nominal GDP series is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The output gap is
computed as the log difference between nominal GDP and potential nominal GDP.
Inflation The inflation series is computed as the annual growth rate of core CPI, that
is, the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers minus food and energy prices.
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Figure B.1 contains the six risk factors used in the analysis. The level factor broadly
follows the average of the yield curve. Except from the period 1972-1982, the level factor
exhibits a downward trend, with some cyclical movements associated with business cycles
and recessions. The slope factor is much more volatile than the level factor, positive on
average but with some negative values. Extreme negative values are found in 1980 at
the beginning of the monetary experiment of Paul Volcker, the then-Chairman of the
Federal Reserve. Harvey (1986) has stressed the importance of the slope factor to predict
upcoming recessions: an inverted yield curve (a negative slope coefficient) accurately
forecasts recessions two to six quarters ahead. Two alternative definitions of the slope
factors (the difference between the 10-years and 3-months yields or the difference between
the 10-years and Federal Funds Rate) are even published in the Financial Stress Index of
the St. Louis Fed and the Index of Leading Economic Indicators of the Conference Board.
The curvature factor is quite choppy and reaches its maximum at around the same time
the slope factor reaches its minimum. High values correspond to convex yield curves and
are found at, or around, times of economic recessions.
Figure B.1  Data
Note: The figure displays the data over the sample period: 1972Q1 to 2011Q4. The gray area represents
the unsustainable fiscal policy periods identified through the Markov-switching fiscal policy rule.
Core CPI inflation has experienced two peaks: 1975 and 1980. These two peaks
correspond to the aftermath of the first oil shock and the Iran-Iraq war, respectively.
After 1982, core inflation has remained constant for over a decade before entering a
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smooth decline since 1990. The output gap variable exhibits a clear cyclical pattern.
However the amplitude and the regularity of the cycles are not constant across time.
B.2 Regime-specific dynamics
Table B.1 reports the results that motivates the use of regime-specific dynamics for the
Dewachter and Toffano rule. One can see that both the Fully Interacted VAR and the
Partially Interacted VAR, that is, the VAR with ΦPP identical across regimes, statistically
improve the fit to the data with respect to the single-regime VAR. The Fully Interacted
VAR is also statistically different from the Partially Interacted VAR at 1% significance
level. The restriction that ΦPP be identical across regimes is therefore rejected by the
data.
Table B.1  Log-Likelihood ratio tests
LLR value Critical
value at
1%
Rejection of
H0= no
statistical
difference
Single Regime vs.
Full Interaction
205.99 92.01 Yes, at 1%
Single Regime vs.
Partial
Interaction
168.74 73.68 Yes, at 1%
Full Interaction
vs. Partial
Interaction
37.25 30.58 Yes, at 1%
Note: the table reports the results of the Log-likelihood ratio test for different econometric specifications of
the models presented in sections 3.2.2 and 3.5.1. The Log-Likelihood ratio test compares an unrestricted
model to a restricted model and concludes whether the fit of the unrestricted model to the data is
statistically significant from the restricted model. The null hypothesis is the statistical equality of the
two models. The test statistic is given by 2 ∗ (Lunrestricted −Lrestricted) ∼ χ2 (κ), where L denotes the
Log-Likelihood value and κ is the number of restrictions between the full model and its nested version.
B.3 A dynamic term structure model with unspanned
macro risks
B.3.1 Factor dynamics under the real-world measure P
Let Zt be the state vector such that its dynamics under the real-world measure is:
Zt = µ+ ΦZt−1 + t, (B.1)
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where Zt = [Pt, Mt] and t is a multi-variate Normal with zero mean and covariance Σ.
B.3.2 Pricing kernel and risk-neutral dynamics Q
Under the risk-neutral measure Q the price of an n-periods maturity bond is given by:
P
(n)
t = E
Q
[
mt+1P
(n−1)
t+1
]
(B.2)
We assume that the pricing kernel takes the following form:
mt+1 = exp
(
−rt − 1
2
λ
′
tλt − λ
′
tt+1
)
, (B.3)
where λt = λ0 +λ1 [Pt, Mt]
′
and rt = δ0 + δ
′
1Pt represents the dynamics of the one-period
interest rate.
It follows that under the risk-neutral measure Q the state dynamics follows:

Pt = µQP + ΦQPPt−1 + Qt
µQP = µP − ΣPPλ0
ΦQP = ΦPP − ΣPPλ1
(B.4)
and Qt is multi-variate normal with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ under Q.
B.3.3 Bond pricing
Given the assumptions above, the price of a zero-coupon bond of maturity n is given by
P
(n)
t = exp
(−An −B′nPt), where An and Bn solve the first-order difference equations:An+1 = An +B
′
nµ
Q + 1
2
B
′
nΣPPΣ
′
PPBn + A1
Bn+1 = B
′
nΦ
Q
PP +B1
(B.5)
with initial conditions A0 = 0, B0 = 0 and A1 = δ0, B1 = δ1 .
It follows that the zero-coupon bond yields are given by:
y
(n)
t = an + b
′
nPt (B.6)
where an ≡ −An/n and bn ≡ −Bn/n for n = 1, 2, 3 . . . .
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B.4 Mapping between fundamental parameters and model
parameters
JPS follow the methodology of Joslin, Singleton and Zhu (2011) and show that there
exists a mapping between the fundamental parameters
(
rQ∞, |λQ|, γ0, γ1,Σ, µ,Φ
)
and the
parameters of the model
(
ρ0, ρ1, µ
Q,ΦQ
)
where:
rQ∞ is the long run risk-neutral mean of the short-rate, |λQ| are the eigenvalues of
ΦQ, γ0,1 are the coefficients of a projection of yield factors onto macro factors, Σ is the
variance-covariance matrix of residuals under the real-world probability measure, µ and Φ
are given by the VAR. Parameters ρ0,1 give the loadings of risk factors on the short-rate,
µQ and ΦQ determine the time-series properties of yields under the risk-neutral measure.
The normalizations above ensure econometric identification (Joslin, Singleton and Zhu,
2011).
B.5 Evidence of unspanned macro risks
Virtually all previous macro-finance models suppose that the macro variables are spanned
by the first N yield portfolios. However, JPS provide evidence of unspanned macro risks
using three types of regressions.
B.5.1 Macroeconomic risks regressions
We estimate the following regression:
M it = β0 + β
′
1Pκt + β
′
2M
−i
t + ut, (B.7)
whereM i corresponds to the ith macroeconomic risk factor, κ takes the values 3 and 5 and
represent the first 3 or 5 Principal Components and M−i represents the macroeconomic
factors, except the dependent variable.
We report the adjusted-R² of the regressions in Table B.2. Besides inflation which
sees an adjusted-R² of acceptable magnitude, the adjusted-R² of the other regressions are
fairly low. The added power comes mainly from the addition of the other macroeconomic
factors, except for inflation.
B.5.2 Excess holding returns regressions
In the regression:
rx
(n)
t,t+4 = β0 + β
′
1Pt + β
′
2Mt + ut+4, (B.8)
where rx(n)t,t+4 is the one-year holding-period excess return on a bond of maturity n and
the set of macro factors Mt can include one or more macro variables, we test the null
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Table B.2  Evidence of unspanned macro risks
Adjusted R² Inflation Output Gap Deficit
PC1−3
No macro 0.61 0.33 0.37
Macro 0.64 0.55 0.57
PC1−5
No macro 0.63 0.35 0.38
Macro 0.66 0.56 0.58
Note: the table presents the adjusted R-squared from regressions where the dependent is found in column
and the regressors can be found in rows. The odd rows only include the first three or five principal
component of the yield curve, while the even rows add the remaining macro variables as explanatory
variables.
hypothesis β2 = 0. The average adjusted-R² for expression (B.8) is 27.8%. This propor-
tion decreases to 25% under the null hypothesis β2 = 0 and 23.3% under the restriction
β1 = 0. Predictability is inversely related to the maturity. We can therefore conclude that
excess holding returns are forecastable. Dai and Philippon (2005) report similar values
for their excess returns regressions, while Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) use forward rates
and they can predict up to 40% of bond excess returns.
As Figure B.2 indicates, we can reject the hypothesis that macroeconomic factors do
not explain excess holding returns. This conclusion is especially relevant for maturities
below 8 quarters. Almost 3/4 of the regressions show a statistically significant improve-
ment in fit at a significance level of 5% when macroeconomic variables are included and
100% are significant at the 10% significance level. These results strongly indicate that
excess holding returns are forecastable and that macroeconomic variables are a valuable
addition to the yield curve factors. Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton (2014), Cooper (2009)
and Ludvigson and Ng (2009)) support this claim.
B.5.3 Forecasts of macroeconomic risks
If macroeconomic factors were spanned by the yield curve current macroeconomic vari-
ables would not carry additional information to forecast macroeconomic variables than
the yield curve factors already have. To test this hypothesis, we estimate Equation (B.9)
and test whether β2 = 0:
Mt+1 = β0 + β
′
1Pt + β
′
2Mt + ut. (B.9)
A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates a rejection of the macro-spanning condition.
We report the Log-Likelihood ratio test results below.
The Log-Likelihood ratio test compares an unrestricted model to a restricted model
and concludes whether the fit of the unrestricted model to the data is statistically sig-
nificant from the restricted model. The null hypothesis is the statistical equality of the
two models. The test statistic is given by 2 ∗ (Lunrestricted −Lrestricted) ∼ χ2 (κ), where
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Figure B.2  Joint test of β2 = 0 in the regression
rx
(n)
t,t+4 = β0 + β
′
1Pt + β ′2Mt + ut+4, where rx(n)t,t+4 stands for the realized one-year
excess returns
Note: the figure displays the Fisher statistic (with markers) of the joint test of irrelevance of macro factors
for predicting realized one-year excess returns for various maturity. The horizontal lines correspond to
critical values of the F-statistic at 1, 5 and 10% respectively. Values of the F-statistic above the critical
values indicate rejection of the null hypothesis.
L denotes the Log-Likelihood value and κ is the number of restrictions between the full
model and its nested version. The test statistic reaches 65.7 and the critical value at
1% statistical significance is 21.67. We can safely reject the null hypothesis and conclude
that past values of macroeconomic variables provide additional information to forecast
macroeconomic variables over and above the information that the yield curve contains.
Duffee (2011, 2012) provide strong evidence against the null hypothesis β2 = 0.
B.6 Alternative fiscal policy rule
We reproduce the analysis of Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) by estimating Equation
(3.15) between 1972 and 2012. The parameters in Table B.3 bring some interesting fea-
tures. First, Panel (a) indicates that fiscal policy in the US is generally unsustainable, as
indicates the sign of γb. Taxes react positively to output and government consumption.
Panel (b) provides the estimates for the Markov-switching policy rule. The sustainable
regime sees an absence of sensitivity to debt developments whereas the unsustainable
regime exhibits a negative co-movement between taxes and the debt level. The relation
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Table B.3  Estimates of Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) tax rule
(1972Q1− 2011Q4)
Estimates of Davig and Leeper fiscal policy rule (1972Q1:2011Q4)
γ0 γb γy γg σx100 pSS pUU Log Lik.
Panel (a) Single-regime model
0.082*** -0.045*** 0.607*** 0.154*** 0.02 441.49
(0.001) (0.004) (0.043) (0.014)
Panel (b) Markov-switching model
Sustainable 0.091*** 0.001 0.241*** -0.614*** 0.005 0.98 556.12
(0.00) (0.004) (0.00) (0.00)
Unsustainable
0.094*** -0.104*** 0.652*** 0.072*** 0.006 0.98
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: the table reports the estimated parameters of the rule presented in Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011)
for the sample period 1972Q1 to 2011Q4. Panel (a) reports the single-regime while panel (b) presents
the optimization results from the Markov-switching model.
between government expenditures and taxes is much more negative in the sustainable
regime than in the unsustainable, indicating that the government focuses on one instru-
ment during these periods of unsustainable fiscal policy.
Figure B.3 presents the smoothed probabilities of being in an unsustainable regime
from the Markov-switching regression. The alternative tax rule produces different pa-
rameters and periods of active fiscal policy compared to Dewachter and Toffano (2012).
Typically, episodes of unsustainable fiscal policy are much more persistent. Nevertheless,
they agree on several important aspects. The first is that 1975 is categorized as an un-
sustainable fiscal policy. The second is that the first few years of the 2000s and the last
few years of the 2000s are also characterized as unsustainable. Thirdly, they also agree
that the period between 1980 and 2000 saw a sustainable fiscal policy.
B.6.1 Impulse response functions
We provide impulse response functions from the Davig and Leeper rule for illustrative
purposes. Generally speaking, there is little difference across regimes identified with the
Davig and Leeper (2007, 2011) tax rule. The magnitude of the responses is broadly
consistent with the Dewachter and Toffano (2012) identification, ranging from 50 basis
points to 100 basis points. One difference, however, is that the yields in the unsustain-
able regime respond more quickly than in the sustainable regime, although they only lead
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Figure B.3  Davig and Leeper fiscal policy rule (1972Q1-2011Q4)
Note: the figure presents the estimated periods of unsustainable fiscal policy according to the Davig and
Leeper (2007, 2011) rule.
by three quarters. If we decompose the yields responses into the components, we can
see that now all three components of the yield curve are affected by fiscal policy shocks,
compared to only the level and the slope in the Dewachter and Toffano (2012) identifi-
cation. The inflation and output schedules also exhibit starkly different shapes between
the two identification strategies. Indeed, while output remains consistently higher in the
unsustainable regime, national income exhibit a U-shaped response, with the through at
16-20 quarters after the shock. The results show that regimes are still relevant, especially
for the responses of macro variables. Indeed, although the restrictions are imposed on
the signs of the responses, their shape is left unrestricted. Having different shapes in the
responses seems therefore an interesting feature.
B.6.2 Variance decomposition
Variance decomposition based on the IRFs presented in B.6.1 lead to different conclusions
compared to the Dewachter and Toffano (2012) identification strategy. In particular,
deficit shocks do not seem particularly relevant for sovereign yields at the short end of
the yield curve. However, deficit shocks do have a sizeable influence at the long end of
the yield curve. The aggregate demand shocks follow the same trend. Additionally, we
can observe that the distinction across regime diminishes.
B.6.3 Excess returns
Excess returns under the Davig and Leeper (DL) rule are presented in Figure B.5. They
share three main characteristics with the excess returns in the Dewachter and Toffano
rule (DT). First, they share the same general patterns set forth by Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005, 2009). Second, the unsustainable regime particularly stands out from the single and
sustainable regimes. Third, excess returns in the unsustainable regimes are consistently
larger than in the single and sustainable regimes. They even are mostly positive across
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Figure B.4  Impulse response functions - Davig and Leeper tax rule
Note: The figure presents the responses of the yields and variables included in the VAR to a one-percentage
increase in the deficit. The shocks are identified with sign restrictions. The horizon of the restrictions
corresponds to the dark shade. The light shade gives the 90% confidence bands of the unsustainable regime
(left axis) around its median in solid line while the dashed and circled lines pertain to the sustainable
regime (right axis). Both axes give the response of the variables in percentage points.
time whereas The distinction is especially marked at the beginning of the eighties as well
as during the mid-nineties. However, the two rules also lead to some differences. The peak
in excess returns at the start of the eighties is more pronounced in the Davig and Leeper
rule than in the Dewachter and Toffano rule. Second, the risk premium in the sustainable
regime after 2010 is negative for the DL rule whereas it is positive in the DT rule. As
already mentioned, the post-2010 period saw unconventional monetary policy measures
and that could explain the discrepancy. Third, there seems to be a negative correlation
between the excess returns across the two regimes, and especially so after the nineties.
Further investigation on the differences across regimes and specifications is called for.
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Figure B.5  One-period expected excess returns - Davig and Leeper tax rule
Note: The figure reports the one-period expected excess returns for US yields between 1972Q1 and
2011Q4 according to the two types of regimes we consider. The solid line pertains to the unsustainable
regime while the dashed line refers to the sustainable regime. The gray area corresponds to episodes of
unsustainable fiscal policy.
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Table B.4  Median variance decomposition for yields (1-year, 3-years) - Davig
and Leeper tax rule
Shock to: Others Supply Demand Deficit
1-year
Single
Horizon: 1 70 11 17 2
4 71 13 14 2
20 71 14 13 2
40 71 15 11 3
Unsustainable
Horizon: 1 69 10 18 3
4 69 13 16 2
20 67 16 15 2
40 65 20 13 2
Sustainable
Horizon: 1 65 18 14 4
4 64 18 14 4
20 64 17 14 5
40 65 17 14 5
3-years
Single
Horizon: 1 67 12 19 3
4 67 14 17 3
20 66 15 15 3
40 67 16 13 4
Unsustainable
Horizon: 1 62 5 26 7
4 63 8 24 5
20 62 11 22 5
40 61 15 20 5
Sustainable
Horizon: 1 62 16 17 5
4 59 17 18 6
20 59 17 18 6
40 60 17 17 6
Note: The table reports the variance decomposition for yields of maturity 1- and 3-years. The rows may
not sum to 100 due to rounding. The shocks are identified with sign restrictions. Unidentified shocks are
grouped under the label Others.
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Table B.5  Median Variance Decomposition for yields (5-years, 10-years) -
Davig and Leeper tax rule
Shock to: Others Supply Demand Deficit
5-years
Single
Horizon: 1 62 6 25 7
4 61 7 24 8
20 61 8 23 8
40 60 9 23 9
Unsustainable
Horizon: 1 56 2 31 11
4 55 3 30 11
20 55 4 29 11
40 55 6 28 11
Sustainable
Horizon: 1 53 9 23 15
4 52 9 24 16
20 51 9 23 16
40 51 10 23 17
10-years
Single
Horizon: 1 62 6 25 7
4 61 6 25 8
20 61 6 24 8
40 61 7 24 9
Unsustainable
Horizon: 1 55 2 32 12
4 55 3 31 12
20 55 3 30 12
40 54 4 29 12
Sustainable
Horizon: 1 50 7 23 20
4 50 7 22 21
20 49 7 22 22
40 48 7 22 23
Note: The table reports the variance decomposition for yields of maturity 1- and 3-years. The rows may
not sum to 100 due to rounding. The shocks are identified with sign restrictions. Unidentified shocks are
grouped under the label Others.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Cross-Border Risks in
the Eurozone Bond Markets
C.1 Importance of spatial lags
Table C.1  Spatial parameters - Γ
Inflation Output gap Deficit CLIFS PC1 Spreads PC2 Spreads
Inflation
0.0733 0.1353 -0.0201 0.5946 0.0355 -0.0117
[-0.008 ; 0.138] [0.054 ; 0.211] [-0.256 ; 0.202] [-0.465 ; 1.635] [-0.116 ; 0.185] [-0.074 ; 0.050]
Output
gap
-0.0032 -0.0313 -0.1223 -1,1463 0.0220 -0.0167
[-0.0264 ; 0.018] [-0.060 ; -0.003] [-0.367 ; 0.140] [-2.503 ; 0.180] [-0.168 ; 0.210] [-0.089 ; 0.068]
Deficit
0.0043 -0.0044 -0.0006 0.1520 0.0300 0.0013
[0.000 ; 0.008] [-0.009 ; 0.001] [-0.015 ; 0.013] [-0.210 ; 0.526] [-0.016 ; 0.078] [-0.018 ; 0.022]
CLIFS
0.0244 0.0267 0.0794 0.0124 0.0002 0.0010
[-0.018 ; 0.073] [-0.034 ; 0.084] [-0.069 ; 0.223] [-0.566 ; 0.297] [-0.008 ; 0.008] [-0.003 ; 0.005]
PC1
Spreads
-0.0221 -0.0775 0.0399 0.4053 -0.0653 -0.0283
[-0.155 ; 0.099] [-0.22 ; 0.063] [-0.367 ; 0.443] [-1.647 ; 2.306] [-0.300 ; 0.163] [-0.062 ; 0.008]
PC2
Spreads
0.0774 -0.0442 -0.0531 0.1174 0.0584 0.0203
[0.067 ; 0.126] [-0.122 ; 0.044] [-0.307 ; 0.203] [-0.902 ; 1,191] [-0.103 ; 0.224] [-0.053 ; 0.085]
Note: the table reports the median value of the spatial parameters based on 500 stationary bootstraps.
The 90% confidence bounds based on the empirical distribution of the parameters are found below the
median value. Bold font indicates significance at 10% confidence level.
Tables C.1 and C.2 report the values of the spatial lags and spatio-temporal lags coeffi-
cients based on 500 stationary bootstraps. The dependent variables are found in columns
while the spatial independent variables are found in rows. The 90% confidence interval
based on the empirical distribution of the draws are found below the median. Interest-
ingly, some parameters of Γ and Ξ are statistically significant, mostly in the macro group
of the model. Spatial transmission generally occurs with a temporal lag. In general,
the diagonal elements of Ξ are significant and positive, indicating a self-exciting behavior
for these variables. Notice also that foreign output gaps significantly influence domestic
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deficits and that foreign inflation rates determine in part domestic output. Deficits ex-
hibit spatial diffusion only with a lag, as one would expect given the considerable policy
lag implementation (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002). Taken together, this indicates that
there exists some transmission across macroeconomic variables. We could understand this
result as an indication of an integrated business cycle. Turning to the CLIFS, we can con-
clude that financial stability within a country depends partly on the financial stability in
neighboring countries. The two financial variables that summarize the domestic spreads
vis-à-vis the OIS yield curve exhibit a self-exciting behavior for the first, but appear with
a negative sign for the second. This positive sign would indicate that if a country faces
difficult times such that investors cast doubt on its solvency, this increased risk spills over
to neighboring countries.
Table C.2  Spatial parameters - Ξ
Inflation Output gap Deficit CLIFS PC1 Spreads PC2 Spreads
Inflation
0.1108 0.0908 0.0382 1.2554 0.0249 0.0149
[0.060 ; 0.121] [0.088 ; 0.134] [-0.258 ; 0.295] [-0.034 ; 2.535] [-0.169 ; 0.199] [-0.067 ; 0.090]
Output
gap
0.0282 0.0952 0.1067 0.2815 0.0287 0.0091
[-0.040 ; 0.111] [0.048 ; 0.097] [0.041 ; 0.177] [-0.096 ; 0.650] [-0.022 ; 0.078] [-0.011 ; 0.029]
Deficit
0.0039 -0.0011 0.0420 0.0540 -0.0051 -0.0005
[-0.019 ; 0.025] [-0.029 ; 0.029] [-0.011 ; 0.088] [-0.028 ; 0.072] [-0.016 ; 0.006] [-0.005 ; 0.005]
CLIFS
-0.0013 -0.0092 0.0090 0.1470 0.0621 0.0286
[-0.006 ; 0.003] [-0.016 ; -0.003] [-0.008 ; 0.027] [0.120 ; 0.240] [0.040 ; 0.102] [-0.017 ; 0.065]
PC1
Spreads
-0.0088 0.0527 -0.0387 0.2771 0.0924 0.0249
[-0.054 ; 0.034] [-0.004 ; 0.108] [-0.184 ; 0.114] [-0.243 ; 0.910] [0.035 ; 0.107] [-0.087 ; 0.136]
PC2
Spreads
-0.0029 0.0045 0.1471 2.0585 0.2138 -0.0960
[-0.133 ; 0.114] [-0.149 ; 0.162] [-0.255 ; 0.570] [-0.191 ; 4.153] [-0.101 ; 0.479] [-0.133 ; -0.064]
Note: the table reports the median value of the spatial parameters based on 500 stationary bootstraps.
The 90% confidence bounds based on the empirical distribution of the parameters are found below the
median value. Bold font indicates significance at 10% confidence level.
C.2 Alternative transmission mechanisms
I list hereunder four possible alternative candidates for the transmission matrix. The first
three are standard in the literature (e.g. Dewachter, Houssa and Toffano 2012, Anselin
1988, Cesa-Bianchi et al. 2012) and are based either on geographical distance or trade
distance.
Contiguity Elements in the contiguity matrix take the value 1 if the two entities share
a border or, in other words, are first-order neighbors, and 0 otherwise. This transmission
matrix posits that geographically closer countries have closer links in economic or cultural
terms such that shocks in one country transmits easily to the other. Clearly, this matrix
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is not well-suited for the analysis at hand because some countries (Finland and Ireland)
have no first-order neighbors. This would preclude potential spillovers to and from those
two countries.
Distance between capitals and economic centers The distance between capitals
and economic centers refers to the distance as a bird flies between two capitals and
economic centers. The distance is computed from the coordinates of the cities, taking
into account the curvature of the Earth. The coordinates and distances are provided by
CEPII. The transmission mechanism mirrors the contiguity matrix.
Trade weights Trade weights refer to trade between country i and country j. In order
to weather the risk of misreporting trade flows values, I computed trade weights between
country i and country j as Mij+Xij
2
whereMij stands for imports of country i from country
j and Xij stands for exports of country i to country j. The literature has shown that
countries which trade more have more correlated business cycles (see, for instance, Frankel
and Rose 1998). The mechanism works as follows: better economic conditions in country
i will cause its consumers to consume and import more from abroad, including country
j, such that the foreign countries increase their production capacity. Better economic
conditions in country i also lead firms in country i to increase their production and raise
exports. Data for this spatial weighting matrix is taken from the Direction of Trade
database of the IMF.
Domestic banks holdings of foreign banks This weighting scheme resembles the
previous one with the difference that there is no explicit reference to the sovereign debt
market. The portfolio rebalancing mechanism is, however, still present. Data comes from
the Consolidated Banking Statistics of the Bank for International Settlements. In order to
grasp the real exposure of domestic banks to foreign banks, I build the weighting matrix
based on Ultimate Risk for all types of instruments, maturities and currencies. There is,
however, one data point missing: German banks have not reported holdings on Finnish
banks.
C.3 Variance decomposition of spreads for other matu-
rities
I provide in Tables C.8 and C.9 the variance decomposition of the 1-year and 10-years
spreads, respectively. It is instructive to compare the shares across the 1-year, 5-years
and 10-years spreads. Starting with Germany, we can see that the influence of common
shocks is larger at the short end of the yield curve rather than at the medium or long
end. The influence of foreign shocks, on the other hand, remains fairly constant across
maturities. While foreign shocks in Italy affect the spreads in a similar way for the three
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Table C.8  Country-wise Variance Decomposition by type of shock - Domestic
1-year spread
Shock to: Common
shocks
Domestic
shocks
Foreign
shocks
Germany
Horizon: 1 6 86 8
4 10 83 8
12 14 79 8
36 17 75 7
Italy
Horizon: 1 6 82 13
4 9 79 12
12 16 73 12
36 20 69 11
Spain
Horizon: 1 5 54 41
4 7 53 39
12 11 53 36
36 20 48 33
Belgium
Horizon: 1 2 83 14
4 2 83 14
12 3 83 14
36 3 83 14
Ireland
Horizon: 1 1 82 17
4 1 83 16
12 2 83 15
36 3 82 15
Portugal
Horizon: 1 3 66 32
4 5 67 29
12 8 66 25
36 13 63 23
Note: the table reports the variance decomposition of the 5-years domestic spread based on the median
impulse response for a selection of countries. The first column gives the share of the variance in the
forecast error that is due to common shocks (volatility, real economic activity, stock returns, and OIS
curve). Columns 2 aggregates all domestic shocks and column 3 aggregates all foreign shocks. The sum
of common, domestic and foreign shocks should be equal to 100 minus rounding errors. The horizon is
given in months.
maturities considered, the effect of common shocks has an inverted U-shape and peaks
at the medium term. The difference here is quite sizeable: 20% for the 1-year spread,
51% for the 5-years and finally 37% for the 10-years. Spain is also particular because
the influence of foreign shocks linearly increases with maturity, from 33% to 53% for the
1-year and the 10-years spread, respectively. The conclusions for the smaller countries are
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Table C.9  Country-wise Variance Decomposition by type of shock - Domestic
10-years spread
Shock to: Common
shocks
Domestic
shocks
Foreign
shocks
Germany
Horizon: 1 2 90 8
4 2 88 10
12 3 87 11
36 5 85 10
Italy
Horizon: 1 2 83 15
4 5 81 14
12 17 71 12
36 37 54 10
Spain
Horizon: 1 5 36 59
4 6 37 57
12 7 38 55
36 9 37 53
Belgium
Horizon: 1 1 89 10
4 1 89 10
12 1 89 10
36 1 89 10
Ireland
Horizon: 1 0 72 27
4 1 75 24
12 2 78 20
36 3 78 19
Portugal
Horizon: 1 4 49 46
4 6 50 44
12 11 51 38
36 21 47 33
Note: the table reports the variance decomposition of the 5-years domestic spread based on the median
impulse response for a selection of countries. The first column gives the share of the variance in the
forecast error that is due to common shocks (volatility, real economic activity, stock returns, and OIS
curve). Columns 2 aggregates all domestic shocks and column 3 aggregates all foreign shocks. The sum
of common, domestic and foreign shocks should be equal to 100 minus rounding errors. The horizon is
given in months.
essentially unaffected, although foreign factors in Portugal increase in importance at the
long end of the yield curve.
To summarize, there is some variability in the influence of common and foreign factors
for the larger countries of the eurozone, and much less for smaller countries.
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Figure C.1  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years German spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years German spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the German spread increases by one
percentage point.
C.4 Alternative identification of shocks
In this section, I revisit the identification of shocks by proposing alternative orderings of
the countries and the variables. In the current setting, i.e. 10 countries and 6 variables, the
number of possible permutations reaches 5 billion. To reduce the number of permutations,
I grouped countries and variables as blocks within which there is no permutation. For
the country groups, I created four groups along two dimensions: large vs. small economic
size and core vs. periphery countries. The Big-Core group includes Germany and France,
the Big-Periphery group includes Italy and Spain, the Small-Core group includes the
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland, the Small-Periphery group includes Ireland
and Portugal. While it may be sensible to permute those groups, the ordering within the
group seems of secondary importance. For the permutation of the variables, I created
three groups: the macro block (inflation, output gap, deficit) as one group, the CLIFS as
a second group and finally the principal components of the spreads as the financial group.
I therefore have 144 possible combinations.
In order to summarize the information from 144 bootstrapped models, I decided to
use the quicksort algorithm used in Computer Sciences. This algorithm approximates the
median value in two steps: the first step creates a series of medians based on subgroups
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while the second step takes the median of those medians. Due to computer limitations,
the number of bootstrapped replications has been downsized from 500 to 100. Confidence
intervals are computed as the empirical 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of first-
step medians. Results are presented in Figures C.1 to C.4. First, German spread shocks
now generate spillover effects to neighboring countries. However, the extent of those is
limited when we consider big or core countries. Nevertheless, an increase in the German
spread depresses Irish, Portuguese and, to a lesser extent, Spanish spreads. Second,
Italian spread shocks remain important drivers of other countries spreads, typically in the
periphery. The spillover effect is large: 80 basis points increase in Spain, 25 basis points
for Ireland. Third, Belgian spread shocks gain in statistical significance but still do not
seem strongly economically relevant. Lastly, Portuguese shocks now generate a negative
response of Irish spreads, although a 3 basis points decrease should not be seen as strongly
economically relevant.
Figure C.2  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years Italian spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years Italian spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the Italian spread increases by one
percentage point.
C.5 Spatial dependence of the shocks
In this section, I present a special case of the model where shocks are not spatially-
dependent. Technically, the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix
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Figure C.3  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years Belgian spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years Belgian spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the Belgian spread increases by one
percentage point.
of the residuals is performed country-by-country. The variance-covariance matrix is re-
stricted to be block-diagonal. The spatial transmission on impact therefore solely comes
from the spatial lags Γ. Subsequent periods rely on the temporal and spatial diffusion
Φ, Γ and Ξ. I report the results in Figures C.5 to C.8. We can conclude that, in this
setting, only big countries generate spillovers and that those spillovers are fairly small.
Considering spatial dependence of the shocks therefore seems important.
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY ON SOVEREIGN YIELDS 150
Figure C.4  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years Portuguese spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years Portuguese spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the Portuguese spread increases by one
percentage point.
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Figure C.5  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years German spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years German spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the German spread increases by one
percentage point.
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Figure C.6  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years Italian spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years Italian spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the Italian spread increases by one
percentage point.
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Figure C.7  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years Belgian spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years Belgian spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the Belgian spread increases by one
percentage point.
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Figure C.8  Response of euro area countries 5-years spreads following a 1
percentage point increase in the 5-years Portuguese spread
Note: the figure presents the responses of the 5-years spread to a shock to the 5-years Portuguese spread.
The IRFs are Orthogonalized IRFs. The continuous line is the median response based on 500 stationary
bootstraps while the dashed lines correspond to the 90% confidence interval based on the empirical
distribution of the IRFs. The size of the shock is scaled such that the Portuguese spread increases by one
percentage point.

